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"Toda a teoria deve ser feita para poder ser posta em prática e toda a prática
deve obedecer a uma teoria. Só os espíritos superficiais desligam a teoria da prática,
não olhando a que a teoria não é senão uma teoria da prática, e a prática não é
senão a prática de uma teoria. Na vida superior a teoria e a prática completam-se.
Foram feitas uma para a outra."
Fernando Pessoa
"Não se vai de uma teoria para uma prática, começa-se sempre por uma
prática e depois organiza-se uma teoria. Uma teoria que mais ou menos explica
essa prática. Também ninguém começou por elaborar uma teologia para justificar um
Deus, começou-se por afirmar a existência de Deus e depois elaborou-se a teologia
que vai explicá-lo."
José Saramago
"In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not."
Albert Einstein
v

Abstract
Water is a natural resource whose scarcity is very likely to rise in the future
(Griffin, 2006), in spite of recent breakthroughs regarding the promotion of economic
instruments (European Commission, 2007) and governance principles (OECD, 2015),
as well as the declaration of water and sanitation as human rights since 2010
(Albuquerque and Roaf, 2012). Behavioural economics has been on the agenda of
European Union policies (Van Bavel et al., 2013), however there is no bridge linking
these two fields. This thesis focuses on this unexplored relationship, suggesting
behavioural water resource economics.
Firstly, after the general introduction on chapter 1, a literature review is
conducted on chapter 2 where four seminal ideas of behavioural economic applications
to water management are identified: reference block pricing, asymmetric elasticities,
reference transaction, and social comparison using reference consumption.
Chapter 3 contributes to a profile of Portuguese residential water consumers,
especially focused on consumer perceptions. Consumers appear to exhibit some
misperceptions and low awareness of average price and monthly water consumption,
although they exhibit high awareness of their bill.
Chapter 4 continues to explore the effects of consumer perceptions, in this
case, on the decision to adopt outdoor and indoor water-saving behaviours, as well
as new extensions to modern billing standards, such as direct debit payment and
electronic billing. The findings of chapter 3 lead to the study of factors influencing the
consumer’s probability to have reference points (for the average water price, monthly
water consumption and bill). Overall, the behavioural findings suggest that price
(un)fairness plays a role on water choices. Moreover, results show a perceived price
fairness (PPF) effect that affects the reference point about water price, a novelty in
the literature. Additionally, the factors driving the decision to prefer to drink tap
water are analysed. Consumer perception about price fairness seem to influence this
choice.
These last evidences lead to the development of a conceptual framework to
systematically measure PPF, as a global index, on chapter 5. This study proposes a
conceptual model and variables to measure the determinants of PPF: price clarity,
distributive fairness, consistent behaviour, price reliability, price honesty, respect and
regard for the partner and fair dealing.
Chapter 6 presents a new discrete/continuous model for consumer choice with
reference-dependent preferences. The main theoretical results are based on three
scenarios of reference points. In the case where the first block is a reference point,
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consumers in the second block will suffer a loss effect which will decrease their
consumption. When the second block is the reference, the first-block consumers will
increase their consumptions influenced by a gain effect. In the last case, when the
reference is the average price, "bunching" will occur around the point where block
shifts happen.
Finally, chapter 7 discusses the main contributions. Overall, these contributions
may be helpful to reshape water management and consequently water policies,
through the use of behavioural findings. This work advocates a holistic approach
of neoclassical and behavioural theories and further avenues to promote sustainable
water consumption are proposed.
JEL Classification: D03, D12, D63, Q25.
Keywords: water management, consumer behaviour, tap water, water-saving be-
haviours, direct debit, electronic billing, perceived consumption, water bill perception,
price perception, perceived price fairness, prospect theory, behaviour economics.
Resumo
A água é um recurso natural que se encontra sobre risco de escassez no futuro
(Griffin, 2006), apesar dos avanços recentes quer na promoção do uso de instrumentos
económicos (European Commission, 2007) e de princípios de governance (OECD,
2015), bem como na declaração da água e do saneamento como direitos humanos
desde 2010 (Albuquerque and Roaf, 2012). A economia comportamental tem sido
tema central na agenda política da União Europeia (Van Bavel et al., 2013), contudo
não existe nenhuma ponte que unifique estas áreas. Esta tese centra-se nesta relação
inexplorada sugerindo a economia comportamental aplicada aos recursos hídricos.
Em primeiro lugar, após a introdução geral do capítulo 1, é realizada uma
revisão da literatura no capítulo 2 e são identificadas quatro ideias seminais de apli-
cações económicas comportamentais na gestão dos recursos hídricos: bloco tarifário
de referência, elasticidades assimétricas, transação de referência, e comparação social
usando um consumo de referência.
O capítulo 3 contribui para definir um perfil dos consumidores domésticos
portugueses de água, especialmente sobre as suas perceções. No geral, conclui-se que
os consumidores apresentam algumas perceções que divergem da realidade, tendo
reduzido nível de conhecimento sobre o preço médio e o consumo mensal de água
percebidos. No entanto, apresentam um elevado nível de conhecimento da sua conta
de água mensal (CAM).
O capítulo 4 continua a explorar os efeitos da perceção do consumidor, neste
caso, na adoção de comportamentos de poupança de água em usos exteriores e
interiores, bem como novas extensões aos hábitos modernos de pagamento, tais como
a utilização de débito direto e de fatura eletrónica. Adicionalmente, os fatores que
determinam a decisão de beber preferencialmente água da torneira são analisados,
sendo que a perceção sobre o preço ser justo parece influenciar moderadamente a
escolha de beber água da torneira. As evidências do capítulo 3 fomentaram a análise
dos fatores que influenciam a probabilidade do consumidor ter ou não pontos de
referência (i.e., preço médio de água, consumo de água mensal e CAM percebidos).
As evidências comportamentais sugerem que a (in)justiça de preço percebida afeta
os comportamentos analisados, bem como a existência de um efeito de justiça de
preço percecionada (JPP) que afeta o ponto de referência relativo ao preço da água
e constitui uma novidade na literatura.
Estas últimas evidências incentivaram o desenvolvimento de um quadro concep-
tual para medir sistematicamente a JPP, sob a forma de um índice global, de acordo
com o capítulo 5. Este estudo propõe um modelo conceptual de JPP e variáveis para
ix
xmedir os seus determinantes, nomeadamente: clareza do preço, justiça distributiva,
comportamento consistente, credibilidade do preço, honestidade do preço, respeito e
consideração pela contraparte e tratamento justo.
O capítulo 6 apresenta um novo modelo de escolha discreta/contínua com
preferências baseadas em referências. Os principais resultados teóricos são baseados
em três cenários de pontos de referência. No caso do primeiro bloco como ponto de
referência, os consumidores no segundo bloco sofrem um efeito de perda que os fará
diminuir os seus consumos. Quando o segundo bloco é a referência, os consumidores
do primeiro bloco irão aumentar o seu consumo devido a um efeito de ganho. No
último caso, quando a referência é o preço médio baseada nos dois blocos anteriores
irá ocorrer uma situação de "concentração" em torno do ponto onde as mudanças de
bloco ocorrem.
Finalmente, o capítulo 7 resume as principais contribuições. Esta tese constitui
um contributo que poderá ser útil para reformular a gestão dos recursos hídricos, e
consequentemente, as políticas públicas de água, através da utilização de evidências
comportamentais. Este trabalho advoga uma abordagem holística das teorias neo-
clássica e comportamental e propõe novas direções de investigação para promover o
consumo sustentável da água.
Classificação JEL: D03, D12, D63, Q25.
Palavras-chave: gestão de recursos hídricos, comportamento do consumidor,
água da torneira, comportamentos de poupança de água, débito direto, fatura
eletrónica, consumo de água percebido, perceção da conta de água mensal, perceção
de preço, justiça de preço percecionada, prospect theory, economia comportamental.
Acknowledgements
I am indebted (although not financially one, but from the heart) to all for this
positive experience, good vibes, all the ups and downs, everything worth it. First,
I would like to thank to my two supervisors Catarina Roseta Palma and Henrique
Monteiro for all the high standards, and challenges made to accomplish this long
journey to cross this Ocean, this PhD Thesis. Professor Henrique for all the patience,
high accuracy and critical spirit on his invaluable comments and insights. Professor
Catarina for all motivation, challenging me everyday, and support in this lifetime
goal, and for being a professor of excellence in the academia, an academic idol. Thank
you both for everything.
To all my PhD colleagues, especially to my friends Ricardo Barradas and Marta
Silva. Farah Mussa, Patrícia Pinto, Patrícia Lourenço, Raquel Soeiro for helpful
insights, discussions and revisions (although you might have found even more errors,
besides the ones you found it, but thank you for all the patience). Margarida dos
Reis Vale, Sandra Batalha, Sara Ruela, Ana Clemente, Catarina Neto Lopes, Sandra
Nóbrega, Tiago Barros, Carlos Ferreira, Cristiano Canelas, André Martins, Daniel
Sanches and João André for all the support and positive inspiration. As well as all
my other friends and my family. Sharing Boa Energia with everyone. ,-
I would like to acknowledge insightful comments and help from professors Ana
Costa, João Leão, Emanuel Gasteiger, José Dias Curto, José Gonçalves Dias for
helpful discussion and ideas, in the preliminary state of this research, among others.
Additional thanks to Alistair Ulph and Dale Southerton as well as all the participants
at "Sustainable Consumption: A Multifaceted Approach" (Sustainable Consumption
Institute, University of Manchester, 8–9 March 2012). A special thanks to Geoff
Beattie for his discussion of the literature review chapter of this thesis and to Partha
Dasgupta for inspiring the work of so many economists. Lastly, to professor Rita
Martins for her ideas and helpful comments.
I am also grateful to the conference participants at ISEE 2012 Conference (Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil), V AERNA Conference (Faro) and 11º Congresso da Água (Porto),
for helpful comments, as well as the useful discussion in the following conferences:
5th International Conference in Economics and Administration ICEA - FAA 2013,
in Workshop on Applied Behavioral Economics and Decision Theory Workshop on
Health Economics (Bucharest, Romania), European Water Resources Association
8th International Conference of Water Resources Management an Interdisciplinary
and Changing Context (Porto), 7th Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal
(Covilhã), Workshop New Directions in the Economic Analysis of Water (Lisboa)
xi
xii
and discussions with participants of Young Water Professional Forum (Lisboa).
I also would like to thank to BRU-IUL (Business Research Unit), ISCTE-IUL
(ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa) and FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e
a Tecnologia) for providing the resources and financial support, respectively, that
enabled the conclusion of this work.
To all the participants of forums from "Stata" (Stata statistical software) and
LATEX(software for word processing) for the help in solving problems and making me
understand the great advantages of these software.
Finally a word about the unfortunately unexplored path of this research, namely
the design of a field experiment in the Portuguese water sector, with collaboration of
some water utilities. First, thanks to Michael Price for his preliminary, but priceless
insights on this issue. Secondly, to all water utilities that showed enthusiasm towards
this project, although some factors turned out to be outside our control. I still believe
one day will be the day. Any omissions and remaining errors, inevitably, present in
this work are the responsibility of the author.
I am very grateful to all.
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AD Aggregate Data
AIC Akaike Information Criterion
AIE Asymmetric Income Elasticity
AIF Average Index Function
APE Asymmetric Price Elasticity
ASF Average Structural Function
BIC Bayesian Information Criterion
EAD Experimental Aggregate Data
EHD Experimental Household Data
ERSAR Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority
FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
GMM Generalized Method of Moments
HD Household Data
HES Households and the Environment Survey
IBR Increasing Block Rate
INE National Statistical Institute of Portugal
IPMA Portuguese Sea and Atmosphere Institute
IV Instrumental Variables
JEL Journal of Economic Literature
JOPA Núcleo de Jovens Profissionais de Águas
LPM Linear Probability Models
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPF Perceived Price Fairness
PTA Portuguese Tax Authorities
RWD Residential Water Demand
SL Significance Level
VAT Value Added Tax
VIF Variance Inflation Factors
WFD Water Framework Directive
WS Water Supply
WU Water Utility
WW Waste Water
xiii
xiv
CONTENTS
1. General Introduction....................................................................... 1
1.1 Behavioural water resources economics - a new subfield of behavioural
economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Behavioural Economics in Water Management................................ 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Literature Review of Behavioural Economics in Water Management. . . 12
2.2.1 Behavioural Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 State of the Art of Behavioural Economics in Water Resource
Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.3 Literature Review Based on a Behavioural Perspective . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Discussion of Behavioural Applications and Their Effects in Water
Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Reference Block Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.2 Asymmetric Elasticities of Residential Water Demand . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.3 Reference Transaction and Tariff Acceptability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.4 Social Comparison (and Water Reference Consumption) . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Conclusion and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3. Do you know how much you pay for water? .................................... 33
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Framework of the residential water sector in Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 Survey on the water consumption of Portuguese households . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.1 Description of survey and dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.2 Highlights from the survey responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5 Conclusion and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
xvi Contents
4. Water consumer behaviours and perceptions................................... 47
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.1 Determinants of water-saving behaviours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.2 Determinants of the decision to drink tap water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3 Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3.1 Analysis of the probability of formation of reference points by
residential water consumers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3.2 Analysis of the probability to adopt outdoor water-saving
behaviours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.3 Analysis of the probability to adopt indoor water-saving be-
haviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.4 Analysis of the probability to adopt modern billing standards . 68
4.3.5 Analysis of the probability of drinking tap water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4 Conclusion and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5. Perceived Price Fairness - Determinants in the residential water
sector in Portugal ........................................................................... 75
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2 Cost recovery in the residential water sector in Portugal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.3 Conceptual model of price fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4 Determinants of PPF for water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4.1 Price clarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.4.2 Distributive fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4.3 Consistent behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.4.4 Price reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.4.5 Price honesty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.4.6 Respect and regard for the partner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.4.7 Fair dealing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5 Conclusion and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6. Nonlinear pricing with reference dependence .................................. 95
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 Modelling different types of reference effects with block rates . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.2.1 Modelling reference-price effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Contents xvii
6.2.2 Modelling reference-expense effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.3 Conclusion and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7. Main Contributions......................................................................... 113
Appendix 137
A. Appendix - Do you know how much you pay for water?.................. 139
A.1 Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
B. Appendix - Water consumer behaviours and perceptions ................ 145
B.1 Modelling Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.1.1 Probit model with sample selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.1.2 Special regressor model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.2 Brief literature review of the determinants of water-saving behaviours
in outdoor and indoor uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
B.3 Brief literature review of the determinants of the preference for drinking
tap water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.4 List of variables with definitions, units and sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
B.5 Estimation of income fitted variable incfitted for the special regressor
method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B.6 Special regressor method estimated average index and coefficients . . . . . 159
B.7 Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of reference points on
special regressor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.8 Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
C. Appendix - Nonlinear pricing with reference dependence................ 193
C.1 Sign of the difference term with decreasing and increasing block rates 195
C.2 Generalized Slutsky Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
D. Appendix - Portuguese household water consumption survey (Por-
tuguese version) .............................................................................. 199
E. Appendix - Portuguese household water consumption survey (En-
glish version)................................................................................... 211
xviii Contents
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Synopsis of the studies developed in the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Brief overview of residential water demand studies since 2000 to 2011 19
2.2 Brief overview of residential water demand studies since 2000 to 2011
(continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Potential behavioural applications to water management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Total dwellings and response rates by water utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Summary statistics by water utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1 Brief review of type of variables used in studies of water-saving be-
haviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Brief review of the type of variables used in studies about the decision
between drinking tap water or alternative sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3 Average marginal effects of the probability to have consumer perception
awareness based on reference points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Average marginal effects of the probability to adopt outdoor water-
saving behaviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.5 Average marginal effects of the probability to adopt indoor water-
saving behaviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.6 Average marginal effects of the probability to adopt indoor water-
saving behaviours (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.7 Average marginal effects of the probability to adopt modern billing
standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.8 Average marginal effects on the probability to drink tap water - Com-
parison without and with sampling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1 Price clarity - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources 86
5.2 Distributive fairness - Relevant factors of measurement and available
sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
xx List of Tables
5.3 Consistent behaviour -Relevant factors of measurement and available
sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.4 Price reliability - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources 90
5.5 Price honesty - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources 91
5.6 Respect and regard for the partner - Relevant factors of measurement
and available sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.7 Fair dealing - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources . 93
6.1 Main theoretical results with three different reference-price possibilities 109
7.1 Subareas of behavioural pricing explored in this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.2 Synopsis of the main results of the studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A.1 Dwelling ownership and main residence by type of dwelling . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.2 Monthly net household income and household size by type of dwelling 141
A.3 Respondents’ characteristics by type of dwelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A.4 Consumer habits and decisions by type of dwelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
B.1 Brief literature review of the type of variables used in studies about
the water-saving behaviours in outdoor and indoor uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
B.2 Brief review of the type of variables used in studies about the decision
between drinking tap water or alternative sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.3 List of variables of interest with definitions, units and sources . . . . . . . . 153
B.4 List of variables of interest with definitions, units and sources (contin-
ued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B.5 List of variables of interest with definitions, units and sources (contin-
ued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
B.6 List of variables of interest with definitions, units and sources (contin-
ued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
B.7 OLS estimated coefficients of income (with sampling weights) to obtain
the linear prediction of fitted income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B.8 OLS estimated coefficients of income with sampling weights to obtain
the linear prediction of income fitted (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
B.9 Summary statistics of the variable income fitted (incfitted) used as
special regressor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
B.10 Average index, marginal effects at means on the probability to have
consumer perception awareness based on reference points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
List of Tables xxi
B.11 Special regressor estimated coefficients on the probability to have
consumer perception awareness based on reference points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
B.12 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
B.13 Summary statistics (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
B.14 Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to have
consumer perception awareness based on reference points, with sam-
pling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
B.15 Final probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt
outdoor water-saving behaviours with sampling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B.16 Heckman probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to
watering the garden in the coolest parts of the day with sampling
weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
B.17 Heckman probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to
watering the garden in the coolest parts of the day with sampling
weights (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
B.18 Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt outdoor water-
saving behaviours, including other variables in the literature . . . . . . . . . . 169
B.19 Probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt out-
door water-saving behaviours, including other variables in the literature 170
B.20 Probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt out-
door water-saving behaviours, including other variables in the literature
(continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
B.21 Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt outdoor water-
saving behaviours without sampling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
B.22 Probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt out-
door water-saving behaviours without sampling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
B.23 Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt
indoor water-saving behaviours with sampling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
B.24 Final Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt
indoor water-saving behaviours with sampling weights (continued) . . . 175
B.25 Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt indoor water-
saving behaviours, encompassing all variables with sampling weights
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
B.26 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours, encompassing all variables with sampling
weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
xxii List of Tables
B.27 Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt
indoor water-saving behaviours, encompassing all variables with sam-
pling weights (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
B.28 Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt indoor water-
saving behaviours, encompassing all variables without sampling weights 179
B.29 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours, encompassing all variables without sampling
weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
B.30 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours, encompassing all variables without sampling
weights (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
B.31 Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt
modern billing standards with sampling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
B.32 Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt modern billing
standards, encompassing all variables without sampling weights . . . . . . 183
B.33 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern
billing standards, encompassing all variables without sampling weights 184
B.34 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern
billing standards, encompassing all variables without sampling weights
(continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
B.35 Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt modern billing
standards, encompassing all variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
B.36 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern
billing standards, encompassing all variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.37 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern
billing standards, encompassing all variables (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
B.38 Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to drink
tap water, comparison without and with sampling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
B.39 Average marginal effects on the probability to drink tap water, includ-
ing other relevant variables in the literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
B.40 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to drink tap
water, including other relevant variables in the literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
B.41 Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to drink tap
water, including other relevant variables in the literature (continued) 191
C.1 Summary of the unit gain and unit loss for two-block IBR .. . . . . . . . . . . . 196
List of Tables xxiii
E.1 Description of the questions in the survey and coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
E.2 Description of the questions in the survey and coding (continued) . . . . 214
E.3 Description of the questions in the survey and coding (continued) . . . . 215
E.4 Description of the questions in the survey and coding (continued) . . . . 216
xxiv List of Tables
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Type of data used in residential water demand studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1 Locations of the municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1 The ECSI model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.2 Conceptual model of price fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.3 Components of PPF in WS and WW services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.1 Budget set with two blocks for x1, with increasing block rates . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2 Decrease in consumption due to the loss effect (with p1r = p11) . . . . . . . . 104
6.3 Increase in consumption due to the gain effect (with p1r = p12) . . . . . . . . 104
6.4 Increase (decrease) in consumption in the first (second) block (with
average price as the reference) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.5 Increase (decrease) in consumption with expense lower (higher) than
reference expense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
B.1 Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of referenceprice on special
regressor incfittedd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.2 Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of referencebill on special
regressor mincfittedd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.3 Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of referencecons on special
regressor incfittedd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
xxvi List of Figures
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Behavioural water resources economics - a new subfield of be-
havioural economics
Since the first decade of the twentieth-first century, at least, behavioural economics
has been in the European Commission agenda, with the promotion of conferences1 and
studies. The European Commission has been especially focused on enhancing public
policy design (Van Bavel et al., 2013) and the libertarian-paternalism approach of
nudges (Umpfenbach, 2014) to positively influence consumers towards better decisions.
Overall, the European Commission recognizes and recommends the development of
behavioural applications, highlighting potential benefits for consumers. Despite these
great efforts at the policy level, in academia the situation is different.
At the European level, the European Commission revealed consistent efforts
to incorporate behavioural economics in policy making. The aim seems to be to
better serve citizens, with particular focus on consumer decision-making. Behavioural
economics has attracted policy-makers’ attention due to its focus on how people
make decisions in reality, using an interdisciplinary approach with insights from
social sciences, like psychology and economics. Ciriolo (2011) attributes the seminal
behavioural study by the European Commission to the report about consumer choices
in the retail investment services (Chater et al., 2010), which used experimental and
behavioural economics. One of the major findings of this study was that consumers
seem to have difficulties to make optimal investment decisions.
In September of 2015, an executive order from president Barack Obama (2015)2
stated the importance of the field of behavioural economics and behavioural science
insights (i.e. empirical research findings from that field) for a better design of
public policies. This policy directive is a breakthrough towards the development of
1. So far three conferences were organized by the European Commission (European Commission,
2015) The first, in 2008, approached how behavioural science insights can improve public policies with
impact on consumers. The 2010’s conference tackled why these insights are relevant to policy-makers.
The last conference in 2013 was about application of behavioural economics to policy design. The
information on European Commission’s website was accessed on 9th October 2015.
2. Executive Order - Using Behavioural Science Insights to Better Serve the American
People (www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/executive-order-using-behavioral-science-
insights-better-serve-american), information was accessed on 9th October 2015.
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behavioural science insights applied to policy, where higher relevance is given to how
information is presented and frames the consumers and other economic agents.
Surprisingly, Barberis (2013, p.173) states that it is "curious, then, that so many
years after the publication of the 1979 paper, there are relatively few well-known and
broad applications of prospect theory in economics. One might be tempted to conclude
that, even if prospect theory is an excellent description of behavio[u]r in experimental
settings, it is less relevant outside the laboratory. In my view, this lesson would be
incorrect." One of the reasons for this fact is that prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) that explains how people derive utility from "gains" and losses is not
a "ready-made" framework. It appears that the formation of reference points and
the accurate context-specific determination of what are gains and losses have been a
topic with weak guidance in the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), as stated
by Barberis (2013). Another reason pointed out is that although clarification about
gains and losses has been attempted with success by (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006), so far
is unclear how to conciliate references and consumption levels and why the gain-loss
framework matters, as we will discuss further on chapter 6. These challenges seem
to explain the poor success of economic applications using prospect theory, although
it contains important insights that can be incorporated into mainstream economics.
Prospect theory states that people’s willingness to take risks depends on the
way a choice is framed as a gain or a loss, thus the choices are context-dependent.
The Prospect theory’s seminal paper (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) shows that
people make decisions that are not optimal and it’s one of Econometrica’s most
cited papers and a major reference to behavioural economists as an empirical and
theoretical framework.
Economists (especially behavioural economists) struggled with two major issues:
i) prospect theory is not a "ready-made" theory for applications in economics and ii)
behavioural sciences insights needed to be incorporated into mainstream economics.
This was the starting point of this thesis. Due to the broad potential applications of
prospect theory we narrow our main goals to the study of potential applications of
reference points and what factors affect the formation of these points in the residential
water sector. This reference point framework is based on the idea that economic
agents have reference terms used in their decision-making processes. In the work
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), reference points are used in prospect theory to
divide the space of outcomes of the value function into gains and losses. In practice,
these (neutral) points act as consumer anchors to make decisions, or they may be
associated with an expected level the consumer wishes to achieve. Nevertheless,
as we will discuss later on, reference terms can have other applications, from price
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perceived price fairness that evolved from the standards of justice on price based on
the reference-transaction framework (Kahneman et al., 1986b) to social comparison
(Festinger, 1954).
The importance of reference points has been implicitly accounted for in early
stages of development of behavioural science insights in the European Union policy
design. For instance in consumer protection legislation, as early as 1997 there is a
consumer right to cancel a contract during the cooling-off period, another example
is the protection against framing effects on health and nutritional claims (e.g. low
fat product) in 2006 (Ciriolo, 2011). The latter protects the consumers "(...) since
in the past consumers were often misled by changes in the reference point (a cheese
containing 20% was often labelled as 80% fat-free)" as stated by Ciriolo (2011, p.2).
One of the underrated paths is the development of behavioural economics in
water management, which is the main research topic of this thesis. We approach
this issue acknowledging that behavioural insights can be useful to mainstream
economics, but as an non-rival approach, in some cases. Instead of a dichotomy,
we argue that reasonable research should account for the advantages of both fields.
The researchers of conventional economics, but also from behavioural economics,
are subject to the natural tendency to look and overvalue confirming evidence, also
known as confirmation bias (Thaler, 1987), which could jeopardize the findings of
these studies. In this thesis, we argue for a hybrid approach, since both behavioural
and neoclassical economics can bring insights that would benefit water resource
economics, and especially the residential water sector.
Overall, the Portuguese residential water sector can be characterized by ac-
ceptable affordability conditions of the water utility services (Martins et al., 2013),
whose charges representing 0.84% of the average household disposable income in 2013
(ERSAR, 2014c). This is a value within the range of affordability levels in the OECD
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries (OECD, 2010).
The average bill for mainland Portugal was 21.9 € per 10 cubic meters in 2013. The
average water prices for a thousand litres (or one cubic meter) of water supply (WS)
and wastewater (WW) collected were 1.2 € and 0.7 €, respectively (ERSAR, 2014c).
The cost recovery ratios in mainland Portugal in WS and WW changed, respectively,
from 0.87 and 0.57 (INAG, 2005) to 0.87 and 0.67 between 2005 and 2013 (ERSAR,
2014c).
News that exhibit information about consumers often focus on typical "bad
news", such as price increases for water utility services (Jornal de Notícias, 2015;
Castanho, 2014; Tomás, 2014; Henriques and Filipe, 2011). The media has also
reported social protests against water price rises (Henriques and Filipe, 2011; Mirante,
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2011). Moreover, in the past Portuguese residential water consumers exhibited a low
willingness to pay more to ensure a higher quality of water utility services, according
to a national survey performed in 2007 based on around 1,000 face-to-face interviews
(Pires, 2007). The results show that 70% of the sample was unwilling to pay more.
The major reasons presented to explain this were that consumers already considered
their charges to be too high, had concerns about paying more for nothing to change,
and assumed that the WS and WW services were already too expensive. Notice that
this survey was performed before the economic-financial crisis, so additional concerns
could be raised today about about consumer acceptability of pricing strategies, such
as water tariff increases.
Given the previous facts about residential water consumption, it is reasonable
to look at non-pricing strategies or hybrid approaches. The recommendations of
ERSAR (ERSAR, 2012a), the Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority, and
recent legislation for the Portuguese water sector (Assembleia da República, 2014)
reflect concerns about the need for more transparency and better data quality to
enhance consumer perceptions. The Decree Law 114/2014 (Assembleia da República,
2014) provides the necessary procedures to implement a better billing system with
clearer and more detailed information on average costs and revenue transfers from
amounts paid by water consumers. This may potentially contribute to enhance
consumer perceptions, but still there is a long path ahead.
Nowadays, water stress in river basins is an issue for 40% of the population
in the world (OECD, 2015), urging the development of water governance principles
to cope with challenges in the sector. Water pricing is linked with two foremost
challenges: i) the increasing competition for water use and ii) ensuring sustainable
access to WS and WW services (OECD, 2010). Economic market analysis (e.g.
pricing, demand estimation, costs) has been on the main agenda of environmental
economists studying water consumption. Promotion of economic instruments became
a European Commission priority, but there is a lack of an integrated approach with
behavioural science insights. The literature review on residential water demand in
chapter 2 shows that there is scant evidence of the incorporation of psychological
findings. In this vein, we identify behavioural economic applications that can
have policy implications for water management and can be further extended to
energy, gas or waste management. The empirical findings of this thesis are mainly
obtained through the collection of data by a household-level survey using a telephone
questionnaire during the summer of 2012.
The main research questions, motivations and behavioural theoretical frame-
works used in each chapter are summarized in table 1.1.
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Tab. 1.1: Synopsis of the studies developed in the thesis
Chapters Study name Main research questions Main motivations Research frameworks
Chapter 2 Behavioural Economics in Wa-
ter Management - An Overview
of Behavioural Economics Ap-
plications to Residential Water
Demand
- What is the state-of-art of behavioural
economics in the field of water resource eco-
nomics?
- Which behavioural applications can be sug-
gested based on the literature?
- European Commission stresses the rele-
vance of economic instruments in the water
sector
- The 3Ts (taxes, transfers and tariffs) ap-
proach was questioned with the financial
crisis
- Unsustainability in water sector
- Prospect theory
- Asymmetric price elasticity
- Reference transaction
- Social comparison (and refer-
ence consumption)
Chapter 3 Do you know how much you
pay for water?
- What is the profile of residential water
consumers in terms of perceptions?
- Studies show low awareness of water price
and consumption
- Scant evidence of the overestimation or un-
derestimation of key elements of the water
bill, such price, number of blocks or con-
sumption
- Water consumer habits and res-
idential water demand literature
- Behavioural pricing literature
Chapter 4 Water consumer behaviours
and perceptions
- What factors influence the water con-
sumer’s probability to have reference points
(i.e. average water price, monthly water
consumption and bill)?
- Is perceived price fairness a factor affecting
the formation of reference points?
- Do perception factors affect the household’s
probability to adopt outdoor and indoor
water conservation choices, modern billing
standards and the choice to drink tap water?
- The determinants about the formation of
reference points were never studied
- Water-saving literature often neglects wa-
ter bill information, consumer perceptions
and fairness concerns
- Direct debit payment of the water bill and
the electronic billing, as well as perceived
price fairness are underresearched subjects
- Consumer perceptions and ref-
erence points literature
- Behavioural pricing literature
- Indoor and outdoor water con-
servation literature
- Averting behaviour to drink tap
water and water quality litera-
tures
Chapter 5 Perceived Price Fairness (PPF)
- Determinants in residential
water sector in Portugal
- What are the potential determinants of
PPF, for Portuguese households?
Absence of a clear conceptual framework for
price fairness applied to water sector that
incorporates price awareness
- Reference transaction literature
- Price fairness and behavioural
pricing studies
Chapter 6 Nonlinear pricing with refer-
ence dependence
- Can block price structures create specific
reference effects?
- Consumers often have to deal with nonlin-
ear prices from water and energy services to
cellphone and internet bills
- Nonlinear pricing has mostly been anal-
ysed in the traditional utility-maximization
framework
- Residential water demand liter-
ature
- Prospect theory and reference-
dependence models
Source: author’s analysis.
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Chapter 2 provides an overview of behavioural economics applications to the
residential water sector, suggesting a new subfield of research, Behavioural Economics
in Water Management. We try to address two issues: to describe the state-of-art
of behavioural economics and applications of social sciences in the field of water
resource economics and identify potential behavioural economic applications3.
One main motivation for this study was that within a context of unsustainability
for water resources management the European Commission promoted the development
of economic instruments in the water sector (European Commission, 2007), as a first
stage in the implementation process of the Water Framework Directive (European
Parliament and Council, 2000). The promotion of economic instruments is an
essential part of efficient water management everywhere. Afterwards, the mainstream
approach to the water sector was questioned with the economic-financial crisis since
2008, which could potentially lead to a paradigm shift.
We discuss the potential of economic instruments in a new light, looking
into four behavioural economic applications that can have implications for water
management. Namely, we suggest: reference block pricing, asymmetric elasticities of
residential water demand, reference transaction implications for cost recovery and
tariff acceptability and fairness, and social comparison based on reference water
consumption. Some potential questions that emerge from this review for our study
addressing these behavioural applications are: Can block price structures create
specific reference effects? Are consumer reactions to price increases quantitatively
different from those to decreases? Do consumer perceptions of price fairness hinder
cost recovery efforts? How do social norms on consumption affect water use?
In order to improve the understanding of consumer perceptions a household
survey was performed in the summer of 20124. In chapter 3, we review a group of
studies which highlight the low awareness about water price (Frondel and Messner,
2008; Carter and Milon, 2005) and water consumption (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011;
Tralhão, 2011) in the residential water sector. We identify the profile of residential
water consumers in terms of perceptions, especially whether they know how much
they pay for water and what are their average price and monthly water consumption.
Chapter 4 is an empirical study that approaches the formation of reference
points, water consumer behaviours and perceptions, given particular relevance to
concerns about perceived price fairness. The perceived price fairness appears to
be understudied in this context, especially regarding the formation of reference
points. The reference points considered were the perceived values of residential water
3. The work developed for the thesis was published in 2014 (Correia and Roseta-Palma, 2014)
4. Survey developed under the project PTDC/EGE-ECO/114477/2009, with financial support
from FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Science and Technology Foundation). Additional
information can be provided upon request.
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consumers about their average water price, monthly water consumption and bill.
In this context the accounting for endogeneity could be important, especially with
discrete variables, for which special regressor methods (Dong and Lewbel, 2015;
Lewbel, 2014, 2000) emerge as a potential general approach. Another rational
motivating this chapter was the scant incorporation of information about the water
bill and consumer perceptions in the literature on water-saving behaviours and
the preference to drink tap water. Additionally, the relevance of modern billing
standards such as the use of direct debit to pay the water bill and electronic billing
are undervalued. The main research questions posed are focused on understanding
how perception and fairness factors affect the probability of forming reference points,
of adopting outdoor and indoor water conservation choices, modern billing standards,
and the decision of drinking tap water.
Chapter 5 proposes a conceptual model of perceived price fairness (PPF)
and identifies some factors that may explain PPF in the residential water sector
in Portugal. In this sense, the main research goal of this chapter is to achieve a
set of measures needed to identify each one of the determinants. At the European
level, recent studies of consumer perceptions indicate that the majority of Europeans
agree with the user-pays and polluter-pays principles (European Commission, 2012),
and highlights that hunger, poverty and shortage of drinking water are the most
serious issues worldwide (European Commission, 2014). Additionally, there is some
reluctance to accept the increase of water price, which is perceived as unfair, although
oddly there are relatively good affordability conditions with respect to water tariffs.
Thus PPF may be a relevant factor in the analysis of water consumption decisions,
despite the absence of this issue from water demand literature, as far as we know.
This chapter could have different implications from reference transaction literature
(Kahneman et al., 1986b) to price fairness (Diller, 2008) and behavioural pricing
studies (Krishna, 2009).
Chapter 6 was based on the previous empirical evidence of chapters 3 and 4
about residential water consumers and aims to develop a theoretical framework to
study nonlinear pricing with loss aversion, in the case of increasing block rates (IBR),
i.e. when price increases as the consumption level increases beyond specific levels of
consumption.
Nonlinear pricing has been the subject of growing interest in several industries
(Lambrecht et al., 2007). The use of nonlinear pricing schedules is common from
communication and subscription services to many utilities, including water, electricity
and gas, as a way to recover costs while taking into consideration consumer demand
profiles. In this literature, the consumer is typically modelled as an individual
who maximizes utility with a nonlinear budget constraint. However, in reality the
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consumers may be influenced by a reference point. Based on the traditional approach
that consumers are price-takers and empirical evidence that consumers have high
awareness of their total expenses we analyse two potential references: reference
price and reference expense. We take the discrete/continuous model of consumer
choice that has been widely used for demand analysis (Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995)
under block rates and modify it to include reference-price effects. Moreover, we
develop a model to include reference-expense effects. In particular, we show how
loss aversion with IBR changes consumption decisions when the consumer treats a
higher-than-reference price (or expense) as a loss. Finally, we discuss implications
for utility pricing policies and services with nonlinear pricing, as well as potential
implications of reference-expense behaviour.
Overall, the development of behavioural economics appears to have been made
with baby steps within the economic sciences, in general, and within environmental
economics in particular. Only since the beginning of the twenty-first century has
this field emerged in research areas, such as forest management (Knetsch, 2005),
climate change (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008) and energy economics (Pollitt
and Shaorshadze, 2011). Knetsch (2005) argues that economic analyses of natural
resources can be significantly enhanced through behavioural science insights. The
lack of behavioural economic applications in water management was one of the main
drivers that lead to the development of this thesis, a modest contribution to the new
subfield of behavioural water resource economics.
2. BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS IN WATER MANAGEMENT
2.1 Introduction
Water consumption is an essential component of human activities, yet it has only
recently been acknowledged as an economic good that can be provided through
markets, albeit imperfect or incomplete ones. Traditionally, water management
was mostly held to mean supply management, such as the provision of reservoirs,
distribution networks and other infrastructure, whereas demand management is now
understood to be crucial. Moreover, the quantity and quality of water decisively
affect all ecosystems on Earth, which means that the costs and benefits of water use
are rarely captured fully in market mechanisms. Economists have therefore focused
both on market analysis (pricing, demand estimation, costs) and on the study of
external effects such as the negative impacts of human-induced scarcity and the losses
brought about by water pollution. In the European Union, the Water Framework
Directive (European Parliament and Council, 2000) Article 9 requires that water
prices provide an appropriate incentive for the efficient use of the resource as well
as recover costs, including environmental and scarcity costs. Nonetheless, recent
evaluations (European Commission, 2007) show that economic instruments still
play a very limited role in water management, while significant problems persist in
ecological water status. The European Commission has thus identified the promotion
of economic instruments as a priority action.
On the other hand, economists have also come to accept that traditional
utility-maximization models often do not appropriately describe actual decisions
of economic agents. Through the influence of many significant experiments and
insights provided by psychologists, an interesting cross-fertilization process took place
between the two fields, giving rise to what is now known as behavioural economics.
To ascertain the potential of economic instruments in a new light, in this chapter
we use the behavioural economics framework to identify possible implications for
water management, using references from psychology and marketing that we believe
have been overlooked. We suggest four behavioural economic applications (hereafter
behavioural applications), namely: reference block pricing; asymmetric elasticities;
reference transaction; and social comparison through reference consumption.
There are some surveys with extremely well-organized information which
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discuss water demand models, both generally, at a global level (Worthington and
Hoffman, 2008) and at a European level (Schleich and Hillenbrand, 2009), and focus
on price specifications and price elasticities (Arbués et al., 2003). Nevertheless, they
all implicitly exhibit a common feature: the absence of behavioural economics in the
residential water demand literature. In this work we corroborate this finding through
a brief review of similar studies over the last decade, which differs from the previous
surveys in that our analysis focuses on the behavioural perspective. We refer to
the existing (slender) literature about behavioural economics in water management
and sketch our proposals for the four behavioural applications mentioned already.
Furthermore, we stress the importance of experimental data versus nonexperimental
data, besides the usual division between aggregate data and household data.
First we discuss reference block pricing, which relates primarily to the issue
of choosing the most appropriate price structure. There is a significant amount
of literature on block-tariff structures in regulated water utilities, yet none of it
explains the popularity of increasing block tariffs, since the nature of the water supply
infrastructure recommends constant or decreasing tariff structures (Elnaboulsi, 2009,
2001). In Portugal, for example, most utilities charge prices with a fixed and a
variable component, and the latter is usually an increasing block rate (IBR) of three
or more blocks, especially for residential use, where the IBR structure is seen by
water managers as a way to signal scarcity and promote resource conservation.
Recent work on residential water demand (Monteiro and Roseta-Palma, 2011)
has shown that if water demand and costs respond to weather conditions, increasing
marginal prices could indeed be explained by water scarcity and customer heterogene-
ity in a setting where utilities maintain a balanced budget. However, the implications
for tariff design of asymmetric value functions with loss aversion (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) have never been considered, and we believe such a framework can
shed new light on the issue. In particular, if water consumers react to a reference
price, which may be that of the initial block or their actual block, the following block
price can be interpreted as a loss or a discount, depending on whether the block
tariff structure is increasing or decreasing, respectively.
A closely related topic is that of behavioural responses to price changes. We will
investigate the implications of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) on the
optimal pricing policy and on the frequency of price updates, given that consumers
seem to value losses more highly than gains, which should generate asymmetric
price elasticities (i.e. higher price elasticities with price increases than with price
reductions). This asymmetry was first corroborated by the pioneering study of Putler
(1992). More recently this topic has been studied in the energy literature Adeyemi
and Hunt (2007), but it is yet untested for water demand. The third topic deals with
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the implications of the reference-transaction framework (Kahneman et al., 1986b)
for water management. The concept of reference transaction is based on the dual
entitlement principle, under which firms are entitled to a (positive) reference profit
and individuals are entitled to reference terms (i.e. price, salary, rent). This concept
was recently applied in a comparison of allocation rules for scarce resources (Raux
et al., 2009) as well as in the marketing literature, which has analysed the issue of
perceived price fairness (for recent reviews see Diller (2008) and Krishna (2009). In
the case of water, since a reference transaction could imply fairness constraints, the
utilities could be inhibited from proposing reference terms (i.e. prices) that would
be perceived as unfair. This may indeed be the case in Portugal, where 71 per cent
of water utilities are held by municipalities or associations of municipalities (INAG,
2011). Recent social protests against the rise of water bills highlight consumers’
concerns and could lead to the maintenance of artificially low cost recovery levels by
the municipalities due to fairness constraints. To illustrate, note that the revenues
of Portuguese water utilities in 2009 covered only 80 per cent of the financial costs
of providing the service5, for water supply, and an even lower 46 per cent for waste
water drainage and treatment (INAG, 2011). Given the characteristics of water as an
essential good, indeed now a human right, perceived fairness could be one explanation
for the insufficient cost-recovery levels attained by water utilities in many countries.
Finally, we will review the few existing papers on the impact of the information
included in water bills, such as that on price, social norms, and resource saving
campaigns, in particular the inclusion of reference consumption values that are
used to frame consumers into social comparison. The water demand literature has
emphasized the importance of incorporating information about the water price in
water bills and its relevance to the effectiveness of water pricing policies (Frondel
and Messner, 2008; Gaudin, 2006). Nevertheless, only recently has social comparison
been tested as a water management tool (Ferraro and Price, 2011), and reference
consumption information was the more effective tool of all the conservation strategies
tested.
The remainder of the chapter can be summarized as follows. Section 2.2
contains a literature review of behavioural economics in water management. Section
2.3 describes the behavioural applications and their potential contribution to water
policy and water resource economics. Section 2.4 concludes and examines potential
paths for future research in water management shedding light on the behavioural
applications suggested.
5. The financial costs of water services include the operation and maintenance costs, capital costs,
administrative costs, and other direct costs (European Commission, 2003, p.118).
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2.2 Literature Review of Behavioural Economics in Water Manage-
ment
2.2.1 Behavioural Economics
Behavioural economics arguably started as early as the eighteenth century with
Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, but economic theory gradually grew
apart from psychology until the second half of the twentieth century with "researchers
like George Katona, Harvey Leibenstein, Tibor Scitovsky, and Herbert Simon ...
suggesting the importance of psychological measures and bounds on rationality"
(Camerer, 2004a, p. 6).
In the mid-1970s Kahneman and Tversky (1974) identified some significant
heuristics and biases of human behaviour, especially under uncertainty6, but their
major contributions to economics were published a few years later. In one of Econo-
metrica’s most cited papers the authors developed prospect theory as an alternative
model to expected utility theory and the rational choice paradigm (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). This article has had by far the most major influence in changing the
conceptual framework of economics and establishing the growing field of behavioural
economics7.
The field of behavioural economics is focused on empirical validation and
identification of behavioural departures from the standard model (i.e. the neoclassical
model) as well as on the interpretation of behavioural deviations using alternative
economic frameworks. Furthermore, these deviations can be organized into three
areas where human nature strays from standard assumptions: there are limits to the
pursuit of self-interest, to cognitive abilities, and to self-control (Mullainathan and
Thaler, 2000)8.
Despite the obvious rivalry between behavioural economic theory and stan-
dard rational choice theory, we want the reader to bear in mind that these two
competing theories are not a dichotomy, in spite of past (and current) conflicts
among practitioners. Future economic theory could (and we dare say should) be
based on a hybrid approach, with the co-existence of neoclassical and behavioural
approaches (MacFadyen, 2006; Rabin, 2002). For instance, Matthew Rabin states
that behavioural findings should be integrated into economics and that his research
programme "does not abandon the correct insights of neoclassical economics, but
6. For further information about departures from the standard economic theory see Kahneman
et al. (1982).
7. Behavioural economics could be defined as "a commitment to empirical testing of neoclassic
assumptions of human behaviour and to modifying economic theory on the basis of what is found in
the testing process" (Simon, 2008, p. 221).
8. For a more recent analysis of the types of departures see (Zarri, 2010).
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supplements these insights with the insights to be had from realistic new assumptions"
(Rabin, 2002, p. 659).
The rivalry mentioned here is one barrier to the development of this field, but
there is another one, related to the dissemination of behavioural economic findings.
The recent literature has made several efforts to encourage use of behavioural
economic models, either through analysis of field phenomena (Camerer, 2004b) or
by pointing out potential applications of different behavioural models (Ho et al.,
2006). Nonetheless, some subfields of economics have shown little evidence of the
incorporation of behavioural economics. Water resource economics is one of these
cases, as discussed in section 2.2.2.
2.2.2 State of the Art of Behavioural Economics in Water Resource Economics
Water resource economics deals with the efficient allocation of a scarce resource
(water). It aims to develop water management policies and to study the decision-
making process of economic agents that use water resources (Griffin, 2006). In
surveying this literature we found there is almost no incorporation of concepts from
behavioural economics.
The subfield of behavioural water economics should focus on the development
of water resource economics through the application of the findings of behavioural
economics, as well as insights from other related general fields (e.g. psychology,
sociology, ecology, marketing) or more specific fields (e.g. behavioural environmental
economics, experimental economics, environmental psychology, behavioural finance).
So far, there seem to be very few published papers in this subfield. The first
paper to incorporate behavioural assumptions into water resource economics was Win-
kler and Winett (1982), which approaches resource conservation, namely residential
energy and water, integrating the psychological (social-learning) and economic views.
The authors discuss the importance of monetary rebates for conservation policies,
emphasizing that those rebates9 (i.e. economic approach) could allow changes in
conservation behaviour, but also that they could be complemented by information
technology that would influence consumer behaviour (i.e. psychological approach).
Therefore, they argue for a combined approach in conservation policies, without
overlooking the psychological framework in the policy-makers’ agenda.
Additionally, the authors argue that changes in human behaviour are made
through behavioural interventions which should be interpreted in the context of
two systems of behaviours: an internal system (linked to the individual) and an
external system (linking the individual and the society). Therefore, insofar we are
9. Nevertheless, the application of (monetary) rebates has since been criticized due to the low
price elasticity of water demand (Foxall, 1995).
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analysing behaviours of households (the typical individual level used in residential
water demand literature) we should account for these two systems when designing
water policies.
More recently, Jorgensen et al. (2009) contribute to the residential water
demand literature with a new socio-economic model to understand household water
consumption, emphasizing the importance of trust. Their work stresses the demand
side and summarizes the main direct and indirect drivers which determine human
behaviour towards water conservation. Their model also emphasizes other behavioural
variables besides trust (e.g. past water use behaviour, outdoor-area interest and use,
and pricing attitude), although the authors advise that there could be other variables
to discover.
Finally, another issue within the framework of behavioural economics is the
impact of social comparison as a water conservation strategy (Ferraro and Price,
2011). The authors analyse the influence on water consumption of three types
of experimental treatments (i.e. technical recommendation, pro-social message,
and social comparison). These authors conclude that non-pecuniary strategies (i.e.
psychological strategies) do influence water conservation, with a higher effectiveness
of social comparison in the group of high-use households, and a larger effect in the
short-term rather than the long-term.
One of the major issues in water resource economics is the potential unsustain-
ability of use (i.e. demand exceeding water supply in a consistent manner leading to
the degradation of the resource). Strategies to improve water management can be
centred on demand management or on supply enhancement (Griffin, 2006). Perhaps
due to the prevalence of the latter throughout the twentieth century, the last few
years have seen demand-side strategies became the dominant paradigm both in the
water and energy sectors (Strengers, 2011; Barberán and Arbués, 2009)10. Naturally,
demand analysis is also the purpose of the few published papers, described already,
which incorporate behavioural insights into residential water consumption.
Further applications of behavioural economics in water management could also
be developed for other sectors that contribute significantly to water demand, such
as agriculture, industry, and tourism, although these are outside the scope of this
chapter. Another possibility would be for supply-side analysis to take into account
the biases of system managers within water utilities and understanding the behaviour
of these utilities.11
10. This one-sided approach can be criticized, for instance Merrett states that "[w]ith outstream
water we should always integrate in our thinking and our practice both demand-side and supply-side
strategies" (Merrett, 2005, p. 92).
11. Recent literature discusses the importance of understanding the behaviour of firms. See the
work of Bandiera et al. (2011) for a review of field experiments with firms.
2.2. Literature Review of Behavioural Economics in Water Management 15
At this point two questions could arise: (i) why is there so little work on
behavioural economics in the water management literature? And (ii) why does
behavioural economics matter in this context?
From our perspective, the underdevelopment of this subfield has some potential
explanations:
Neoclassical hegemony
• Environmental economics models are underpinned by the hegemony of standard
neoclassic economic theory (Shogren and Taylor, 2008; Venkatachalam, 2007),
and water resource economics is not an exception, as will be described in section
2.2.3.
Dearth of household data
• Scarcity of social/psychological data about households (Jorgensen et al., 2009)
and lack of "readily available data" in environmental data (Smith, 2008, p.
141).
• Difficulty in obtaining reliable (and real) variables (e.g. appropriate income
per household) and in collecting information from several sources of household
data.
Limited systematization and availability of detailed aggregate data
• There are significant limitations in the available aggregate statistics, even those
related to fundamental aspects of water supply and waste water services at the
country level (OECD, 2010).
Little application of experimental design to residential water de-
mand
• Few water demand studies have used experimental data during the last decade
(as discussed in section 2.2.3), possibly because many water utilities have not
traditionally focused on demand management and so do not perceive the value
of engaging in such activities.
Status quo bias
• Resistance to change of water resource economists to behavioural economic
models12, which is in a broader sense connected to status quo bias in human
behaviour. Or as stated by MacFadyen "we are often reluctant to abandon the
security of conventional construct systems, but there may be cascade effects as
highly regarded practitioners adopt new ideas" (MacFadyen, 2006, p. 195).
12. Note that water resource economists may not be aware of the existence of behavioural economics
models and therefore in this case the idea of resistance to change is not applicable.
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In response to the second question, there are some arguments in favour of
incorporation of psychological insights into water resource economics:
Development of residential water demand models, using a behavioural
perspective
• A wider set of models to test would improve knowledge of demand determinants
and contribute to water policy design.
Impact of psychological strategies in water policy
• Policy-makers have exhibited little understanding of psychological strategies,
diminishing the potential role of demand management and leading to a lack of
significant influence of resource management strategies on policy (Winkler and
Winett, 1982).
In the expression "economic agents’ behaviour", behaviour should
stand first
• That "a major part of economics is concerned with the study of behaviour"
(Winkler and Winett, 1982, p. 422) seems to be a trivial statement. However,
the residential water demand literature is focused on the economic, leaving the
behaviour on the sidelines.
If economics is about studying economic agents’ behaviour (e.g. consumers,
firms, and investors), there is indeed redundancy in "behavioural economics" (Simon,
2008; Thaler, 1999). We think data play a major role in this issue. Shogren and
Taylor state that data are essential because they are "a necessary condition to fully
understand the relevance of any behavio[u]ral bias to economic phenomena" (Shogren
and Taylor, 2008, p. 34). Arguably this is one of the major constraints to the
development of behavioural environmental economics in general and behavioural
water economics in particular.
There have been some recent improvements in aggregate environmental data,
such as the creation of the Water Information System for Europe in 2007 (WISE,
2007). However, there are still no globally available micro-level data.
The scarcity of individual household consumption data and of potential con-
ditioning factors which are difficult to measure (e.g. past water use patterns, or
attitude towards restrictions) is another important issue (Jorgensen et al., 2009). At
the household level additional information (i.e. economic, financial, and behavioural
indicators) is also essential to improve water demand studies. However, the quality
of the information used influences the significance and robustness of both statistical
and economics results in water demand literature (Arbués et al., 2010). To illustrate
the difficulties, it is interesting to consider the experience we have had in the research
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project we are currently developing.13 We contacted many water utilities to ask
for their cooperation, both in providing us with consumption data and customer
telephone numbers so we could run a household survey. Some utilities could not
provide organized information on household consumption levels, others did not have
telephone numbers in their customer databases, and yet others did not agree to
cooperate with the project because of data privacy concerns. In one case of a rural
municipality with a small customer base, the utility was keen to participate and did
give us the necessary data, but after we had collected a few surveys some of the
customers complained to the utility that they thought we had asked for too much
information on household characteristics (house size, garden, appliances, household
income, number and age of household members, and so forth) and therefore they
wondered whether the research team might possibly be running a scam! Naturally,
the utility withdrew its cooperation.
Besides this household data problem, there is another scarcity problem (and we
are not talking about water scarcity): the lack of information about water allocations
and consumption levels. Some examples of lack of measurement can be found in all
sectors (agriculture, households, and industrial water), as well as in water losses, not
only the leakage but also the unmeasured waste and consumption of water (Brown,
2002).
After this overview of the state of the art of behavioural economics in water
management and discussion of some problems that have negatively influenced the
development of this subfield, we provide a brief literature review of residential water
demand to highlight past contributions and bring out the absence of behavioural
models. Then we discuss four behavioural applications that could contribute to water
resource economics.
2.2.3 Literature Review Based on a Behavioural Perspective
There are a few recent literature reviews in the field of residential water demand
(Schleich and Hillenbrand, 2009; Worthington and Hoffman, 2008; Arbués et al., 2003).
We do not intend to provide another one. Instead, we will analyse the residential water
demand literature in light of the potential applications of behavioural perspectives,
to be developed in section 2.3.
Nonetheless, before starting that analysis we want to discuss the categorization
of the type of data used in residential water demand studies. The literature reviews
divide data between aggregate data and household data. In this literature review we
will also take into account whether the data is experimental. Thus, the categorization
13. Pricing and behavioural responses in the water sector supported by Fundação para a Ciência e
a Tecnologia (Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation), PTDC/EGE-ECO/114477/2009.
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of the data used by the studies includes: aggregate data (AD); household data
(HD); experimental household data (EHD), where the data is collected directly from
households through experiments; and experimental aggregate data (EAD) where we
have experimental data at the aggregate level related to one or more communities.
These categories are summarized in Figure 2.1.
Fig. 2.1: Type of data used in residential water demand studies
Table 2.1 summarizes 25 papers that estimate residential water demand that
have been published since 2000. The great majority used panel data and the
periodicity of the data is mostly annual or monthly, with some exceptions. Typically
the price elasticity of residential water demand in these studies is inelastic and
negative, whereas income elasticity is positive but has a small magnitude in general
terms, which is in line with the findings of the literature (Worthington and Hoffman,
2008).
The use of aggregate data is more common than household data, as expected.
A more interesting finding is that experimental procedures have not been used often
in this literature. Also, there are differences in the way data are obtained through
experimental design or surveys. Two studies use surveys to obtain aggregate data from
water utilities, namely Bell and Griffin (2008), which asked water providers about
tariff structures, and Mazzanti and Montini (2006), which obtained information on
water consumption, tariff structure, and water users from water utilities. Nonetheless,
these studies are not experiments and should not be misinterpreted as EAD studies
just because the researchers used surveys to obtain the data. In order to understand
what would fit in the EAD category, suppose there is a government funding programme
to enforce the use of water-saving technology in some communities of the country’s
richest regions in income per capita during a given period.
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Tab. 2.1: Brief overview of residential water demand studies since 2000 to 2011
Author(s) (year) Study area Data set Periodicity Type of data Price elasticity Income elasticity
(Bell and Griffin, 2011) USA Panel Monthly data
[Jan-95; Dec-05]
AD Residential: -0.15
Commercial: -0.12
Aggregated: -0.27
n.a.
(Martins and Moura e Sá,
2011)
Madeira (Portugal) Cross-
sectional
Data obtained from 1 survey HD n.a. n.a.
(Monteiro and
Roseta-Palma, 2011)
Portugal Panel Annual data
[1998, 2000, 2002, 2005]
AD [-0.13; -0.05] [0.03;0.09]
(Arbués et al., 2010) Zaragoza (Spain) Panel Quarterly data (10 meter
readings) [1996–1998]
HD Aggregated: -0.57 Wealth semielasticity(1):
0.29× 10−3
(Diakité et al., 2009) Côte d’Ivoire Panel Annual data [1998–2002] AD -0.82 0.15
(Schleich and Hillenbrand,
2009)
Germany Cross-
sectional
Annual data [2003] AD -0.24 0.36
(Bell and Griffin, 2008) Texas (USA) Panel Monthly data
[Jan-99; Dec-03]
AD -0.13 n.a.
(Frondel and Messner,
2008)
Leipzig (Germany) Panel Annual data [1998–2001] HD [-0.49; -0.27] [0.30; 0.31]
(Kenney et al., 2008)(2) Aurora (USA) Panel Monthly data [1997–2005] HD Pre-drought: -0.56
Drought: -1.11
Aggregated: -0.60
n.a.
(Ruijs et al., 2008) São Paulo (Brazil) Time
series
Monthly data [1997–2002] AD [-0.50; -0.45] [0.39; 0.42]
(Martínez-Espiñeira, 2007) Seville (Spain) Time
series
Monthly data [1991–1999] AD Short-run: -0.10
Long-run: -0.50
n.a.
(Martins and Fortunato,
2007)
Portugal Panel Monthly data [1998–2003] AD -0.56 n.a.
(Musolesi and Nosvelli,
2007)
Cremona Province
(Italy)
Panel Annual data [1998–2001] AD Short-run: -0.27
Long-run: -0.47
0.18
(Olmstead et al., 2007) USA and Canada Panel Daily data [four weeks] HD Full sample: -0.33
IBT only: [-0.61;-0.59]
Full sample: 0.13
IBT only: [0.18; 0.19]
(Arbués and Villanúa,
2006)
Zaragoza (Spain) Panel Quarterly data (10 meter
readings) [1996–1998]
HD -0.08 0.79
Continued
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Tab. 2.2: Brief overview of residential water demand studies since 2000 to 2011 (continued)
Author(s) (year) Study area Data set Periodicity Type of data Price elasticity Income elasticity
(Gaudin, 2006) USA Cross-
sectional
Annual data [1995] AD Base model: -0.37
Price info given: -0.51
Price info not given: -0.36
Mean: 0.30
Median: 0.24
(Hoffmann et al., 2006) Brisbane (Australia) Panel Quarterly data
[Sep-98; Jun-03]
AD Short-run: -0.51
Long-run: -1.17
0.24
(Mazzanti and Montini,
2006)
Emilia-Romagna
(Italy)
Panel Annual data [1998–2001] AD [-1.33; -0.99] [0.40; 0.71]
(Carter and Milon, 2005) Florida (USA) Panel Monthly data [1997–1999] HD Marginal price short-run
Know price: -0.58
Don’t know price: -0.21
Short-run
Know price: -0.01
(not significant)
Don’t know price:
0.06
(Garcia-Valiñas, 2005) Seville (Spain) Panel Quarterly data
[Dec-91; Sep-00]
HD Average: -0.49
Peak period: -0.55
Offpeak period: -0.46
0.58
(Arbués et al., 2004)(3) Zaragoza (Spain) Panel Quarterly data (10 time ob-
servations) [1996–1998]
HD [-0.06; -0.03] [0.07; 0.21]
(Martínez-Espiñeira and
Nauges, 2004)
Seville (Spain) Time
series
Monthly data [1991–1999] AD -0.1 0.1
(Garcia and Reynaud,
2004)
Bourdeaux (France) Panel Annual data [1995–1998] AD -0.25 0.03 (not significant)
(Krause et al., 2003) New Mexico (USA) Panel Data obtained from 6 ex-
periments
EHD [-0.10; -0.02] n.a.
(Higgs and Worthington,
2001)
Brisbane (Australia) Cross-
sectional
Annual data [n.a.] HD n.a. n.a.
Source: author’s analysis of the papers. Notes: aggregated data (AD) are the data compiled from several households by water utilities related to one or more communities;
household data (HD) are data of individual households provided by water utilities, which could be sample data or all the community data about households; experimental
household data (EHD) is the information collected directly from households through experiments; experimental aggregated data (EAD) are experimental data at the aggregate
level related to one or more communities. n.a.: not available or not applicable. (1) The wealth (income) semi-elasticity is the percentage change in water consumption when the
income variable changes 1,000 €. (2) This study used community household data with all household data about single family homes available of the city of Aurora. (3) Almost all
the data used in this study are household data, with the exception of the variable of availability of collective hot water facilities used in the water demand estimation that was
obtained through a telephone survey.
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A possible control group for this field experiment would be communities of the
same regions, in which the use of the technology is not compulsory. Thus, analysing
the aggregate data from each community the government can check whether the cost
of the programme would compensate the water savings for a global implementation
in all regions. In this case we would have EAD.
In the case of EHD and HD some experiments and household surveys have
focused on residential water demand during the last decade (Martins and Moura e Sá,
2011; Frondel and Messner, 2008; Olmstead et al., 2007; Carter and Milon, 2005;
Krause et al., 2003; Higgs and Worthington, 2001). A recent work from Martins and
Moura e Sá (2011) argues that water bills fail to spread environmental education
among water consumers because they are too complex. They recommend the redesign
of the bills with more clarity and simplicity, because current bills could compromise
price signals and consequently the effectiveness of price strategies.
Frondel and Messner (2008)’s work uses data from a household survey in
Leipzig (Germany) to analyse price perceptions and their impact on residential water
consumption. They conclude that water pricing policies will only have significant
effects in sophisticated households (i.e. "price-conscious"). Naïve households (i.e.
"price-ignorant"), the majority according to their sample, do not significantly di-
minish their water consumption with price increases. In a prior study, Carter and
Milon (2005) also approached the issue of price knowledge, among other sources of
heterogeneity. These authors used a 1997 survey of residential water consumers and
monthly billing data of these households and found that water users’ behaviour is
sensitive to price awareness, with price-conscious households exhibiting more respon-
siveness to both average and marginal prices. Additionally, the authors obtained a
counter-intuitive conclusion that price awareness increases water consumption which
may be explained by price-overestimation, in line with the literature on electricity
demand.
Olmstead et al. (2007) use household data from a previous study14 and suggest
that the difference between the price-elasticities under IBR and uniform rates could
be explained by behavioural responses to price structures or city-level heterogeneity.
Krause et al. (2003) developed six laboratory experiments in New Mexico
(United States) which combined experimental and survey data to analyse and estimate
water demand. The authors found that consumer heterogeneity matters, since the
heterogeneous responses of consumers are relevant to water policy effectiveness.
Moreover, they criticized the limitations of studies that use aggregate data, which
do not allow testing for this heterogeneity. Higgs and Worthington (2001) used a
14. Household level data obtained through mail surveys and historic billing data (Mayer et al.,
1999).
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household survey in the city of Brisbane (Australia) to study consumer preferences in
a dual-pricing system (i.e. consumers can choose one of two systems). The authors
conclude that consumers generally prefer a pricing system which minimizes the
impact on payments of uncertain future demand, even if there are no clear reasons to
do so considering only current consumption. This can explain the so-called "flat-rate
bias".
To sum up, economists have not used experimental data very much in residential
water demand studies. This could be explained by the resistance of social scientists
to laboratory experiments15, which are criticized because of their lack of realistic
features and lack of generalization to the real world (Falk and Heckman, 2009).
Non-experimental data (i.e. AD and HD) are used by most of the studies, with
laboratory experiments and field experiments left on the sidelines.16
Furthermore, none of the studies accounts for asymmetric price and income
elasticities or reference block pricing. The use of the reference-transaction framework
has likewise never been proposed, whereas the use of social comparison (and reference
consumption) has just begun with the pioneering work of Ferraro and Price (2011).
We proceed to discuss the four behavioural applications we propose - reference
block pricing, asymmetric elasticities, reference transaction, and social comparison -
highlighting their potential contribution to the enrichment of this literature.
2.3 Discussion of Behavioural Applications and Their Effects in
Water Management
In this section we suggest four applications of behavioural economics to water demand
studies based on four different behavioural frameworks, namely prospect theory,
asymmetric price elasticity (APE), reference transaction, and social comparison.
Table 2.3 summarizes the main features of different behavioural economic frameworks
that can have implications for water management. We stress that these potential
applications are not exhaustive. Our approach is to focus on the introduction of
some new methods into the residential water demand literature.
2.3.1 Reference Block Pricing
Prospect theory proposes a model of decision-making under risk which accounts
for some behavioural biases, namely the certainty effect, the reflection effect, and
15. Lab experiments are sometimes underestimated compared with field experiments due to the
implicit assumption of the superiority of field data over lab data. However, Falk and Heckman argue
that lab experiments should be done more often (see Falk and Heckman (2009) for further details).
16. The discussion about non-experimental data versus experimental data is outside the scope of
this research, although further research should focus on the advantages and limitations of different
type of experiments within water resource economics.
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the isolation effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)17. Prospect theory assumes an
asymmetric value function with three characteristics: value depends on the deviation
from the (neutral) reference point18 (e.g. status quo or current asset position); the
function is concave for gains and convex for losses; and it is steeper for losses than
for gains (i.e. there is loss aversion). This means that individuals are more sensitive
to changes seen as losses than to gains of the same magnitude with respect to a
reference point. Supported by the existence of loss aversion, the potential application
suggested for this concept is reference block pricing. Notice that most pricing research
in both economics and marketing has been focused on intrinsic prices, although
the "behavioural aspects of pricing", including reference-price effects, acquired some
importance over the last three decades. For a categorization of these behavioural
aspects see Krishna (2009).
As noted in the Introduction, the significant amount of literature on pricing
structures in regulated water utilities does not explain the popularity of increasing
block tariffs, given the theoretical efficiency of marginal-cost pricing in most situations.
Some countries and regions do use decreasing block tariffs, predominantly for users
with high consumption levels, due to their weight on the total revenues of water
utilities. Since these large consumers ensure "substantial revenues" and "stable flows",
the water utilities could be reluctant in such cases to apply tariff structures which
promote water conservation (OECD, 2010, p. 11). On the other hand, Griffin and
Mjelde (2011) have recently argued that low-consumption and low-income households
are favoured with uniform block tariffs compared with increasing block tariffs.
Despite this extensive discussion of block-tariff settings in water, the impact
of asymmetric value functions with loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
has never been proposed. We think that consumer responses could be based on a
reference point which we call the consumer’s reference block tariff. This may be the
tariff of their actual block or, alternatively, the initial blocks of a tariff structure
could be interpreted as reference points, so that framing effects would influence
customers to view a change to the following block as a loss (increasing block tariffs)
or discount (decreasing block tariffs).
17. The certainty effect is the bias to underweight outcomes that are probable in relation to sure
outcomes. Reflection effect is the aversion to risk in the domain of gains accompanied by risk
seeking in the domain of losses. Finally, the isolation effect means that people display inconsistent
preferences in the presence of the same choice with a change of framework (i.e. framing effects). For
additional information see Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
18. The reference point could shift and be different from the status quo. The location of the
reference point and the form in which the choice is framed are essential determinants of decisions.
24
2.
BehaviouralEconom
ics
in
W
ater
M
anagem
ent
Tab. 2.3: Potential behavioural applications to water management
Seminal reference Behaviour framework Potential application Policy implications Current references in
water management
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Prospect theory Reference block pricing • Redefinition of tariff structures
• Revision of the effectiveness of pricing policy
• Influence on price elasticities in terms of
magnitude and persistence
-
Putler (1992) Asymmetric price elas-
ticity (APE)
Asymmetric price elastic-
ity (APE)
• Redefinition of tariff structures
• Revision of the effectiveness of pricing policy
• Influence on price elasticities in terms of
magnitude and persistence
-
Kahneman et al. (1986b) Reference transaction Reference transaction
and tariff acceptability
• Understanding of the insufficient cost recov-
ery achieved by water utilities through tariffs
• Definition of economic criteria for equitable
allocation
• Implications in the definition of allocation
rules for scarce resources
• Redefinition of water policies
-
Festinger (1954) Social comparison (and
reference consumption)
Social comparison (and
water reference consump-
tion)
• Development of water conservation strate-
gies
• Redefinition of water policies
• Influence on price elasticities in terms of
magnitude and persistence
Ferraro and Price
(2011)
Source: author’s analysis.
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Furthermore, loss aversion indicates that individuals are more sensitive to
variations interpreted as losses and consequently IBR could lead water consumers
to reduce consumption by more than higher flat rates. Therefore, the reduction on
water consumption due to changing to a more expensive block tariff, which would be
typically explained by the price effect, could also be explained by this loss aversion
effect.
This behavioural application could have several implications to sectors with non-
linear prices. The concept of reference block price could contribute to the redefinition
of tariff structures, revision of the effectiveness of pricing policy, redefinition of
water policies, and also influence the determination of price elasticities in terms of
magnitude and persistence.
2.3.2 Asymmetric Elasticities of Residential Water Demand
APE can be defined as the asymmetric behaviour of consumers to price changes,
according to the seminal work developed in the field of marketing (Putler, 1992).
Typically if prices increase with respect to a reference price the price elasticities
of demand will be higher, whereas we will have lower price elasticities with price
reductions. The author argues that reference price influences consumer behaviour.
Moreover, he corroborates the existence of loss aversion. We propose that both
asymmetric price elasticity and the asymmetric income elasticity of demand are
relevant issues in residential water demand.
Water pricing is one of the most important policy instruments to deal with
scarcity and sustainability issues, allowing the implementation of demand manage-
ment strategies (Griffin, 2006). Therefore, the study of the price elasticity of water
demand is an essential measure for evaluation of the impact of pricing policies.
APE has been commonly applied in marketing studies according to Ho et al.
(2006). More recently the study of APE has also been extended to the energy
sector (Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007; Gately and Huntington, 2002), but it has not
been approached so far in the domain of residential water demand, according to
our previous literature review. Moreover, the study of asymmetric income elasticity
(henceforth AIE) has not been analysed in this domain either. However, there is a
piece of research in energy economics stating that income changes have asymmetric
effects in the energy and oil demand in many non-OECD countries and these should
be accounted for to mitigate biased estimations (Gately and Huntington, 2002).
The existence of APE could have several policy implications, of which we
highlight the formation of reference prices, their effects on water consumption,
implications for the design of tariff structures and impact on optimal water pricing
policies.
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Note that we argue that asymmetry in price and income elasticities should be
tested, not assumed to exist. In this sense we believe that residential water demand
studies should look into the issue instead of implicitly assuming that both price and
income elasticities of water are symmetric.
2.3.3 Reference Transaction and Tariff Acceptability
The reference-transaction framework was first suggested by Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler during the 1980s. The concept is based on the dual entitlement principle
under which firms are entitled to a (positive) reference profit and individuals are
entitled to reference terms (i.e. price, salary, rent) (Kahneman et al., 1986b). The
most puzzling finding of the authors was that consumers and employees consider it
acceptable for a firm to increase price and/or cut wages in order to ensure a reference
(positive) profit. Additionally, firms’ behaviour seems to be influenced by fairness
constraints which lead to inefficient decisions according to standard rational theory.
Using a framework with fairness constraints could explain many market anomalies.
In particular, we believe the reference-transaction framework could provide a better
understanding of the low levels of cost recovery in the water sector.
Notably, one of the major aims in the development of water policies has been
the cost recovery of the services provided by water utilities through water prices
(OECD, 2010). According to this report it is often difficult to reach full cost recovery
exclusively through tariffs in water sector, with this concern reflected in Article 9 of
the Water Framework Directive (European Parliament and Council, 2000). Given
this difficulty the core debate has changed from full cost recovery to sustainable
cost recovery, which implies a mix of tariffs, taxes, and transfers (i.e. three types of
revenues, also known as "3Ts") to achieve that aim.
According to our perspective, the use of the reference-transaction framework
(Kahneman et al., 1986b) could be tested using an experiment to assess the attitudes
of water users and managers of water utilities in at least two different ways. First, how
does framing influence individual perceptions of fairness in water pricing? Second,
why do water utilities so often seem to be financially unsustainable if they ought
to be entitled to a positive reference profit? Both questions seem important in
order to develop new approaches to cost recovery, at least for countries in which
water services are a political issue for municipalities, such as Portugal. In the first
question the underlying idea is to understand how different frameworks influence the
application of water pricing policies, especially tariff increases aimed at ensuring full
cost recovery. The second question is more puzzling. On the one hand, the concept of
reference transaction implies the existence of fairness constrains which limit the water
utilities’ profit maximization and hence could explain (at least partially) the financial
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unsustainability. On the other hand, water utilities, as firms, should be entitled
to a positive reference profit, which would minimize the issue of insufficient cost
recovery. The essential nature of the good in question and traditionally low prices
may provide clues to answer these questions. The marketing literature provides one
avenue for solving this puzzle by identifying price fairness as a multifaceted concept,
with possibly conflicting components, such as firm reputation, inferred motive of firm
and price comparison (Krishna, 2009) or price honesty and credibility (Diller, 2008).
The reference transaction framework has not been applied to water resource
economics as far as we know, although it seems appealing to understand whether
water utilities could be a counter-evidence of the reference profit entitlement. This
topic has been explored in experimental research, with a recent application in the
comparison of allocation rules related to two scarce resources, seats in a high-speed
train and parking spaces Raux et al., 2009. The authors tested different allocation
rules and conclude that they depend on the educational level of the individuals, the
type of good, and the type of scarcity (exceptional or recurrent).
This framework could have some policy implications for water management,
such as understanding why prices charged by water utilities are often insufficient to
cover their costs, defining economic criteria for equitable allocation of scarce resources
and general redefinition of water policies, in particular those related to public versus
private ownership of utilities, since the reference transaction could be seen differently
by consumers in each case.
2.3.4 Social Comparison (and Water Reference Consumption)
The theory of social comparison was developed in the seminal work of Festinger (1954).
Typically, social comparisons are based on framing individuals with comparative
information in order to promote a specific behaviour. Since Festinger’s findings there
have been several studies on this issue, but only recently has the theory been applied
to residential water demand. In particular, the use of social comparison as well as
pro-social information and technical advice given to the members of a household
can influence their water consumption (Ferraro and Price, 2011). The authors show
that social comparison has the strongest impact on consumer behaviour, using as
reference consumption neighbours’ consumption levels. Households in a randomized
field experiment were provided with their own consumption along with two types of
comparison: the median household consumption of their region and the percentile of
that household considering all households of the region.
In this sense, the neighbours’ consumption levels could be seen as the reference
consumption, defined as a reference value of consumption (normally the average or
median consumption) which frames the consumers into a social comparison framework.
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Consequently, if consumers have household consumptions above average (or median)
they will categorize their actual situation in the domain of losses (i.e. these consumers
will try to save water in order to achieve the domain of gains) and vice versa. In
the field of energy economics the reference consumption framework has also been
applied recently in a field experiment with the aim of promoting energy conservation
by consumers through two reference consumption set-ups: an average consumption
level of neighbours and an efficient consumption level of neighbours (Allcott, 2011).
The author concludes that non-pecuniary strategies of energy savings can change
consumer behaviour in a significant and cost-effective manner. Moreover, there is
also another avenue of research focused on environmental conservation in hotels. A
recent study (Goldstein et al., 2008) concludes that guests of hotels react more to
social-comparison frameworks (e.g. "the majority of quests reuse their towels"), than
to the typical appeals to environmental protection.
Gaudin (2006) underpins the importance of the information provided to water
consumers through the water bill and the relevance of this information in the
effectiveness of water pricing policies. Frondel and Messner (2008) corroborate
the importance of incorporating information in the water bill (e.g. price and cost
perception) and argue that pricing policies need to be complemented by the availability
of information to consumers in their bill, including price and cost information. More
recently, Martins and Moura e Sá (2011) found that the clarity of water bills is a
major issue in residential water sector. According to the authors the bills fail to have
environmentally relevant impacts on consumers, namely in terms of fostering water
conservation, thus their redesign to make them clearer and simpler could contribute
to the effectiveness of price-based policies.
The social comparison measure could be tested in other ways. For example, the
use of the typical average (or median) household consumption does not account for
household size when framing the consumers. This fact could lead to biased conclusions
if the household size has a significant impact on consumption. Arbués et al. (2010)
recently argued that using household data which accounts for household size could
matter in the estimation of residential water demand. Potential contributions of the
social comparison framework to water management include the development of water
conservation strategies, the redefinition of water policies, and influence over the price
elasticities in terms of magnitude and persistence.
Framing effects are well-known to behavioural economists. Our aim in this
section was to briefly explain some behaviour frameworks which we use to illustrate
some of the applications and effects in water demand studies. In the section 2.4 we
discuss further research of the suggested behavioural applications.
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2.4 Conclusion and Future Research
At a basic level, water consumption cannot be considered sustainable until its costs
are properly recovered. This issue has occupied many economists who have analysed
customer demand, on the one hand, and service costs, on the other. However,
financial cost recovery is not sufficient - truly sustainable use must respect ecosystem
needs and be based on a good understanding of consumption patterns.
One of the aims of this chapter was to approach the scarcity issue. Surely,
water scarcity is a topic dear to all water researchers; however our direct focus
was on another type of scarcity: that of residential water demand studies that
include behavioural economics, i.e. empirical testing of behavioural assumptions.
Nowadays, the fields of behavioural economics and experimental economics, which
arose from the collaboration between psychologists and economists, are an integral
part of mainstream economics, as can be attested by many articles in top economic
journals (Santos, 2011). However, the existing water demand literature exhibits a
clear dominance standard neoclassic economic theory. We argue that further research
on water demand should use behavioural economics frameworks and account for
behavioural failures19.
As argued by Thaler (1999) the logical evolution of economics as a field will be
the incorporation of behavioural features into economic models. The challenge is to
understand that the highway along which the herd of researchers is travelling could
be the slowest way. Exploring alternative approaches and rethinking the frameworks
could be the new alternative to that highway. New empirical results could promote
discussion of new hypotheses and new lines of reasoning (Smith, 2008). Nevertheless,
the development of environmental economics data along with social and psychological
data (Jorgensen et al., 2009; Smith, 2008) is essential: without a proper vehicle,
travelling will be a footslog.
In our view, this is one of the fundamental issues holding back the development
of behavioural economics in the water domain. Information needs to be periodically
collected, compiled, and organized, always respecting confidentiality constraints,
especially in the case of household data. We believe that the development of more
powerful databases and the growing importance of the sustainability issue will bring
new researchers into water resource economics. The importance of data wealth
has been proven by the developments of behavioural finance (Thaler, 1999). The
challenge of development, collection, and systematization will be the first step in
further research on behavioural applications in water management.
19. Behavioural failures refer to situations where "a person fails to behave as predicted by rational
choice theory" as well as an "anomaly, paradox, bias, heuristic misperception, fallacy, illusion, or
paradigm" (Shogren and Taylor, 2008, p. 27).
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This chapter discussed some behavioural applications that could reshape the
understanding of major issues in water management, through four different ideas:
reference block pricing, asymmetric elasticities, reference transaction, and social
comparison (and reference consumption). None of these lines of research have been
analysed so far, with the exception of social comparison.
Reference block pricing could be empirically tested with the identification of
reference blocks within different pricing structures (e.g. increasing and decreasing
block rates) for each household and looking into their ex-post consumption behaviour
after block shifts. Reference effects could help explain the stronger consumption
reactions found by Olmstead et al. (2007) for IBR and thus provide a justification
for the overwhelming use of such structures in Portugal, as well as in other countries.
Further research on asymmetric elasticities is essential due to the importance
of price and income elasticities to evaluate pricing and affordability, which are core
issues in water policy. If the typical assumption of symmetric elasticities does not
hold this could reshape, to some extent, the pricing policies in the water sector.
The reference transaction framework could be an explanation for insufficient
levels of cost recovery by emphasizing how perceived price fairness hinders tariff
increases. Then again, limitations to profit maximization through fairness constraints
contradict the idea that water utilities, as firms, are entitled to a positive reference
profit. Although both ideas come from the reference transaction framework, they
have antagonistic effects and the study of their combined impact is a further avenue
of research.
Lastly, social comparison (and reference consumption) is a recent topic with
several promising lines of research: the comparative study of different social com-
parison treatments (e.g. sending users the average household consumption in their
neighbourhood, region, or country) and the application of findings from energy
conservation literature, such as efficient consumption information, are two potential
options for further research in this area. Furthermore, the use of different household
sizes in experimental design could result in new findings.
There are other areas of water resource economics in which behavioural applica-
tions could also be applied, such as supply analysis, including investment decisions in
water infrastructures, policy design, cost–benefit analysis, resource efficiency, water
losses, and water markets, among others. For instance, in water markets, Garrido
(2007) used a laboratory experiment to test specific market regulations of the water
reform in Spain and concluded that eliminating the existing trading restrictions
would imply welfare gains for senior users of water rights.
Simon (2008) argued that the development of behavioural research (and theory)
is based on testing economic theories through empirical methods, namely survey
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research and experiments based on direct observation, either in laboratory context
or through observation of the decision-making process in natural environments (e.g.
case studies based on individual decisions or decisions in business firms). These
methods are not common tools for economists, who are challenged by the techniques
of experimentation and individual data collection as well as by interpretation of
survey data. Thus, economists who aim to implement empirical tests of economic
theory will probably have to invest time to develop skills in at least one of the afore-
mentioned methods. These additional skills give an edge to behavioural economists
and contribute to the redesign of consumption theory in general and water resource
economics in particular. Further research could focus on the advantages and lim-
itations of different types of experiments (e.g. laboratory experiments and field
experiments) in contrast with the typical use of nonexperimental data.
If water resource economists were to grasp the differences between the "rational
consumer" and the "normal consumer"20 through empirical behaviour analysis, that
could improve water management practices and prevent scarcity, while possibly
gaining insights that would be applicable to other natural resources. This conceptual
framework could also be important to understand the supply side, with the analysis
of existing water utilities as "rational" or "normal" in terms of corporate decisions
(e.g. operational decisions, or investment decisions).
Although behavioural economics was originally based on empirical research it is
not to be dismissed as some sort of "reverse engineering" field based only on empirical
analysis. Since the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), behavioural
economics is based on both empirical and theoretical foundations. Therefore, the
development of residential water demand argued for in this chapter is implicitly
based on a dual approach which tries to incorporate both.
The behavioural applications proposed in this chapter are based on the seminal
works of psychologists such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Leon Festinger,
as well as on the price fairness research in marketing literature. We believe this
highlights the relevance of a multidisciplinary approach to provide new research ideas
and improve our understanding of water consumption.
We would like to end the chapter by noting that one of its primary aims
is to promote brainstorming, not necessarily to be exhaustive in our analysis of
possible applications of behavioural economics in water management. To conclude,
our timeless question is: are economists thinking outside the box in their fields?
20. This draws on the dichotomy rational investor and normal investor suggested by Statman
(1999), which can be similarly applied to consumer behaviour.
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3. DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH YOU PAY FOR WATER?
3.1 Introduction
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development stated the principles
of water governance: effectiveness, efficiency, trust and engagement (OECD, 2015).
This document highlights the importance of a holistic approach to build up public
confidence and fairness, besides the conventional principles of effectiveness and
efficiency. Water demand management is crucial to achieve a balance between uses
and the availability of the resource. Water pricing, in particular, is broadly accepted
as a tool for increasing economic efficiency in use as well as the financial sustainability
of utilities and, if prices are properly set, even environmental sustainability. Water
supply systems should therefore be managed taking into consideration consumer
price reactions, and many studies have assessed these through the estimation of water
demand functions as shown by several literature surveys (Correia and Roseta-Palma,
2014; Sebri, 2014; Nauges and Whittington, 2010; Worthington and Hoffman, 2008;
Arbués et al., 2003; Dalhuisen et al., 2003). Most point to fairly low values of the
price-elasticity of demand (range: -0.1 to -0.6). However, a few authors have noted
two important factors on residential water demand. Firstly, residential consumers
are not always fully informed of their water price (Frondel and Messner, 2008; Carter
and Milon, 2005) nor tariff structures (Tralhão, 2011) and this naturally has an
effect on the role prices can play in moderating consumption. Secondly, literature
shows that there are clarity and informational issues regarding water bills as well as
the transparency about water prices in these bills (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011;
Gaudin, 2006).
Household surveys have been widely used in issues related with residential
water management literature (Binet et al., 2014; Nauges, 2014; Martins and Moura
e Sá, 2011; OECD, 2011), although they mostly neglected the consumer perception
about two essential pieces of information in demand function: the water price and the
water quantity consumed. Exceptions are Frondel and Messner (2008) and Carter and
Milon (2005). Studies have paid limited attention to the determinants of consumption
perception bias (Beal et al., 2013), or in other words, why the perceived water use
by the consumers does not match their actual water consumption. Nevertheless,
perceived consumption versus effective consumption has been addressed by Tralhão
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(2011), who found that lower consumptions imply greater accuracy. Followed by
Barata et al. (2012), who shown that larger water consumption reduces the consumer
accuracy about their actual consumptions. According to the authors, one potential
explanation pointed out for this is that higher levels of water consumption and income
levels are related, which could indicate that a higher consumption level reflects a
lower concern with the water bill paid.
With our 2012 survey, we were able to collect detailed information about the
characteristics of dwellings, households and respondents, consumer habits; price, bill
and consumption perceptions; as well as on consumer attitudes towards environmental
and financial sustainability of water utilities. The method chosen for primary data
collection was the telephone survey applied during the summer of 2012 for a sample
of residential water users in Portugal. With the collaboration of ERSAR (Water
and Waste Services Regulation Authority), we gathered thirteen water utilities that
were willing to participate. They are dispersed across mainland Portugal and have
different characteristics (e.g. population size, urban-rural typology, management
models).
The database contains information on households and dwellings obtained from
the respondents, and on their actual water consumption and bill from the 12 months
preceding the survey, provided by the water utilities. This enables us to create a
unique data set to compare perceptions about water price, monthly consumption
and total monthly water bill with their actual values. We collected data on average
monthly household disposable income in each municipality from Portuguese Tax
Authorities (PTA) (Ministério das Finanças). Our database also includes weather
data from the Portuguese Sea and Atmosphere Institute (IPMA), namely were
monthly minimum, maximum and average temperature in Celsius degrees and the
total monthly precipitation in millimetres, i.e. the amount of rain that falls per
square meter in one hour, collected from Portuguese weather stations. All climate
variables are based on the year prior to the survey data collection (i.e. between July
2011 and June 2012).
This study is organized with the following structure. In section 3.2, we briefly
discuss the current situation of the sector in Portugal. In section 3.3, we present
a condensed review of the literature. In section 3.4, we describe the database and
empirical results. In section 3.5, we discuss the limitations and potential avenues for
future research.
3.2 Framework of the residential water sector in Portugal
The current market structure of the Portuguese mainland water sector is fairly com-
plex, where the most common governance structures are the municipal departments
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in retail water services (Pinto and Marques, 2015). On the other hand, bulk water
services are mainly provided by multimunicipal concessionaires revealing a hetero-
geneous structure in terms of management in water supply (WS) and wastewater
(WW) services that could have relevant financial shortcomings in water utilities.
WS and WW services in Portugal are characterized by a problem of cost
recovery, in spite of a positive evolution after the approval and transposition of
the Water Framework Directive (WFD) (European Parliament and Council, 2000).
ERSAR data shows cost recovery ratios in 2005 of 0.87 and 0.57 (INAG, 2005) in
water supply (WS) and waste water (WW), respectively, for mainland Portugal. In
2013, the cost recovery ratio in WW increased to 0.67 and the cost recovery ratio in
WS remained steady (ERSAR, 2014c). Nevertheless, achieving this improvement of
cost recovery ratios implied rising water tariffs, which has in same occasional cases
stirred up opposition and protests from the population21. A priori, it looks like there
is a communication failure between consumers and water utilities that influences
consumer perception. The overall affordability of water utility services in Portugal
was 0.84% of the average household disposable income in 2013 (ERSAR, 2014c),
comparing with OECD countries with a range between 0.2% (e.g. Korea, Italy) to
1.2% (e.g. Poland, Hungary), in 2008 (OECD, 2010). Nevertheless, it is far below
the affordability threshold which ranges from 3% to 5% in the literature (Barata
et al., 2015; Martins et al., 2013; OECD, 2010; Komives et al., 2005). Portugal
exhibits idiosyncrasies, the work of Barata et al. (2015) raises concerns about poor
and numerous households, where the affordability threshold (3%) for these families is
exceeded and heterogeneity of the municipalities should be accounted for. There are
large disparities between municipalities and cases where the affordability threshold is
exceeded for the poorest 20% households, with a significant number of municipalities
above the burden limit Martins et al. (2013), and even when low-income households
have low-water consumption levels Cruz et al. (2015). However, these authors also
found that overall the water charges can be considered affordable and respecting the
human right to safe water under affordable conditions22.
Therefore, public policies, and water utilities could focus on the issue of con-
sumer misperception of prices, consumption and total bill, and how this misperception
affects total consumption expenditure. Media often presents cases where consumers
pay high prices or focuses on announcements of price increases for utility services
21. For instance, during 2011 social protests about increasing water prices occurred in some
Portuguese municipalities, such as Loures, Odivelas and Cartaxo (Henriques and Filipe, 2011;
Mirante, 2011).
22. As a comparison, in electricity the charges represent 2.8% of the average household expenditure,
both in European Union (Linden et al., 2014) and United States in 2009 (Delmas and Lessem,
2014). In European Union, the electricity household expenditure ranges from 1.2% (e.g. Greece) to
5.6% (e.g. Slovakia), with Portugal exceeding the 4% of consumption expenditure, according to an
Eurostat household budget survey carried in 2012 (Linden et al., 2014).
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(Jornal de Notícias, 2015; Castanho, 2014; Tomás, 2014; Henriques and Filipe, 2011),
although the reality of water-expenditure statistics often denies the fact for the
average consumption. ERSAR data for 2013 shows that in mainland Portugal the
average monthly total water bill for 10 cubic meters was 21.9 € (WS 10.4 €, WW
7.0 €, solid waste 4.5 €)23 and the average water price per cubic meter for WS and
WW were 1.2 € and 0.7 €, respectively (ERSAR, 2014c).
As noted above, water as a utility represents a small percentage of the average
Portuguese households’ monthly expenses24. The existence of increasing block rate
(IBR) structure in all Portuguese municipalities also introduces complexity and
could affect consumer perception. Potential explanations for street protests could be
consumer misperception and media as well as the way the information is presented.
This puzzling evidence is not addressed on residential water demand literature, as
far as we acknowledge.
3.3 Literature review
Prices are seen in several different frameworks depending on the field of study. For
instance, conventional economic sciences have been mainly focused in the intrinsic
value and exchange value of a good or service. Nevertheless, in the last three decades
some other aspects attracted researcher’s attention, such as behavioural pricing that
frames price as a subjective price. This subjective price is created by the consumer
based on their internal reference prices (e.g. past prices) and price presentation
effects (e.g. 99-cent endings), as well as on the perceived price fairness (Krishna,
2009), i.e. consumer perception about how fair the price is to him or her. Consumers
have internal norms which are constructed by themselves against which they compare
observed prices (Cheng and Monroe, 2013). These are called (internal) reference
prices25. This will be their perceived price, e.g. perceived average price of water.
Thus, it is important to stress that residential water demand studies, in general,
use price specifications and observed prices (Sebri, 2014; Arbués et al., 2003) and
even a recent price-perception approach that uses a geometric average of marginal
and average prices and improves Shin’s model in the choice of the perceived-price
23. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
24. Even taking into account that the average water bill includes the costs with WS, WW and
municipal solid waste, but does not include water resource rate or VAT (Value Added Tax),
components with smaller relative weight (ERSAR, 2014c).
25. Reference prices are internal and dynamic prices used by individuals to judge and evaluate a
given price of a good or service, so "cannot be external" (Cheng and Monroe, 2013, p.113). Cheng
and Monroe (2013, p.108) also state "Researchers have mistakenly dichotomized reference price
as internal (in mind) or external (in the environment). All reference prices are internal meaning
they are in the minds of the individual buyers." Moreover, it is a well-established stylized fact that
"Consumers have individual reference prices for each product or service they consider for purchases"
(Cheng and Monroe, 2013, p.110). For an alternative perspective, see Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) on
external reference points.
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functional form (Binet et al., 2014), still does not go further that the conventional
dichotomy between consumer reactions to marginal and average prices in utilities
(Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1991; Shin, 1985). This seems to be a narrow approach,
when the use of alternative approaches, such as the reference prices and study of
their implications was never developed (Correia and Roseta-Palma, 2014). Besides
the price, the same reasoning could be also applied to other reference terms (e.g.
perceived monthly water consumption and bill).
The quality of information, namely the way the price, consumption and total
amount paid are presented on the water bill, e.g. different transparency levels of water
prices, influence consumer perceptions and behaviour (Gaudin, 2006). Moreover the
type of information, e.g. average price of last month or average price of last year, will
be an external reference price to the consumers and influence their price perceptions,
a phenomenon known as price presentation effects.
In several sectors, from water to energy sector, price increases can be difficult
to implement (Delmas and Lessem, 2014), since they can create negative emotions
on consumers (Homburg et al., 2005). Surveys are important to access this issue
because they enable us to analyse attitudes and perceptions.
Recently, the residential water demand literature has used household surveys,
and it has become common practice to obtain richer and more detailed information
about water consumers (Binet et al., 2014; Nauges, 2014; Martins and Moura e Sá,
2011; OECD, 2011; Clark and Finley, 2008). Moreover, recent studies have also
used surveys to analyse water utility managers’ attitudes and perceptions towards
strategic planning, water conservation and rate structure decisions (Boyer et al.,
2014, 2012).
Surveys are developed with two main purposes: i) evaluate respondents’ (e.g.
consumers or water utility managers’) attitudes, habits, and perceptions; ii) ob-
tain latent variables, i.e. unobserved variables that only become observable to
the researchers with a survey, and observable variables with personal information
that sometimes are not available to the researchers, e.g. monthly net household
income, household size, dwelling with a pool, number of taps, among other specific
chairacteristics.
Overall, surveys in this field seems to be extremely focused on consumer
habits (Binet et al., 2014; Nauges, 2014; OECD, 2011) and attitudes towards water
management, environment, sustainability, fairness and efficiency (Zetland and Gasson,
2013; Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011; OECD, 2011; Clark and Finley, 2008). However,
there is scant evidence of surveys focusing on consumer perceptions about what
we considered relevant variables in demand analysis, i.e. perceived consumption
(Barata et al., 2012; Tralhão, 2011; Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011) and perceived
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price (Binet et al., 2014) assuming imperfectly informed households. This latter
study takes the Shin (1985) approach, used in water demand studies and also known
as Shin price (Sebri, 2014), one step further. Nevertheless, the perceived price
parameter is typically an estimation (Binet et al., 2014; Nieswiadomy and Molina,
1991; Shin, 1985) or obtained through treatment in experimental economics dealing
with water demand (Wichman, 2014), instead of real perceived prices elicited from
water consumers, i.e. their reference prices. Binet et al. (2014) did not account this in
their survey design, although they collected information on household characteristics
and water-using appliances (phase one) and on the actual consumption levels on
the last three water bills (phase two). The authors concluded that water consumers
underestimate the price (more strongly in the case of marginal price rather than
average price). Martins and Moura e Sá (2011) concludes that more than 90% of
their sample had a perception of bill, but around 85% did not have a clue about
their water consumption. Overall, the water bills seem to have low-value information
about water pricing requiring better price information (Binet et al., 2014; Martins
and Moura e Sá, 2011; Gaudin, 2006). Consumer seems to act using a "benckmark"
value (Moura e Sá and Martins, 2014) (or internal reference point) only looking at
the water bill when there is an abnormal situation (e.g. increase in total amount)
or when they wish to know the amount they must pay (Martins and Moura e Sá,
2015). Therefore, the authors argue that besides enhancing the quality of invoices,
since information within the invoices is sometimes undervalued, due to numeracy
and literacy problems, consumer awareness and the effective informational role of
water bills could be improved by informational and educational programs.
Although these are interesting findings, this literature did not take further
steps to understand if consumers underestimate or overestimate price, consumption
and total water bill, with the exception of Binet et al. (2014) for price perception.
Moreover, it is also important to explain why this happens and how new approaches
can cope with these issues of consumer perceptions and reference points (e.g. reference
price, monthly reference consumption and monthly reference water bill).
3.4 Survey on the water consumption of Portuguese households
3.4.1 Description of survey and dataset
The database used was a household-level survey based on Portuguese residential
water consumers. The Portuguese and English versions of the survey are provided
in the appendices D and E. A telephone questionnaire, on a sample of Portuguese
residential water consumers, which was performed during the summer of 2012.
Thirteen Portuguese water utilities were selected to join the project based on their
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willingness to participate and with the help of ERSAR (Economic Regulator for the
Water and Waste Industry). Table 3.1 shows the response rates computed as the
number of responses divided by the number of dwellings in each municipality, where
dark blue is the higher value and light blue is the lower value. The response rates
are slightly higher for water utilities with less number of dwellings.
Tab. 3.1: Total dwellings and response rates by water utility
Water utility Total dwellings Response rate
1 (Águas do Sado) 61.904 0,4
2 (CM Lagos) 24.810 0,8
3 (CM Montemor-o-Velho) 13.207 0,7
4 (CM Sines) 7.448 2,6
5 (CM Vila de Rei) 2.956 2,0
6 (CM Vouzela) 5.812 2,4
7 (EMARP, Portimão) 46.419 0,4
8 (EMAS Beja) 18.932 1,1
9 (SM Alcobaça) 34.578 0,2
10 (SMAS Caldas da Rainha) 30.909 0,6
11 (SMAS Sintra) 182.377 0,1
12 (SMAS Guarda) 26.494 0,8
13 (SMSB Viana do Castelo) 46.605 0,4
Source: author’s analysis. Number of dwellings in 2012 based on ERSAR data.
The questions in the survey were chosen based on literature review, consultation
with experts from water sector and pretests with water consumers26.
The household data collected has a final sample size of 2,233 water consumers
from Portuguese municipalities. It includes both primary data obtained from house-
holds through the phone survey and their actual consumption and billing data,
provided by water utilities for the twelve previous months (July 2011 to June 2012),
which allows us to compare actual consumer perceptions with real data27.
The data set includes information from consumption habits to several dimen-
sions of consumer perceptions on water price, monthly consumption, monthly total
bill, sustainability and fairness concerns, containing around one hundred variables.
The data set does not include consumer names, addresses or other type of private
information.
The locations of the municipalities in mainland Portugal are provided in figure
26. Survey developed under the project PTDC/EGE-ECO/114477/2009, with financial support
from FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Science and Technology Foundation). Additional
information can be provided upon request.
27. The water consumption provided by the water utilities is based on both monthly estimates and
real values: we create a dummy variable to control for this potential issue, estimated consumption
bias.
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3.1 and the main characteristics by water utility are summarized in table 3.2. The
number of blocks is four in almost all water utilities, with exceptions of the utilities 5
and 8 (CM Vila de Rei and EMAS Beja). The average monthly household disposable
income (2011) ranges between 1.040 € in utility 5 (CM Vila de Rei) and 1.481 € in
utility 1 (Águas do Sado), based in the Portuguese Tax Authorities. Overall, the
actual average bill in the sample and the average bill based on ERSAR for an average
consumption of 10 cubic meter (m3), in 2012, have their minimum values in the
utility 5 (CM Vila de Rei). The highest value for the reference of 10 m3 is the utility
9 (SM Alcobaça), which is the second largest value in our sample.
Fig. 3.1: Locations of the municipalities
3.4.2 Highlights from the survey responses
Household and respondent characteristics
In the sample collected, there are 51% detached or semi-detached houses (henceforth
houses) and 49% apartments. The respondents are mainly owners of the houses
(83%) and apartments (76%) and the majority of the responses regard their main
residence (85% and 89%, respectively) (table A.1, in appendix A).
The monthly net household income is similar between houses and apartments
in our sample, overall 55% of the households have an income between 501 and 1,500
€. Dwellings with two members represent 35% and 36% in house and apartments,
respectively (table A.2).
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Tab. 3.2: Summary statistics by water utility
Water Utility Total dwellings Number
of blocks
Income
(€)
Actual average con-
sumption (m3)
Actual average bill (€) Average bill (consump-
tion 10 m3, €, ERSAR)
1 (Águas do Sado) 61.904 4 1.481,3 9,4 20,1 19,6
2 (CM Lagos) 24.810 4 1.144,2 8,2 18,8 22,9
3 (CM Montemor-o-Velho) 13.207 4 1.295,5 9,0 10,6 13,7
4 (CM Sines) 7.448 4 1.449,7 11,0 16,4 15,5
5 (CM Vila de Rei) 2.956 6 1.040,3 7,8 7,3 8,3
6 (CM Vouzela) 5.812 4 1.062,2 4,8 9,0 12,2
7 (EMARP, Portimão) 46.419 4 1.209,4 8,0 21,0 24,0
8 (EMAS Beja) 18.932 6 1.456,7 8,9 17,6 26,8
9 (SM Alcobaça) 34.578 4 1.174,3 11,1 23,2 27,7
10 (SMAS Caldas da Rainha) 30.909 4 1.219,6 9,4 18,0 20,1
11 (SMAS Sintra) 182.377 4 1.404,5 7,7 23,7 26,2
12 (SMAS Guarda) 26.494 4 1.413,5 8,3 19,2 26,7
13 (SMSB Viana do Castelo) 46.605 4 1.254,3 7,5 18,9 21,4
Source: author’s analysis.
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The average weighted household size is 2.7 inhabitants per dwelling (2.9
per house and 2.5 per apartment), taken into account sampling weights based on
respondents per water utility. This value is similar to the national household size in
Portugal (2.6), according to National Statistical Institute of Portugal28.
In the sample, the respondents are 52.5% women and 47.5% men, and 93%
have primary or secondary education (table A.3). Regarding the water bill, 92% of
the sample are payers, and almost 70% state that they always look at the information
of water bill. Considering awareness about the type of information in the water bill,
54% of consumers state that they analyse the detailed information, rather than only
the total amount. Finally, we also question whether consumers look at it due to
an increase or to a decrease in the total amount. As expected, respondents look
mainly due to increases, 53%, rather than decreases, 2%. The remaining 45% state
they didn’t look. This empirical evidence is raw data that partially corroborates the
idea from prospect theory that losses are more valued than gains (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).
Consumer habits and decisions
This section describes the consumer habits and decisions made regarding the water
billing process. In table A.4, we summarize some consumer habits and decisions.
Around 90% of the total sample stated that they water the garden at the coolest period
of the day to avoid evaporation ("Do you water your garden/backyard/vegetable
garden in the morning or at night to avoid evaporation?", evaporation) and use the
washing machine with full loads ("Do you normally wash full loads?", full). The
concerns on watering the garden are stronger in houses (91%) rather than apartments
(80%), as expected. For car washing, 66% stated that a hose is used for the subsample
of houses (the overall percentage is 61%, car_hose). The existence of an alternative to
publicly supplied water (well) is more common for houses (27%) and not apartments
(1%). As for decisions related with the billing process, almost half use direct debit
(debit), which could be an important factor in water bill perceptions. The electronic
water bill (ebill) is not the primary method of receiving the water bill, since 95% of
the sample still use the traditional method based on a letter in the mail.
Due to geographical differences between the municipalities involved, our sample
comprises a diversity of family and household characteristics, thus providing an
overall view of the Portuguese reality in the residential water sector. Additionally,
we also found that a large majority of households from different municipalities follow
other pro-environmental behaviours, including i) choosing the shower instead of
baths (97%), ii) closing the tap while brushing the teeth (90%) and iii) closing the
28. Source: PORDATA, https://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/, accessed on 17 August 2015.
3.4. Survey on the water consumption of Portuguese households 43
tap while soaping in the shower (77%). From our total sample, another important
decision is that 81% of the respondents do not submit their meter reading to the
water utility. Finally, a consumer habit that revealed a significant variation was the
preference to drink tap water instead of other sources (e.g. bottled water or water
from public fountains), since around 58% of respondents did not have a preference
for drinking tap water (with a minimum of 35% and a maximum of 82% depending
on the municipality). The analysis of the determinants of some of these decisions
will be discussed in chapter 4. We proceed the analysis to understand consumer
awareness and perceptions, especially about the water bill, consumption and price.
Consumer awareness and perceptions
Regarding the total monthly water bill, the majority of respondents (87%) try to
come up with an estimate of the average level they pay for water each month, in line
with previous findings for a Portuguese municipality that found a similar response
rate (84%) (Tralhão, 2011). However, in our survey, we found that they tend to
overestimate their water bill on average. The ratio of the estimated consumption and
the actual average consumption is 1.3 (number of observations, n=1924), while 70%
estimates are between the minimum and maximum bill paid in the previous year.
Nonetheless, there is a significant variation between water utilities in this last finding,
46% to 81%, which can be an indicator of differences in the quality of information
provided to consumers.
With respect to the monthly water consumption, only a minority of respondents
try to come up with an estimate of the level of water consumption (24%). From
those who guessed their consumption they significantly overestimated it, on average:
the ratio of the estimated consumption and the actual average consumption was 2.2
(n=518), and only 57% come up with a guess between their minimum and maximum
consumption of the previous year. As the previous case of the monthly water bill,
there is a significant variation between water utilities in this last finding, 38% to 78%,
which can be again an indicator of significant differences in the quality of information
provided in the water bills as well as literacy levels in different parts of country.
As for prices, respondents are aware of the increasing block rate (54% respond
to the question on tariff structure and 72% do it correctly). In our sample, the
number of blocks perceived question only have a response rate of 27% and from
those 79% underestimate the true number of block applied by their water utility. A
potential explanatory factor is that consumption rarely hits the higher blocks and
therefore consumers are not aware of them. On the other hand, the high non-response
rate (73%) for number of blocks, can indicates a lack of information about this aspect.
Overall, these findings are in line with Martins and Moura e Sá (2011). Sur-
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prisingly, 23% of our sample believe they have a uniform price, although block tariff
structures with increasing prices are universal in Portugal. On the other hand,
Tralhão (2011) highlights that less than 10% of the consumers know their tariff
structure, and when the type of structure was presented to them only 15% guessed
correctly the increasing block tariff structure.
In our survey, we also found that more than 90% of the sample do not know
water prices, neither marginal prices nor average price. Thus, only 7% state they
know an approximate average price for cubic meter of water consumed. Moreover, to
the simple yes-no question "Do you know the per cubic meter price associated with
each block?", only 8% answered they know their marginal prices. This is in line with
the previous water demand studies that found less than 15% of their sample were
aware of the price paid for their water consumption (Frondel and Messner, 2008;
Carter and Milon, 2005). Frondel and Messner (2008) found that only 12% of their
sample is aware of their marginal prices and tariff structure and argue that price
policy will impact only on households that are price aware (price-conscious). The
study by Carter and Milon (2005) states that only 6% of households are aware of
the marginal prices they pay, and that consumers typically react more to average
prices than to marginal prices.
A puzzling fact in our study was that even after stating they do not know their
water price, consumers still answer questions about their price fairness perceptions.
"Processing price information begins with initial exposure to price information (...)"
(Cheng and Monroe, 2013, p.120). In residential water demand estimation, this could
be problematic since consumers seem to be adequately exposed to price information,
perhaps due to lack of clarity in water bills (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011; Gaudin,
2006). This could partially explain the low response rates and knowledge about water
prices found in this literature29. If consumers have higher expense awareness rather
than price awareness, consumers could be using expense awareness as a proxy for
reference price, since in their mind expense be framed as the "value" of water. The
ratio of the estimated average price and the actual average price is 0.5 (n=146), which
reflects an underestimation. Furthermore, looking deeper into this small sub-sample
of consumers that try to guess their average price we found that all estimates are
outside the actual price range30. Moreover, excluding the fixed charge to calculate
the price range, 35% are within the minimum and maximum price of their tariff
29. Another potential factors are poor data quality (Moura e Sá and Martins, 2014), numeracy
and literacy issues (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2015) and the fact that numerical information is not
objective, as we might think, but rather abstract in nature (Cheng and Monroe, 2013). This research
about different representations of prices in our minds could be relevant to understand this issue,
although is outside our initial scope.
30. The maximum and minimum prices for each consumer were used. The prices are based on
their water supply, waste water, municipal solid waste and value-added tax plus the fixed charge,
according to the information provided by the water utility.
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structure. This issue will be analysed in detail in chapter 5, where we propose a
conceptual model of perceived price fairness.
To sum up, according to our survey consumers mistakenly believe that they
are cognizant of their water bills (around 69% stated they always look at the water
bill). Yet, responses show that residential consumers are not aware of the average
price paid and the few who try to come up with estimates tend to underestimate
it. The full tariff structure is generally unknown, while the values of monthly water
consumption and bill tend to be overestimated.
3.5 Conclusion and Future Research
Our study confirms the view, common in the literature of residential water demand,
that consumers have limited knowledge of the marginal price of water (Frondel and
Messner, 2008; Carter and Milon, 2005), which can be explained by the different
levels of price transparency in the water bill (Gaudin, 2006). A potential line of
future research is the use of bills as an alternative to water price in the estimation of
water demand.
Overall, the survey revealed that Portuguese consumers have a low awareness
level about their reference points, such as their perceived price (92% and 93% of
our sample do not know their marginal or average price, respectively) and perceived
consumption (76% of our sample). Consumption and price, which are extremely
important to economic analysis, seem to be unknown variables to the majority of
water consumers, although the bill seems to be widely acknowledged (87% try to
guess their bill).
In general, we found the existence of three effects, with respect to consumer
awareness and perceptions: underestimation of the average price and overestimation
of monthly water consumption and bill. Knowledge about the full pricing structure
was limited (54% try to guess and from those 72% know they have a IBR structure)
and consumers underestimated the true number of block tariffs applied by their water
utility in 79% of the sample. A potential explanatory factor is that consumption
rarely reaches higher blocks, although, the high non-response rate (73%) can also
indicate lack of information. Nevertheless, 57% and 70% of responses on the values
of the monthly water consumption and bill, respectively, are between the minimum
and maximum values of the previous year. Regarding price, all consumer responses
to the survey were outside their average price range paid in reality. Water resource
economists should think how to cope with these issues, acknowledging and testing
consumer awareness.
One of the aims of this article is to explore the puzzle that the majority of
water consumers are unaware of their price, as traditionally shown in this literature,
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and yet react to price according to same studies. This puzzle could be partially
explained by the fact that people normally know (our believe to know) their water
bill. Consumers could in fact use water bill as a proxy to water price, and can mix
the two different values, an avenue of further research.
To successfully manage demand through prices, operators have to do a better
job of providing information to customers. Stakeholder engagement is a crucial
dimension for the development of trust and engagement in public policies (OECD,
2015). A holistic approach should be considered by the public authorities of water
sector, the government and water utilities to improve consumer awareness, tackling
these misperceptions as well as the general lack of information.
Additionally, pricing policies should address not only price perceptions, but
also acknowledge that the timeless discussion about marginal and average water price
seems to have low perceived relevance for water consumers in terms of influencing
their consumption, probably because of biases affecting their decisions (Umpfenbach,
2014). The total monthly water bill could emerge as a key element in the development
of future policy making in water sector. In chapter 4, we will discuss factors that
could explain the formation of reference points, such as reference price, consumption
and bill.
4. WATER CONSUMER BEHAVIOURS AND PERCEPTIONS
4.1 Introduction
Several studies have focused on water-saving behaviours based on indoor and outdoor
water uses (Grafton, 2014; Nauges, 2014; Grafton et al., 2011), but only some
accounted for the potentially different explanatory factors of indoor and outdoor
water conservation choices (Dupont and Renzetti, 2013), according to our review of
the literature (table B.1, in appendix). Two surveys by the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development) collected information about ten and twelve
thousand households in ten and eleven countries, respectively, (OECD, 2014, 2011)
and were the basis for a large part of the studies in the literature review conducted.
Dupont and Renzetti (2013) were an exception using data at local level, namely the
Households and the Environment Survey (HES) performed by Statistics Canada in
2006.
Typical indoor water-saving behaviours are closing the tap while brushing
teeth, taking showers instead of baths, plugging the sink while washing dishes and
washing full loads. Conventional outdoor water uses include rainwater collection or
wastewater recycling, and watering the garden in the coolest parts of the day as
pro-environmental and water conservation behaviours. The literature also focuses
on water-efficient appliances and on the factors influencing the household’s proba-
bility to invest in these equipments such as pro-environmental attitudes, dwelling
ownership, and policy variables (Millock and Nauges, 2010). The importance of
socio-demographic, economic, political and environmental attitudinal and behavioural
factors to enhance pro-environmental consumption and purchase behaviours has
also been recently highlighted (Sánchez et al., 2015). These authors found that
environmental attitudes (opinion of respondents on statements about the environ-
ment), left-wing political ideology and the level of environmental information of
the consumers have a positive effect on pro-environmental behaviours. Another
factor that can impacts pro-environmental behaviours is Media, specifically news
about water such as water scarcity or water-saving campaigns. Queiroz et al. (2012)
consider this factor, but only for the household’s decision whether to drink tap water,
and not for water-saving behaviours. Overall, the main focus of studies has been
either about pro-environmental consumption (i.e. general water-saving behaviours),
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purchase behaviours (i.e. investment in water-efficient equipments) household and
respondent determinants, as well as climate factors for outdoor water conservation
choices. However, information about the water bill and consumer perceptions is
underinvestigated. The literature on indoor water conservation choices focuses mainly
on specific behaviours and uses data from OECD surveys in several cases. Our work
is the first to explore the factors that may explain the household’s likelihood to
adopt modern billing methods, and we propose some new factors to explain water-
saving behaviours, such as variables of consumer perceptions and attitudes. We
also analysed the household’s probability to adopt other indoor water conservation
behaviours, such as closing the tap while soaping in the shower and washing full
loads of laundry. Moreover, we study the household’s probability to adopt outdoor
water-saving habits, commonly covered in this field, namely whether the dwelling
has a water deposit/tank or even a laundry tub to harvest rainwater and whether
the garden/backyard/vegetable garden is watered in the morning or the evening to
avoid evaporation. Furthermore, we also study the factors affecting the household’s
probability to submit meter readings to the water utility and to pay the water bill
by direct debit.
As noted in chapter 3, a puzzling question within water demand studies is the
high level of price unawareness (Frondel and Messner, 2008; Carter and Milon, 2005).
These studies found that more than 85% of their samples were not aware of the
marginal prices they paid which compares with 92% in our sample (see section 3.4.2
for details). Nevertheless, the bill is commonly known by water consumers (Martins
and Moura e Sá, 2011; Tralhão, 2011). These authors pointed out values around 90%
of their samples31. Overall, the total amount billed is generally known, but the unit
water price, marginal or average, is not.
It would be interesting to understand the factors that influence consumers
perceptions about the total amount of their bill, the average price and the consumption
levels. These perceptions may also be seen as reference points, such as those commonly
used in prospect theory to divide the space of outcomes of the value function into
gains and losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). These (neutral) reference points are
consumer anchors for given outcomes, commonly assumed to be status quo values,
but which can be also be formed in other ways32. Our main aim is not to cope with
reference points, but to shed new light into the formation of such points for water
costumers.
Martins et al. (2015) discuss the determinants of consumer awareness about
31. The majority of the sample in our database (87%) try to come up with an estimate of the
average level paid for their bill.
32. Reference points may be an expected or desired level. Reference points may change and,
consequently, be different from status quo, for instance the change in the monthly salary when an
unexpected tax increase occurs(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
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the water bill through an equal-weighted index with three components: i) total
amount paid, ii) consumption and iii) tariff scheme. The latter, is based on the actual
knowledge of the consumers about: i) services charged along with water supply,
namely wastewater and solid waste, ii) presence of increasing block rates, and iii)
the accuracy of the respondent about the about the average price. The authors
found that income negatively impacts on awareness, and factors such as education,
number of water-using appliances and looking more often to the water bill have
a positive impact. Our study differs from the previous one, since it focus on the
formation of reference points, rather than consumer awareness. Thus, our goal is
to understand the determinants that influence people to have an internal reference
for price, consumption and bill, a behavioural pricing issue, specially focused on the
relation of perceived price fairness with reference points (Somervuori, 2014; Krishna,
2009).
In our database, the perceived price fairness, measured through the statement
"The tariffs charged for an essential good such as water are unfair" was answered
by 93% of the respondents, when only 7% know their average price. This is a
puzzling fact, since even after failing to show they know the water prices, they
still have fairness concerns. The mental processing of the price in the consumers
mind is dependent upon exposure to price information (Cheng and Monroe, 2013),
although residential water consumers do not seem to be exposed to it. There are
many potential explanations for this finding, such as the lack of clarity and price
information in water bills (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011; Gaudin, 2006), weak
data quality (Moura e Sá and Martins, 2014), numeracy and literacy issues (Martins
and Moura e Sá, 2015) and the fact that numerical information processing is not
objective, but rather abstract in nature (Cheng and Monroe, 2013)33. All these
potential factors, as well as idiosyncratic explanations related with municipalities
where consumers are located, can play a role. Nonetheless, if consumers have higher
bill awareness rather than average price, it is possible to hypothesize that consumer
price fairness perception has an impact on bill perception, as a proxy to the "value"
of water. In the case of poorly-informed consumers, their minds may frame perceived
bill as the reference price, while well-informed consumers would know both their
reference bill and average price.
Overall, in this chapter, we specifically address the following questions: What
factors influence the water consumer’s probability to have reference points for price,
33. Firstly, the authors state that the internal reference price are not directly observable, but
suppose two numbers equidistant from a reference point, in numerical terms, are perceived to be
closer to this reference if they are larger rather than smaller (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). One
example of this asymmetric perception is if the reference price is 10 Euros, then between 15 and 5
Euros, the higher value is typically perceived as closer to 10 Euros, although the price difference is
equal.
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consumption, and bill? Is perceived price fairness a factor affecting the formation of
reference points? If so, what are its effects on the formation of perceived average
water price and bill? Besides the conventional determinants used in this literature,
what perception factors affect the household’s probability to adopt outdoor and
indoor water conservation behaviours and opt for modern billing standards? Finally,
why do some consumers prefer to drink tap water instead of using alternative sources?
In order to determine the household’s probability to adopt outdoor and indoor
water conservation choices and modern billing standards, we used a binary probit
model, with and without sample selection and instrumental variables probit models,
common methods in this literature (Nauges, 2014; Dupont and Renzetti, 2013;
Grafton et al., 2011). Probit and special regressor models were applied to study
the respondent’s probability of being aware of the reference points. The modelling
framework is described in section B.1.1. The distinction between household and
respondent probabilities is mainly due to the fact that water conservation choices,
as well as other choices within the dwelling reflect a common behaviour within the
household. Nevertheless, perceived values, such as reference points, are less likely
to have such general nature and be common knowledge within the household, since
each household member will have idiosyncratic internal references.
Furthermore, in the preliminary analysis we included dummy variables for
water losses or leakages, or any interruption in the water supply service, in the
previous year. These factors were tested, since interruption in water supply, might
influence water saving behaviour. For example, if you have a lot of interruptions you
have a greater incentive to use a tank, if you can, to get alternative water. Losses or
leakages could affect the probability of adopting the water-saving behaviour.
In section 4.2, we discuss the main factors influencing conservation choices of
residential water consumers and choice to drink tap water through a brief literature
review. In section 4.3, we describe the empirical results about the formation of
reference points, the probability to adopt conservation behaviours and more modern
billing methods, as well as drinking tap water, based on the analysis of the average
marginal effects. Plus, we perform robustness tests of endogeneity. In section 4.4, we
present the conclusions and discuss the potential avenues for future research.
4.2 Literature review
4.2.1 Determinants of water-saving behaviours
The brief literature review summarized in table 4.1 highlights four groups of variables
of interest used in water-saving behaviour studies using: i) household and respondent
variables, ii) attitudinal and behavioural factors, iii) political variables and iv) climate
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variables (see table B.1, in appendices, for details). Consumption perception variables,
have not typically been used to explain water-saving behaviours in this literature.
Moreover, there is scant evidence of studies on billing practices. The respondent’s
probability of being aware of reference points, namely, reference price, monthly
consumption and bill about tap water has also not been covered.
Tab. 4.1: Brief review of type of variables used in studies of water-saving behaviours
Studies Household and
respondent
Attitudinal and be-
havioural factors
Political
factors
Climate
factors
(Grafton, 2014) -
(Nauges, 2014) -
(Dupont and Renzetti, 2013) -
(Grafton et al., 2011) -
Source: author’s analysis.
Household and respondent determinants
Explanatory variables applied in these models typically include: total monthly
household income, a dummy variable for the existence of a volumetric charge,
household size, dwellings with at least one children, house ownership, urban area, as
well as individual characteristics such as age, education and gender (Grafton, 2014;
Nauges, 2014; Dupont and Renzetti, 2013; Grafton et al., 2011). On the other hand,
there are less usual specific regressors, such as the number of years in the current
residence (Grafton, 2014; Nauges, 2014), the number of rooms in the dwelling and
the type of dwelling, highlighting if it is a detached house or other type of house
(Grafton et al., 2011). Dupont and Renzetti (2013) used additional factors, such as
the marginal price of water as well as the price variation, although it is the only study
in our review that does not include information about attitudinal and behavioural
factors.
Attitudinal and behavioural determinants
There are different ways to account for attitudes and behaviours. Some studies
assess attitudes on environmental issues and the "environmental concern" index
(Grafton, 2014; Nauges, 2014; Grafton et al., 2011). We accounted for household
pro-environmental opinions, namely whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with
the statement "Water should be more expensive where it is scarcer". Following the
literature on perceived price fairness (Diller, 2008), we tested in the preliminary
analysis fairness concerns about water price, namely whether the consumer is in
agreement or disagreement with the statements: i) "The water price should be
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increased if the water utility incurs in a loss", ii) "The price you pay for water is fair"
and iii) "the tariffs charged for an essential good such as water are unfair".
Policy and Political determinants
Several articles have used policy and political variables, such as the non-price water
policies (Dupont and Renzetti, 2013), the fact that the respondent is a voter in the
last elections and an environmental organization supporter (Grafton, 2014; Nauges,
2014; Grafton et al., 2011), as well as an environmental organization member (Grafton
et al., 2011). Overall, the political determinants such as election participation or
collaboration within environmental organization, either as a supporter or a member,
typically have a significant positive impact on the household’s probability to adopt
water-saving behaviours. However, database does not include such variables, therefore
these effects were not tested in this research.
Climate determinants
Climate variables are not common in studies of the probability to adopt indoor and
outdoor water-saving behaviours. In indoor water uses, the explanatory power of
climate factors is questionable, although outdoor water conservation choices are
expected to be affected by precipitation (rainfall) and temperature. Dupont and
Renzetti (2013) used total precipitation (rainfall) in the household area, number of
days with average daytime temperature above 18 Celsius degrees (degree days), and
average daytime temperature, all variables calculated for summer months (June, July
and August). The authors found that rainfall and degree days have, respectively, a
negative and positive statistically significant impact on the frequency of lawn and
garden watering during the summer months, based on a bivariate ordered probit
model with instrumental variables. Nevertheless, the average daytime temperature
was not significant.
Consumption perception determinants
This topic is novelty in the literature. Some studies discuss the low level of knowledge
about key elements of the water bill (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011; Tralhão, 2011),
but so far no attempt has been made to analyse their potential impacts in water-
saving behaviours. We hypothesized and tested consumer perception variables in
the preliminary tests to understand their impact on water conservation choices. One
of the variables selected was dummy perception variable on whether consumers
know that their tariff structure is an increasing block rate (IBR), in order to test
whether those who know it behave differently. Moreover, factors that make the
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information and knowledge about the water bill salient were studied. We also tested
dummy variables based on whether consumers answered survey questions about
their perceived values of average price (referenceprice), monthly water consumption
(referencecons) and monthly bill paid (referencebill), i.e. whether they have reference
values for these. Furthermore, we check if consumers are aware of their average
perceived water bill total (percbillt).
4.2.2 Determinants of the decision to drink tap water
A question that has been puzzling to water resource economists is why consumers
buy bottled water instead of drinking tap water. Indeed, the bottled water market
continues to growth rapidly (Jakus et al., 2009; Doria, 2006), although some articles
argue that it is environmental unsustainable due to the waste and the fossil fuel
pollution related with packaging and transportation (Arnold and Larsen, 2006; Wilk,
2006). The global average consumption per capita of bottled water increased from
17.8 to 33.3 litres, with Portuguese bottled water consumption per capita increasing
from 71.5 litres in 2000 to 90.5 litres in 201134. Bottled water can cost hundreds or
thousands of times more than tap water, while tap water could have superior quality,
see for example the literature reviews from Johnstone and Serret (2012), Jakus et al.
(2009), and Doria (2006). Yet, bottled water is perceived as having higher quality and
being more healthy than tap water (Ferrier, 2001), possibly due to Media reports on
the perceived quality of tap water (Queiroz et al., 2012). Overall, the risk perception
related to adverse health concerns (Zivin et al., 2011; Jakus et al., 2009) and quality
perception have been the major topics in this literature, although there is a complex
set of factors affecting consumer perception of water quality, including demographics
and cultural background, trust in the water utilities, prior experiences, sensorial
information (organoleptics) and impersonal and interpersonal information, just to
point out a few (Doria, 2010). Nevertheless, no study has yet approached the impact
of perceived tap water price and consumption perception variables on the discrete
choice between tap and bottled water consumption. Our contribution to this subject
differs slightly from the aforementioned studies by looking at the choice of drinking
water from the tap versus other sources (including bottled water).
The typical models used to perform such studies are binary probit (Francisco,
2014; Johnstone and Serret, 2012; Um et al., 2002) or multi-nominal probit models
(Johnstone and Serret, 2012), if the dependent variable is categorical, e.g. the use
of bottled water, use of filtered water or both is one example. According to the
literature review, we categorize the explanatory variables in groups and test their
34. Source: Authors calculation based on the industry statistics of Beverage Marketing Corporation,
http://www.bottledwater.org, accessed on 17 August 2015.
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statistical significance in our database.
The brief literature review highlighted in table 4.2 shows three groups of
variables of interest in these studies: i) household and respondent characteristics,
ii) water quality and iii) trust variables, in which the checkmarks denote the type
of variables used in each study to estimate the probability of drinking tap water or
purchasing bottled water (see table B.2 for details). The variables will be detailed in
the next sections.
Tab. 4.2: Brief review of the type of variables used in studies about the decision between
drinking tap water or alternative sources
Studies Household and
respondents
Water quality Trust
(Bontemps and Nauges, 2015) -
(Francisco, 2014)
(Nauges, 2014)
(Johnstone and Serret, 2012)
(Um et al., 2002) -
Source: author’s analysis.
Household and respondent variables
A common group of regressors or explanatory variables used in these models include:
monthly household total income or logarithmic income, household size and dummy
variables for administrative areas and to distinguish urban from rural regions, as well
as individual characteristics such as age, education, gender and children (Francisco,
2014; Nauges, 2014; Johnstone and Serret, 2012; Um et al., 2002). Interestingly, there
are other specific variables: the price of bottled water and the presence of children
between 0 and 5 years and 6 and 18 years (Francisco, 2014). An environmental
concern index (Nauges, 2014) has been used, but with mixed results in terms of
statistical significance; and car ownership due to the time costs of buying and
transporting bottled water (Johnstone and Serret, 2012), and the influence they have
on the consumer’s decision. Finally, Um et al. (2002) consider monthly average water
bill, type of house, the use of a water tank or water shortages.
Water quality variables
Water quality variables are typically important determinants of the choice between
tap and bottled water. Variables about the satisfaction with the quality of tap water,
concerning both the taste and the impact on health are common (Nauges, 2014;
Johnstone and Serret, 2012). Other studies include a dummy if water is safe to
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drink without treatment (Francisco, 2014), expectations about the water quality and
quantity, the perceived relevance of tap water or previous unpleasant experiences
when drinking tap water (Um et al., 2002). We use ERSAR water-quality data
by municipality to collect a time-series from 1993 to 2012 in order to create one
variable based on the percentage of tests not complying with the limits imposed in
the quantity of chemicals in the water. The water quality variable related to violation
in chemical parameter values is expected to be relevant, since, drinking water quality
violations are more common than other form of pollution (Zivin et al., 2011), or at
least more common detected because tests are mandatory.
Trust variables
Several studies used trust variables in their research, such as the trust level about
the environmental impacts of products (Nauges, 2014); the trustworthiness of govern-
ment entities in terms of environmental concerns, when compared with alternative
information sources, like NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and consumer asso-
ciations (Johnstone and Serret, 2012); and the perceived trust based on government
information about safe water (Francisco, 2014). Such trust variables are used to
analyse how trust effects affect the decision to drink tap water. Nevertheless, in
general, these variables have turned out to be statistically insignificant, with the
exception of the environmental impacts of products (Nauges, 2014). Although our
survey did not include trust specifically, the questions included fairness concerns.
We included in the preliminary analysis two questions about perceived price fairness
that account for salience to fair and unfair tariffs: "The price you pay for water is
fair" and "The tariffs charged for an essential good such as water are unfair". The
consumers’ responses to these questions ranged from totally disagree to totally agree
(based on the widely known Likert scale, from 1 to 5). Analysis of the determinants
of perceived price fairness on residential water sector is scarce and we will discuss
this topic in chapter 5.
Consumption perception variables
Water consumption variables related with information about the bill, information
clarity and consumer perception, such as perceived water price, consumption and
bill, are not typical in this literature (see table B.2, in appendix). Based on our data,
we used consumer perception variables to understand their impact in the decision to
drink tap water. For instance, the unit charge is often used in probit models as a
dummy variable to reflect whether water consumption is charged on a volumetric
basis (Nauges, 2014; Johnstone and Serret, 2012). In Portugal, on the other hand, all
water utilities charge on a volumetric basis. We also created dummy variables based
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on whether or not the consumer answered survey questions about reference values of
average price (referenceprice) and monthly water consumption (referencecons); this
is equivalent to checking whether consumers have reference values for their average
water price and monthly consumption.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Analysis of the probability of formation of reference points by residential
water consumers
The following results used the database previously described in section 3.4 of chapter 3.
In this study, we are also interested in factors that influence whether consumers have
perceptions about their relevant reference points, such as perceived bill, average price
or consumption level. The total amount paid seems to be more salient to consumers
than water price, according to chapter 3. Despite low consumer awareness about the
average water price, the majority of consumers have an opinion on perceived price
fairness, i.e. the question "The tariffs charged for an essential good such as water are
unfair" was answered by 93% of the respondents. Surprisingly, and coincidentally,
93% do not know their average prices. Our work also tries to address this puzzling
question, i.e. how can consumers that do not know their average prices have price
fairness concerns? Does this fact have consequences on the formation of a price
reference does it also impact other reference points?
Kahneman’s work (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) on prospect theory, had
other extensions, one of which concerns perceived price fairness (PPF), which evolved
from his work on the reference transaction (Kahneman et al., 1986b). PPF has been
used in several approaches, from its genesis in the evaluation of justice standards on
price, income and earnings (Kahneman et al., 1986b) to comparison of several rules
for allocation of scarce resources (Raux et al., 2009), as well as the analysis of the
PPF antecedents, i.e. determinants that lead consumers to construct a perception
on price fairness. The has been analysed from the point of view of marketing and
management sciences (Krishna, 2009; Diller, 2008). To address the subject, we
use two of the fairness questions about PPF included in the survey35. The chosen
questions were "The price you pay for water is fair" and "The tariffs charged for an
essential good such as water are unfair". We create a dummy variable that aims
to make salient the most extreme answers about price fairness (fairprice variable),
i.e. consumers who answered "totally agree" to the former question and and "totally
disagree" to the latter. We used probit models to assess the impact on the existence
of internal consumer references about the average price, the volume consumed and
35. See appendix E, table E.4 for additional information
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the total amount billed (the referenceprice, referencecons and referencebill variables),
which are discrete variables. We also used special regressor models to account for
potential endogeneity in two explanatory variables, the price fairness perception
(fairprice) and whether consumers know they are facing an IBR tariff structure
(knowIBR).
The summary statistics of the explanatory variables used in these models are
shown in table B.12, in the appendix B. We used the special regressor model of
(Lewbel, 2014) to account for the potential endogeneity problem. We also took into
account possible multicollinearity issues. The special regressor modelling framework
is described in section B.1.2. This model has some advantages (Dong and Lewbel,
2015), such as allowing for endogenous binary variables, as well as other discrete
choices such as ordered and multinomial as well as accounting for heteroskedasticity
of unknown form (Lewbel, 2000). Covariates can be continuous, limited, censored or
discrete (Dong and Lewbel, 2015). In our case, we have two discrete binary variables
that we suspect about endogeneity (the case of fairprice and knowIBR variable).
The use of the special regressor method requires the use of a special regressor
V satisfying some assumptions. We selected as special regressor the fitted values
of an auxiliary regression explaining household income from other covariates in our
sample (incfitted)36, which were then normalized to explain the formation of three
reference points under study. We found support for the continuous distribution of
the original variable incfitted (ranging from 0.5 to 8.1) (see table B.9, in appendix).
These special regressors can be considered to be exogenous, since the linear prediction
of income in our sample is not likely to be influenced by the three reference points
proposed, and are expected to have a monotonic and increasing relationship with the
reference variables of interest (i.e. referenceprice, referencebill and referencecons).
As describe in section B.1.2, the expected value of the dummy reference variables
(D) conditional on the covariates X of the model (E(D | X,V )) should increase with
special regressor V . For prove the monotonic relation we used the Kernel-weighted
local polynomial regression following Bontemps and Nauges (2015).
On figures B.1 and B.3 in appendix B.7, we used the demeaned value of incfitted
as the special regressor for reference price and consumption, respectively, defined as
incfittedd). Since we expected the probability of having a reference of the water bill
to decrease with the income level, the special regressor in this case was defined as
mincfittedd, describe as minus incfitted demeaned (see figure B.2 in appendix B.7).
36. We used an OLS regression of the income variable explained by the variables level of schooling,
male, household size, percentage of employed and retired members by household size, owner of the
house, having a pool, and the number of tap and dishwashers. We used heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors (henceforth robust standard errors) and sampling weights based on the percentage
of the dwellings divided by the sample percentage of questionnaires. For additional information see
the list of variables descriptions B.3 and the regression in table B.7 (in the appendix).
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We provide graphical evidence supporting the increasing monotonic relationship for
the three cases, with 95% confidence interval (CI) bands.
The weak-instrument-robust test (Anderson-Rubin Wald test) and the Hansen
J statistic of overidentification test are not rejected for the three different reference
points37. After performing these tests the following instruments were selected: if
the respondents agree or disagree with the statements "The water price should be
increased if the water utility incurs a loss" (loss) and "Water tariffs should be equal
in all the country" (uniform), the numbers of years of schooling of the respondent
(school), the percentage of actual average monthly bill in the income fitted (afford)
and the number of payers of the water bill in the household (payers).
The average index values38 (marginal effects at means) and the probit models39
are presented, respectively, in tables B.10 and B.11, in the appendix, and the null
hypothesis of exogenous variables was never rejected in post-estimation tests of the
special regressor method. This provides us evidence of no endogeneity of fairprice
and knowIBR40.
The average marginal effects of the relevant regressors are shown in table 4.3
(see table B.14 in the appendix B.8 for probit model results).
Overall the most robust variables to explain the probability of having reference
points are whether the consumer is often or always aware of the detail in the
water bill (freqdet), whether he knows his tariff structure is IBR (knowIBR), and
37. The results of the tests were i) Reference price: no evidence of weak instruments (F (5, 1615) =
1.05, with Prob > χ2(1) = 0.384) and no overidentification (χ2(3) = 2.21, with Prob > χ2(3) =
0.530), ii) Reference bill: no evidence of weak instruments (F (5, 1615) = 1.04, with Prob > χ2(1) =
0.391) and no overidentification (χ2(3) = 3.69, with Prob > χ2(1) = 0.30), and iii) Reference
consumption: no evidence of weak instruments (F (5, 1615) = 0.83, with Prob > χ2(1) = 0.527) and
no overidentification (χ2(3) = 1.7, with Prob > χ2(3) = 0.637).
38. The marginal effects for the special regressor methods were calculated using the average
index function (AIF), given its main advantage over average structural function (ASF), the easy of
estimation (Lewbel et al., 2012). For recent critic and detailed explanation about AIF and ASF see
Lin and Wooldridge (2015).
39. In the case of special regressor the Stata command sspecialreg was used. The models used
standard kernel density approach, the Silverman’s rule of thumb for automated bandwidths, instead
of manual selection of bandwidths. We used trimming, i.e. ignored extreme values, since our
assumption was that outliers do not represent the distribution under analysis. Thus, to deal with
outliers we use the trim option at 5% level, so we trimmed using a common level of the ninety-fifth
percentile (Ghosh and Vogt, 2012).
40. The results of the relevant tests reveal that fairprice and knowIBR are endogenous regressors.
The null hypothesis of Wald test of exogeneity is not rejected for referenceprice (Prob > chi2 = 0.221),
referencebill (Prob > chi2 = 0.282) and referencecons (Prob > chi2 = 0.798). The results of other
relevant tests for referenceprice were Durbin (score) tests chi2(2) = −6228.14 with p− value = 1.00
and Wu-Hausman test F (2, 1536) = −614.482 with p− value = 1.00, for referencebill were Durbin
(score) tests chi2(2) = −5852.51 with p−value = 1.00 and Wu-Hausman F test (2, 1536) = −606.698
with p− value = 1.00 and finally for referencecons were Durbin (score) tests chi2(2) = −2944.32
with p− value = 1.00 and Wu-Hausman test F (2, 1536) = −502.461 with p− value = 1.00. All the
tests point to no endogeneity in any reference-point specification. Although, in the reference price
the model is only globally significant at 5% level (see table B.11, in appendix). One potential reason
to explain this is that referenceprice is a rare event, representing only 7% of the sample (chapter 3).
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Tab. 4.3: Average marginal effects of the probability to have consumer perception
awareness based on reference points
Variables referenceprice referencebill referencecons
incfitted 0.025*** -0.019** 0.024*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
freqdet 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.121***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.025)
knowIBR 0.060*** 0.035** 0.188***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.026)
fairprice -0.085** 0.082 0.072
(0.040) (0.062) (0.106)
urban -0.052*** 0.011 -0.055*
(0.017) (0.020) (0.030)
meter 0.017 0.028 0.171***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.030)
Observations 1,660 1,700 1,700
Standard errors in parentheses. Average marginal effects for
probit models were calculated using Stata command margins.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
the linear prediction of income (incfitted). Since higher-income households have
more purchasing power, their total water expenses could represent a small share
of their household disposable income. In a country characterized by an acceptable
affordability (Barata et al., 2015; Martins et al., 2013) having a reference bill seems
to be neglected, because expenditures with water utility services represent less than
1% percentage of the household disposable income, on average (ERSAR, 2014c).
The other two variables seem to reflect that a well-informed consumer has a
higher probability of forming a reference price, consumption or bill, at 1% significance
level (SL) in almost all cases. The probability of having a reference consumption
increases by 0.19 (19 percentage points), if the respondent knows he’s facing an IBR,
at 1% SL. The magnitude of the impact of knowIBR is smaller for reference bill and
price representing an increase in the probability to the formation of this reference,
between 0.04 and 0.06, respectively. Thus, people that know their price structure
are more likely to have reference points. People who only look to the total amount
paid may probably have less information than others, which could be related with
the creation of references in their minds. Moreover, consumers that look often or
always for the water bill, including the detail are more likely to have reference points
by 6 to 12 percentage points.
The variable about the consumer opinion whether the water price is fair
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(fairprice) has a negative impact on the probability of formation of a reference
price, at 5%, and is insignificant in explaining the probability of having a reference
consumption or bill. This may reflect, that people only create references when there
is a negative evaluation in fairness judgement, as suggested by behavioural pricing
literature (Rutte and Messick, 1995; Somervuori, 2014). In fact, Xia et al. (2004)
suggest that fairness and unfairness may be represented by distinct variables of
interest, since they could be different constructs. Although in marketing theory
consumers are assumed to maximize utility, when fairness is incorporated there is
evidence that social preferences may also play a role in consumer behaviour (Krishna,
2009; Ho et al., 2006). Moreover, consumers are not constantly concerned about
fairness (Somervuori, 2014) and have uncertainty about the fair price (Cheng and
Monroe, 2013). People only search for a price comparison, using a reference when
there a negative evaluation or a surprising situation (Bechwati et al., 2009). This
topic will be explored in more detail on the chapter about PPF (chapter 5).
The urban variable seems to positively affect the formation of reference price,
since for people leaving in urban areas the probability to create a reference price is 5
percentage points lower in comparison with consumers from rural and semi-urban
areas. As expected, the probability of formation of a reference-consumption value
increases by 0.17 (17 percentage points) for consumers that submit the meter readings.
Naturally, people who report their water consumption to the water utility are trivially
more likely to have a reference value for consumption.
The mental processing of the price, as well as monthly water consumption
and bill, in the consumer’s mind is dependent upon consumer exposure to price
information (Cheng and Monroe, 2013). But other factors such as submitting the
meter readings and water bill information could also influence this process. These
evidences could be an important issue for residential water consumers because they do
not seem to be exposed to enough water price and monthly consumption information,
according to our sample (chapter 3). The lack of clarity and price information in
water bills (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011; Gaudin, 2006), as well as numeracy and
literacy issues (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2015) may contribute to this phenomenon.
Overall, more well-informed consumers seem to be more likely to have the reference
points analysed in this section and PPF appears to be significant to explain reference
price, after accounting for endogeneity bias.
4.3.2 Analysis of the probability to adopt outdoor water-saving behaviours
We had two dummy dependent variables summarizing concerns about avoiding
evaporation when watering any type of garden (wswatgarden) and using a laundry
tub or water deposit/tank to collect/harvest rainwater (wstank). The use of a water
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deposit/tank is a water-saving equipment used by the consumers, but we considered
the question a behaviour in the sense that they collect water from that equipment,
therefore contributing to water conservation in their dwellings. Around 7% of the
sample had a tank (non-response rate of 0.2%) and 85% watered the garden in
the coolest parts of the day to avoid evaporation from those who have a garden
(non-response rate of 6%). In the latter case, we hypothesized the existence of sample
selection because 64% of the sample stated that do not have any kind of garden. The
first study to address sample selection within this context was Nauges (2014)) which
recalls that if a dependent variable is observed only for a limited and non-random
sample there might be a sample selection bias. In residential water-saving behaviour
studies, only respondents with a garden could answer this question, so the sample
selection problem should be accounted for. We use a probit model that accounts for
this selectivity issue41. The modelling framework is described in section B.1.1.
The summary statistics of the final determinants used in the probit models
are in table B.12, (see table B.3 for probit model results). The marginal effects of
the variables with impact on the probability of the outdoor water-saving behaviours
are shown in table 4.4 (see the appendix B for probit model results, table B.15).
The results are based on the estimated average marginal effects of the regressors of
the probit model of table 4.4. We account for sampling weights differences, using
weighted probit models by municipality42 and robust standard errors.
The probability of collecting rainwater in a laundry tub or water deposit/tank
(wstank) is positively influenced by 9 percentage points by the fact that type of
dwelling is a detached or semi-detached house instead of an apartment (dwetype), in
line with this literature (Grafton et al., 2011). The increase of the number of taps in
the dwelling (tap) has a positive impact in wstank, but not on wswatgarden reflecting
concerns to control water consumptions. Moreover, we found that well, has a positive
impact on wstank. Consumers which have an alternative to publicly supplied water
are more likely to collect rainwater by 0.05 (5 percentage points) compared with
people who do not. Collecting water from alternative sources may be reflects money
saving concerns, and individuals which are more likely to use a method to collect
rainwater. Finally, avcons6m has a significant negative impact on the probability
to adopt this outdoor water-conservation behaviour. This may suggest that water
consumption is steady, and normally constant over time, and this regressor could
represent a proxy for this. Overall, we get the expected signs although the low level
of people with tanks (7% of the sample) in the sample limits the generalization of the
41. Stata command heckprob, also known as heckprobit, fits maximum-probability probit models
accounting for sample selection bias.
42. Sampling weights by municipality are defined as the percentage of the dwellings (dwellings
by municipality / total number of dwellings) divided by the sample percentage of questionnaires
(questionnaires by municipality / total number of questionnaires).
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Tab. 4.4: Average marginal effects of the probability to adopt outdoor water-saving
behaviours
Variables wstank wsgarden
dwetype 0.086***
(0.018)
tap 0.004** 0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
well 0.048*** 0.014
(0.013) (0.028)
children 0.000 -0.070**
(0.014) (0.030)
elder 0.003 -0.048**
(0.009) (0.021)
inactive 0.020 0.041*
(0.013) (0.024)
percbillt -0.000 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
unfairprice -0.008 -0.109***
(0.018) (0.034)
avcons6m -0.004***
(0.001)
watsummer 0.025***
(0.007)
Observations 1,609 502
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
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results and the estimates about the other explanatory variables, which was expected
given the low number of observations of this behaviour within the sample.
The decision to water in a way that reduces evaporation (wswatgarden) could
be conditional on sample selection (Nauges, 2014). We used the Heckman probit
model to account for potential sample selection, in our simple probit model presented.
The null hypothesis of the Wald test (or probability-ratio test) of independence
between the main equation and selection equation is not rejected (χ2(1) = 0.37,
with Prob > χ2(1) = 0.543), as described in the appendix, table B.17. The chosen
instruments were number of washing machines (washmach), dwelling with a pool
(pool), and income fitted (incfitted)43.
The regressors with significant influence have the expected signs: negative
impact of the number of household members with 65 or more years of age (elder)
(Grafton et al. (2011) used a similar variable, i.e. number of adults in the household),
as well as children (not significant in the case of Grafton et al. (2011) for this
particular behaviour). More elders in the household decreases the probability by
0.05 (5 percentage points), at 1% SL. The presence of children also has a negative
impact of 7 percentage points and the number of inactive members in the household
has a barely significant positive impact of 4 percentage points. Inactive people may
have more free time, and thus more flexibility to watering the garden in periods that
reduces evaporation.
Perception variables unfairprice and percbillt seem to be strongly significant, at
1% SL. The fact that tariffs are perceived as unfair by water consumers has a negative
impact of 0.11 (or 11 percentage points) on the probability to adopt this conservation
behaviour, comparing with people that do not totally agree with the statement about
price unfairness. This reveals that people who perceive tariffs as unfair have lower
concerns in watering during the morning or evening to avoid evaporation to save
water. The perceived bill (in €) had a positive impact increasing the household’s
probability by the instantaneous rate of change of 0.003444. So for an 1% increase
in the perceived bill, the probability of the decision to water in a way that reduces
evaporation increases by 0.34 percentage points. The perceived bill effect may reflect
money-saving concerns, since water consumers are normally aware that watering
43. The validity of instruments was confirmed using the Hansen test to control for overidentification
and the C-statistic test for orthogonality (exogeneity) of the selected instruments (Baum, 2006).
According to the literature some of the instruments used in selection equation were dummy variables
related with urban area, ownership status, employee status and household recycling of glass containers
or bottles (Nauges, 2014)
44. We calculate this value by changing the percbillt by a very small amount (delta), i.e. the
standard deviation of the variable divided by 1,000. Afterwards, we computed the predicted value for
the original case (prediction1), and for the case with the small variation (prediction2). Finally, we
compute the (prediction2− prediction1)/delta to get the average marginal effect of the continuous
variable. For a detailed explanation on how to compute average marginal effects of continuous
variable see Cameron and Trivedi (2010).
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during the coolest periods is a high-water demanding behaviour, that could reduce
their water consumption. This finding may have potential implication for public
policies directed at increasing perceptions of water bills.
Finally, the number of times a week people water the garden during the Spring
or Summer are evidentially important regressors to explain wswatgarden. Additional
tests including other relevant variables in the literature revealed to be robust in our
probit models provided in the table B.19, as well as in the respective average marginal
effects B.18 (in appendix). The average marginal effects (table B.21) and probit
models (table B.22) without sampling weights are also provided in the appendix.
4.3.3 Analysis of the probability to adopt indoor water-saving behaviours
The three indoor water-saving behaviours analysed were the choices to wash full
loads of laundry (wsfullload), close the tap while soaping in the shower (wssoap) and
make use of the water that flows while waiting for it to get warm (runwat). The
proportion of respondents adopting these behaviours in our sample are 84%, 74%
and 32%, respectively, with the non-response rates below 1%, except for wsfullload
with a non-response rate of 8%. The analysis performed was similar to the previous
section. The summary statistics of the variables of interest used in the models about
indoor water-saving behaviours are shown in table B.12 (in the appendix).
The marginal effects of the variables with impact on the probability of the
indoor water-saving behaviours are shown in table 4.5 (see table B.23 in the appendix
for probit model results). The results are based on the estimated average marginal
effects of the regressors of the probit model with sampling weights and robust
standard errors.
The proportion of household members who are either inactive or student
(inastudent) and the actual average water price paid during the last twelve months
(July 2011 and June 2012) (aavprice), prior to the survey, significantly increase and
decrease, respectively, the probability of wash full loads of laundry wsfullload, at 1%
SL. The former probably shows that typically those who do not have a job try to
achieve money-savings through the water saving behaviour in question. People that
experience water shortages (wshortage) are more likely to adopt behaviour, since
they have more confidence in a continuous service without interruptions. Overall
the perception variables about price and bill, as well as being aware about the
IBR structure positively influence the probability of adopting this behaviour. The
perception about price unfairness has a negative significant effect, at 1% SL, which
could reflect that fairness judgements could lead to emotional responses and negative
actions (Rutte and Messick, 1995), in this case the attempt to reduce consumption.
This topic will be explored in chapter 5.
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Tab. 4.5: Average marginal effects of the probability to adopt indoor water-saving
behaviours
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
inastudent 0.104***
(0.031)
aavprice -0.002***
(0.001)
wshortage 0.049**
(0.022)
unfairprice -0.057***
(0.019)
expenscarce -0.019***
(0.007)
loss -0.018***
(0.007)
referenceprice 0.083**
(0.039)
referencebill 0.051**
(0.020)
knowIBR 0.036** 0.075***
(0.016) (0.027)
employed -0.044***
(0.014)
p56education -0.216***
(0.045)
heducation -0.105***
(0.028)
dettot 0.076***
(0.026)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. 4.6: Average marginal effects of the probability to adopt indoor water-saving
behaviours (continued)
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
dishwach -0.088***
(0.028)
hpayers -0.094***
(0.034)
male -0.098***
(0.027)
p16education 0.117***
(0.030)
meter 0.131***
(0.033)
refblockprice 0.166***
(0.044)
aavcons -0.005**
(0.002)
Observations 1,761 1,927 2,037
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
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Moreover, the behaviour of closing the tap while soaping in the shower is
negatively affected by the number of household members who are employed (employed)
and have a primary education (5-6 years) (p56education) or an higher education
(heducation), which could be potentially explained that closing the tap while soaping
is in more likely to occur in people with a less busy life, probably without a job.
Higher education and primary education have both negative signs, probably because
income was excluded, since it was insignificant for this behaviour. On the other hand,
the perception variables seems to positively impact the probability of closing the tap
while soaping. Consumers that look for the details in the water bill (dettot) or that
know they have an increasing block rate (IBR) structure (knowIBR), could indicate
consumers with greater awareness.
Overall, the main variables of interest have a negative impact in the probability
of adopting the behaviour of using water that flows while waiting to get warmer.
The number of dishwashers in the dwelling (dishwash) can be a indicator of the
income level. The respondents that are male appear to be less likely to adopt this
behaviour. The fact that at least 50% of the household members are payers (hpayers)
is negatively influencing the probability to reuse the water while waiting to get
warmer, maybe indicating that a small proportion of payers implies higher concerns
about water-savings. The negative effect for male could be a country-specific effect
and Grafton (2014) shows that the gender effect can be either positive or negative,
related with idiosyncrasies of each water-saving behaviour. Submitting the meter
readings (meter) and having a reference about the marginal price (refblockprice) of
water have positive impacts in runwat, probably because these factors with more
informed consumers that have knowledge about price and consumption, thus a type
of more informed consumer that adopt water-saving behaviour in a indoor habit that
is one of the most water-demanding habits in the dwellings. Finally, with a negative
impact we have the actual average consumption, since people that have higher water
consumption is less likely to reuse the water of the shower.
Overall the results appear to be in line with the previous studies about indoor
water conservation choices (Grafton, 2014; Nauges, 2014; Grafton et al., 2011).
Additional tests including other relevant variables in the literature for both marginal
effects and probit models and are provided with two different specifications: without
sampling weights in tables B.28 and B.29, and with sampling weights in tables B.25
and B.26. Overall, the results appears to be robust to the different specifications
and regressors used.
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4.3.4 Analysis of the probability to adopt modern billing standards
Water utilities have improved reporting and paying systems since these practices
provide better information and potentially motivate well-informed water consumers.
In a recent study, several stakeholders’ perceptions were accessed (Adeyeye, 2014),
through stakeholder interviews, from water utilities and NGO (Non-Governmental
Organisations) to policy makers and regulatory authority. Some of the points raised
in this study were that: i) meter reading requires providing information, but can
help in mitigation of household water bills, and concerning water utilities, ii) more
transparency is needed on water bills and iii) incentives to direct debit systems, such
as the offer of a discount, are seen as improvements to customer service. There is
scant literature on these behaviours in the water sector, although a recent field study
for the electricity sector (Barnicoat and Danson, 2015), based on interviews to older
people in rural Scotland, found that the majority of these consumers are aware of
their monthly energy payments, even when using direct debit. This seems to be
related with elderly households placing more importance on money savings, although
they have lower levels of energy-saving behaviours and lower knowledge about energy
use (Mills and Schleich, 2012). In spite of the recognition of the importance of service
innovation (such as payments through direct debit) and improvement of customer
involvement and knowledge in water sector (through the use of a water meter reading
app, an application or software with a specific purpose, for example) (Hoffjan et al.,
2014), these services have received little attention in water-saving related studies.
The adoption of behaviours such as having an electronic water bill or paying the
water bill through direct debit, is fairly neglected in the literature, probably because
they are relatively new technologies. Our study provides empirical evidence on two
such behaviours: the voluntary registration to pay the water bill by direct debit
(ddebit), and wether the respondent receives an electronic bill, only for municipalities
offering this service in 2012 (ebill2012 ). The adoption rates of these behaviours in
the sample were 48% and 3%, respectively, with the non-response rates below 2%.
Overall, the electronic bill seems to be an information method that is not preferred
by the majority of the respondents in our sample. The summary statistics of the
variables of interest used in the models about modern billing standards are shown in
table B.12, in appendix B.
The average marginal effects of the variables with impact on the probability of
adopting modern paying procedures are shown in table 4.7 (see the appendix B for
probit model results, table B.31). The results are based on the estimated average
marginal effects of the regressors from the probit models, and the previous procedures
used in the previous section were applied.
The probability to adopt modern billing standards is affected by a group of
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Tab. 4.7: Average marginal effects of the probability to adopt modern billing standards
Variables ddebit ebill2012
p19education -0.171*** -0.071***
(0.026) (0.018)
owner 0.322*** 0.047**
(0.031) (0.021)
hsize -0.029***
(0.010)
urban 0.107***
(0.034)
aavprice 0.004***
(0.001)
unfairprice -0.071*
(0.038)
meter -0.082** 0.030*
(0.033) (0.017)
Observations 1,989 1,306
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
common factors. These factors are the low schooling level (until the 9th year of school)
(p19education), house ownership (owner) and submission of the meter readings to
the water utility (meter).
House ownership has a significant positive effect maybe reflecting that owners
may remain in a dwelling longer time periods than households with no ownership,
who can change house more frequently. Therefore, non-owners might be less likely to
have these modern billing standards using more traditional methods of payment and
billing. The respondents with few or no years of schooling (p19education) are less
likely to adopt direct debit or an electronic billing method, an effect that could reflect
household members without qualifications and less aware about modern methods
provided by their water utility and also less able to handle them (example computer
literacy). The submission of the meter readings, have opposite signs in (ddebit) and
(ebill2012 ), since probably consumers that submit their readings are interesting in
controlling and prefer to declare their actual consumption, instead of using estimated
values. This may indicate people with concerns about the monthly amount paid and
therefore less likely to use a method like direct debit which is automatic. On the
other hand, consumers submitting the readings seems to value accurate information.
It may be the case that these consumers prefer methods that provide information
more quickly than the traditional ones. Nonetheless, this an interesting topic for
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further research, since the adoption of more modern methods for submitting the
meter readings, such as software applications are being developed (Hoffjan et al.,
2014).
The household size (hsize) and believing the water tariffs are unfair (unfairprice)
have negative impacts on the probability to adopt a direct debit payment, at 1% and
10% SL. A potential explanation is that more members may indicate that the head
of a large household may want to control the monthly amount paid. The unfairprice
has a barely significant effect, although this can mean that when price is perceived
as unfair, consumer may not feel comfortable with an automatic payment method.
In general the results appear to be robust according to the analysis of the
probit model encompassing all the variables selected, without and with sampling
weights which are shown, respectively, in tables B.33 and B.36, and the respective
marginal effects in tables B.32 and B.35 (in appendix). In the case of ebill2012 the
variable owner is significant in the encompassing version with sampling weights, but
insignificant without them. Since less than 5% in our sample represents respondents
using electronic billing, this may be a rare event whose determinants are harder to
grasp.
4.3.5 Analysis of the probability of drinking tap water
In this section, we analyse the decision to prefer to drink tap water instead of using
alternative sources, as for example bottled water or public fountains. The marginal
effects of the variables with impact on the probability to drink tap water are show in
table 4.8 (see the appendix for probit model results, table B.38). The analysis of
correlation and multicollinearity for this behaviour does not present no systematically
strong correlation between the variables and all VIF (Variance Inflation Factors).
Once again, sampling weights differences were accounted for.
The first column is shown for comparison purpose of the data without weights,
the analysis will take as reference the model corrected with sampling weights. The
variable avpmun has a negative sign as expected (Bontemps and Nauges, 2015).
Water price is expected to have a negative effect in the probability to drink tap water
(Bontemps and Nauges, 2015).
The average percentage of tests not complying with the limits imposed in the
quantity of chemicals in the water (1993-2012) has a relevant negative impact, as
expected. We found that an increase of 1% in the violation of water quality chemical
standards had an expected impact of decreasing the probability to drink tap water
by 0.10 (10 percentage points), at a 1% SL. This finding may reflect water quality
concerns and health issues.
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Tab. 4.8: Average marginal effects on the probability to drink tap water - Comparison
without and with sampling weights
drinktap drinktap
Variables (without sampling weights) (with sampling weights)
avpmun -0.053*** -0.055***
(0.020) (0.021)
avvioqual -0.096*** -0.099***
(0.018) (0.019)
unemployed 0.088*** 0.086***
(0.020) (0.028)
mainresidence -0.096*** -0.081*
(0.032) (0.044)
fair 0.017* 0.022*
(0.009) (0.012)
urban 0.056* 0.055
(0.029) (0.035)
Observations 2,044 2,044
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
The number of household members who are unemployed has a positive sign.
The average marginal effect reflects that for each additional unemployed person in
the household the probability to drink tap water increases by 0.08. Although this
seems unstudied so far, it appears reasonable that unemployed household members
who have low income level will adopt behaviours to obtain cost savings, preferring tap
water rather than other sources, like for example bottled water or public fountains.
Consumers with concerns about money savings are more likely, in our view, to know
that tap water price can cost hundreds or thousands of times less than bottled water
(Johnstone and Serret, 2012; Jakus et al., 2009; Doria, 2006). Moreover, the costs to
access to water from fountains or other sources are also relevant, such as time and
transportation costs. In fact, nontap sources outside the dwellings have collection
costs, an important issue to understand household behaviour in an accurate manner
(Nauges and Whittington, 2010).
People who responded to the survey concerning their main residence have a
lower probability of drinking tap water, barely significant at 10% SL. There is a
potential limitation since the respondents when answering if they usually prefer to
drink tap water may not recall which residence is being associated with their answers.
Nevertheless, since no clear explanation seem to justify why people in main residence
are less likely to drink tap water this may seems a relevant line for further research.
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People that considered the price they pay for water is fair (fair) is not commonly
used in this literature. Our model reveals a barely significant effect of price fairness,
at 10% SL. The increase in one level in the Likert scale (1 to 5), about the statement
"The price you pay for water is fair" raises the probability to drink tap water by 0.02.
This positive effect could suggest that water consumers are more likely to use tap
water for drinking when they feel the price charge by the water utility is fair. This
price fairness issue seems to be a novelty in the literature. We will return to this
issue in chapter 5, and may be an important topic for further research.
Finally, the household being located in an urban area has a positive impact on
the probability to drink tap water from the public supply network, but only without
sampling weights, and at 10% SL. The variable urban aims to reflect differences
between water consumers that live in urban areas versus semi-rural and rural areas.
We expected that this could be related with higher satisfaction with taste and healthy
impacts, as a previous study in this literature highlights (Nauges, 2014). On the
other hand, rural and semi-urban areas may have lower levels of satisfaction in terms
of taste and may be more like to people get water from alternative sources, such as
drinking fountains. Nevertheless, this effect does not hold after applying sampling
weights.
We provide additional tests to this final model in appendix with the probit
models in table B.40 and the average marginal effects in table B.39 were we show
the results including other variables based on the literature review made in table B.2
(in appendix).
These results include our control for omitted variables, multicollinearity and
correlation issues, sampling weights and robust standard errors. We provide the
probit models on the probability to drink tap water with and without sampling
weights in tables B.38 (in appendix) as a control to the robustness of the results.
4.4 Conclusion and Future Research
This research approached the formation of reference points or perceived values for
average water price, monthly water consumption and bill and analysed two different
types of water-saving behaviours in dwellings, the outdoor and indoor water uses.
Besides, it also performed detailed analysis of billing standards, such as the use of
direct debit payment and electronic billing. Finally, we analysed the determinants
to explain consumer preference for drinking tap water instead of using alternative
sources.
First, in outdoor water conservation choices, the main results presented the
expected effects, although the results are limited low sample representativeness (7%
of the total sample) on the case of collecting rainwater. The case of watering the
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garden during the coolest period of the day to avoid evaporation is also limited
to the "all-or-nothing" approach (i.e. variable is either 1 or 0), although dealing
with information about how frequent consumers water the garden, with an ordered
probit model, is sometimes an alternative choice recommended (Dupont and Renzetti,
2013). We accounted for potential effects of climate variables and tested different
specifications using data from INE (Portuguese National Statistics Office) and IPMA
(Portuguese Sea and Atmosphere Institute), but we found no significant effects (see
table B.18 in appendix). Secondly, we used the special regressor method to study
reference points (section 4.3.1), but this method is also applicable to outdoor and
indoor water conservation choices, and was never been studied, as far as we know.
The use of the special regressor methodology allows for several types of endogenous
regressors, but surprisingly the impact of endogeneity on perceptions have been
understudied in the literature (Bontemps and Nauges, 2015).
We provide the first analysis of billing standards in residential water sector
and a future line of research could try to measure to which extend the indoor and
outdoor water conservations choices influence behaviours like using electronic billing
or direct debit systems, a topic outside the scope of this work.
The formation of consumer perceptions and the probability of forming these
internal reference points in water consumers’ minds was analysed for the first time,
in this literature. We used a special regressor method to account for potential
endogeneity bias, specially recommended for the case of binary endogenous regressor.
The endogeneity tests reveal that fairprice and knowIBR are exogenous, and therefore
we used the standard probit. Nevertheless, the method specifications and manual
choice of the bandwidth for the kernel density method (Bontemps and Nauges, 2015)
(we used Silverman’s rule of thumb, an automated method), sensibility tests and
more detailed analysis of bootstrapping assumptions (i.e. number of bootstrapping
samples) should be developed in further research. Moreover, we only analysed the
impact of fairprice, but unfairprice variable could be further explored, since in
marketing literature fairness and unfairness are considered to be different variables
of interest (Xia et al., 2004). The development of a perceived price fairness index
and the development of potential determinants is an avenue to be explored (Diller,
2008). We analyse this topic in chapter 5. This index may be included as a partial
effect of a behavioural framework to explain observed consumer behaviours (Krishna,
2009), in order to develop a general model in water demand studies that incorporates
consumer perceptions.
Another potential line of future research is the use of the water bill as an
alternative to the water price since perception variables about bill and price are
significant to explain indoor and outdoor water-saving behaviours. We will approach
74 4. Water consumer behaviours and perceptions
this issue in chapter 6. Moreover, the issue of perceived fairness in terms of total
amount of water paid, rather than perceived price may also be addressed, since it is
more likely that water consumers (especially the bill payers) know the amount they
pay, but not necessarily the tariff structure, as discussed in chapter 3. Price fairness
concerns seems to be relevant to water consumers, as stated in Media, where the news
gave importance to price raises and social protests. However public policies seem
not to attach a lot of importance to fairness either about the average water price
and bill. A set of studies has focused on understanding water bill and clarity issues
(Martins et al., 2015; Martins and Moura e Sá, 2015; Moura e Sá and Martins, 2014;
Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011; Gaudin, 2006), but further development of water bill
fairness indicators, could lead to a better understanding of PPF and clarification of
potential misperception of water consumers between water bill and price.
One of the starting points of this research was to identify factors that influence
the household’s probability to adopt outdoor and indoor water-saving behaviours
as well as modern billing standards behaviours. Our main findings corroborate
most of the literature, although we provide evidence for the first time that consumer
perceptions, namely people knowing they have an IBR structure, a reference about the
bill, the average and marginal price, and price unfairness are relevant determinants
of both water-saving behaviours and modern billing choices in the residential water
sector.
We also provided answers to two main questions: is price fairness a factor in
the formation of reference points? If so, how does it affect average price and bill
perceptions? The empirical evidence indicated that PPF has a significant positive
effect in the probability of people to have a reference perceived value of price, but
not on perceived bill and consumption.
Further empirical evidence about these findings in other countries, as well as
in other sectors, such as electricity or gas, may lead to a reshape of pricing and
non-pricing policies, since other determinants, like firm reputation may play a role
(Krishna, 2009). In this context, a future avenue of research is also the improvement
of water literacy and the promotion of transparency (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2015).
Overall, our study provides evidence that a new set of perception variables may
contribute to better understand water-saving behaviours and consumer references
and choices.
5. PERCEIVED PRICE FAIRNESS - DETERMINANTS IN THE
RESIDENTIAL WATER SECTOR IN PORTUGAL
5.1 Introduction
Water pricing has been focused on two major challenges: i) there is an increasing
competition for resource use, and ii) sustainable access to water supply and sani-
tation must be ensured (OECD, 2010). In this paper, we add a discussion on the
determinants of Perceived Price Fairness (hereafter PPF) at the level of water tariff
policies, considering the case of residential water use in Portuguese households.
Research on PPF seems to be a relevant issue, although studies on this topic
are scant (Bolton et al., 2003) and broadly comprehensive models sparse (Bechwati
et al., 2009). PPF links consumer perceptions and emotions to achieve an outcome
considered acceptable, reasonable and just, when comparing the seller’s price with a
reference price (Somervuori, 2014; Xia et al., 2004).
This literature uses several approaches to explain how and when price fairness
judgements occur (Xia et al., 2004), although it has been largely influenced by the
dual entitlement principle from Kahneman et al. (1986b). This principle emphasizes
that firms are entitled to a reference profit and consumers to reference terms, such
as a reference price. The main factors influencing consumer perceptions of unfair
price in the marketplace are therefore prices, profits and costs (Bolton et al., 2003).
Moreover, people tend to prefer simple prices rather than complex ones, even
when the former are more expensive, since complexity has a negative impact on
customer fairness perceptions (Homburg et al., 2014). As nonlinear pricing is
common in the residential water sector, this could be an additional factor affecting
the perception of water consumers. Price judgements are complex processes that
include reference prices and the notion of fair price, as noted by Cheng and Monroe
(2013). PPF is a notion that pops up in the consumer’s mind during the purchase
decision process.
PPF is not in the main research agenda in water supply (WS) and wastewater
(WW) services, although the recent article of Martínez-Espiñeira et al. (2012) discusses
the fairness of an approach focused on the access to water residential use and the
application of Spanish water tariffs. The results show considerable differences in both
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water prices and tariff structures that can potentially explain the negative views
about the different accessibility conditions between municipalities. The authors’
recommendation to avoid unfairness in the access to water is the development of
guidelines establishing the number of blocks, the block-consumption levels, and price
harmonisation for the acceptable minimum to meet water-consumption needs.
Given the European Commission’s priority to develop new economic instru-
ments in the water sector and the current economic situation in Portugal, there
has been a widespread debate around the sector’s sustainability (mostly economic-
financial). Since residential WS and WW services are local monopolies, consumer
decisions are limited. Each household faces a single tariff structure of one water utility.
To this extent, the PPF appears as a relevant measure of consumer perceptions
on the impact of pricing policies (e.g. seasonal policies to conserve water during
droughts).
Nevertheless, there is not much evidence of price fairness studies in water. As
a comparison, in the electricity sector Fiorio and Florio (2011) used Eurobarometer
surveys and found higher consumer satisfaction about prices in countries where
utilities are mainly publicly owned.
According to the Eurobarometer, most Europeans agree with the principles
of user-pays and polluter-pays45 (European Commission, 2012). The European
Customer Satisfaction Index (ECSI) can also provide relevant customer data for some
determinants of price fairness. Considering all the sectors and subsectors studied
in Portugal, customer satisfaction in the water sector substantially improved from
the second to last position in 2008 to the third position in the 2014/2015 report
(ECSI Portugal, 2015, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009). The basic ECSI model that
explains the latent variables used to determine customer satisfaction is presented in
figure 5.1.
Each latent variable or component in the model is determined through man-
ifested variables as described in Kristensen et al. (2000). Recently, Yeung et al.
(2013) found a relationship between customer satisfaction and consumer expenditures
in European Countries. Price is viewed as a signal of quality, but not consumer
expenditures (Freitas and Wagner, 2009). As discussed in chapter 3, consumers in
the residential water sector have more awareness about total monthly bill rather
than price, although the price fairness variable used in chapter 4 seems to affect
only the reference price, fairness and unfairness may be different constructs (Xia
et al., 2004). Therefore, the measurement of unfairness rather than fairness, may be
45. Although the Eurobarometer does not mention these principles directly, it notes that more
than 8 in 10 Europeans agree that water users should pay for the amount of water used, while about
6 in 10 Europeans agree that the price of water should reflect the environmental impact related to
its use.
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Fig. 5.1: The ECSI model
Source: Kristensen et al. (2000, p.50).
a further research avenue. We hypothesize a conceptual model where bill perception
and price perception, can both play role on fairness evaluation. This model is based
on the empirical evidence from chapter 3, where only 7% of the consumer have a
reference price, with response rate above 90% for the price unfairness question "The
tariffs charged for an essential good such as water are unfair". In this sense, customer
satisfaction and price fairness models using price-related variables should allow to
be tested the potential hidden impact of water expenditures. Notice that Customer
Satisfaction Index and PPF are not alike, since there are several differences in latent
and measurement variables, as well as in the conceptual model that we will propose
in section 5.3. The ECSI model is a tool for firms to better understand the major
factors that influence customer satisfaction and loyalty. On the other hand, the price
fairness model that our study proposes is focused on a consumer perspective, which
has been neglected in this literature (Chung and Petrick, 2015). Nevertheless, some
measurement variables used in the construction of Customer Satisfaction Index are
also relevant for PPF, as we will discuss in detail in section 5.4.
Greater bill clarity has been promoted in Portugal through Recommendation
number 1 of 2010 (ERSAR, 2012a) of the Water and Waste Services Regulation Au-
thority (hereafter ERSAR), and the Decree Law 114/2014 (Assembleia da República,
2014), which entered into force on the 1st of March, 2015. This trend to more clarity
to water users may contribute to the customer satisfaction increase observed in the
Portuguese water sector.
As for reference price, since there is a history of transactions between water
utilities and water users, expressed on the water bill, the idea of Kahneman et al.
(1986b) that the reference term will be the latest price known could be extended to
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account for the total amount of the water bill as an alternative to the water price, since
it is more likely that the consumer knows the former. Moreover, reference price is a
dynamic internal price based on consumer perception and used as a comparative price
(Somervuori, 2014; Cheng and Monroe, 2013), thus consumers react relative to this
reference rather than to prices. Other factors that could affect fairness judgements
are framing effects, in particular money illusion (Kahneman et al., 1986b). In section
5.2, we discuss cost recovery ratios in mainland Portugal and potential framing effects
of water price increases in media.
The conceptual model of PPF based on Maxwell (2008) and Rutte and Messick
(1995) (as cited in Somervuori (2014)) is divided in three parts: fairness antecedents,
evaluation process and consequences. The novelty in our conceptual model is the
segmentation into price-conscious and naïve consumers. The analysis of antecedents
or determinants of PPF and subsets of potential indicators for each one will be
discussed in section 5.4. The determinants that will be analysed are price clarity,
distributive fairness, consistent behaviour, price reliability, price honesty and respect
and regard for the partner and fair dealing. The study of Diller (2008) states price
clarity and price honesty as a common determinant of PPF. In our view, price clarity
addresses the question: is information clear? On the other hand, price honesty
addresses whether information is always completely available. Therefore, price clarity
is based on potential indicators from the water bill. Price honesty is focused on
the completeness and implies that water utilities will not take advantage of the
consumers, in spite of their monopolistic position.
The aim of this study is to suggest a potential conceptual model to measure the
PPF incorporating price awareness and the relevant consumer knowledge about bill
in the residential water sector. The chapter is organized with the following structure.
In section 5.2, we discuss the current situation of the sector in terms of cost recovery
and household affordability. In section 5.3, we propose a conceptual model of price
fairness influenced by price awareness. In section 5.4, we present a review of the
literature on PPF and explain the potential PPF determinants in the residential
sector water. Finally, in section 5.5 we conclude and discuss the topics for future
research.
5.2 Cost recovery in the residential water sector in Portugal
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) (European Parliament and Council, 2000)
highlights the need for cost recovery, considering financial costs and environmental
scarcity. Both prices and taxes can be used to achieve this goal. In Portugal, a water
resource charge was created as a mean to begin tackling environmental and resource
costs, while financial costs recovery was mostly left to water tariffs.
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According to ERSAR, cost recovery ratios in water utilities present an increasing
tendency between 2005 and 2013. In 2005, the cost recovery ratios for water supply
(WS) and wastewater (WW) were 0.87 and 0.57 (INAG, 2005), for mainland Portugal.
In 2013, the last available year, the cost recovery for WS remained steady and for
WW increased to 0.67 (ERSAR, 2014c).
However, this increase was made exclusively by price increases, which often
do not seem to be well perceived by consumers as portrayed by the stirred up
opposition and social protests against price increases by Portuguese consumers of
several municipalities46. A socially fair price is a price that is equal to everyone. The
personal unfairness has minor importance when compared with the social unfairness,
since the "amount of distress caused by personal unfairness appears to be relatively
mild compared with reactions to social unfairness (Maxwell and Comer, 2010)"
(as cited in Somervuori (2014, p.469)). Moreover, media coverage could also have
contributed to grounding of consumer perceptions, in particular on water price. News
could be a potential source of framing effects, since media often exhibit information
on consumers generally paying high prices or announce price increases for water
utility services (Jornal de Notícias, 2015; Castanho, 2014; Tomás, 2014; Henriques
and Filipe, 2011).
These negative media highlights fail to account for the good level of affordability
of water utility services, considering the typical Portuguese household. Recent
data corroborate that overall the services paid are 0.84% of the average household
disposable income in 2013 (ERSAR, 2014c). As a comparison, OECD (Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries in 2008 had affordability
levels of water utility services ranging between 0.2% (e.g. Italy and Korea) and 1.2%
(e.g. Hungary and Poland) (OECD, 2010). Additionally, the average affordability
level for Portugal is far below the affordability thresholds of 3% and 5% which are
used in the literature (Martins et al., 2013; OECD, 2010; Komives et al., 2005) as
references, allowing an acceptable subsistence level of water consumption. Martins
et al. (2013) does highlight that Portugal exhibits some idiosyncrasies. Average values
of affordability may hide specific situations of each municipality, and the authors’
findings suggest that there could be large disparities. Additionally, the affordability
threshold, previously mentioned, is sometimes exceeded, with a significant group of
municipalities where the poorest 20% households are above the affordability threshold
calculated by the authors based on the weight of essential minimum quantity charges
in the household income.
Commonly the news about residential water prices present information in terms
46. As an example, it is possible to mention the social protest on the price increases by consumers
of Loures, Odivelas and Cartaxo during the year 2011, published in the media (Henriques and Filipe,
2011; Mirante, 2011).
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of variations, or percentages, instead of absolute values. Although there are some
exceptions (Mirante, 2011), this bias is observed even in news with very detailed
information (Suspiro, 2015). Plus, news often mix presentation of price and total
monthly bill, which may reinforce consumer misperception. At first glance, there
seems to be a communication failure between water utilities and consumers that
limits consumer perception. Therefore, insights about consumer perceptions, namely
the PPF, could be important to reduce this informational gap and social criticism
about water price increases.
Although the water bill represents a small percentage of the average monthly
expenses of Portuguese households, consumers can disagree, at times noisily, with
increases in their water tariff. This contradiction can be justified by the perceived
unfairness associated with price increases. The next section analyses the factors that
may contribute to improve the perceived fairness of water price.
5.3 Conceptual model of price fairness
The conceptual model of PPF that we suggest in figure 5.2 is an adaptation of works
of Maxwell (2008) and Rutte and Messick (1995) (as cited in Somervuori (2014)).
Rutte and Messick (1995) suggest a three-part conceptual model with antecedents,
evaluation and consequences. The outcome evaluation process precedes the fairness
evaluation process. This first stage assesses whether the outcome is positive, neutral
or negative, and only the latter evokes a fairness evaluation. At this stage, a price
comparison process between the suggested price and the consumer’s reference price
level occurs (Somervuori, 2014).
The fairness dimension is active when there is a negative evaluation in the
price or bill comparison, and invokes feelings of distress and thoughts of unfairness in
the individuals, leading to the second stage. When outcomes, in this case price or bill
comparison, are neutral or positive, the consumer usually does not perform a fairness
evaluation (Rutte and Messick, 1995; Somervuori, 2014); this is expressed in figure 5.2
by the positive signs near price and bill comparison boxes. Individuals do not have
fairness concerns all the time, the positive signs represent situations with positive
outcome evaluation and without distress and fairness judgements (Somervuori, 2014).
The determinants of fairness judgements suggested by Kahneman et al. (1986b)
are the outcomes, the reference transaction, and the context. The second part of the
model focuses on the fairness evaluation process which determines if the outcome is
unfair. This process is influenced by the distress dimension that could be reference
(Rutte and Messick, 1995) and context dependent (Xia et al., 2004). The fairness
evaluation is focused on the identification of the fairness rule that has been violated.
According to Kahneman et al. (1986a) a fairness rule is, for example, that it is
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Fig. 5.2: Conceptual model of price fairness
Source: Author’s adaptation from Somervuori (2014), Maxwell (2008), and Rutte and Messick (1995).
"fair" for a firm to maintain its reference profit, if necessary, by increasing prices or
cutting prices47. A judgement considered unfair leads to the third stage of emotional
reaction.
Following the conceptual model, when fairness judgement is considered fair
(positive sign) the outcome is evaluated as positive. For instance, when firms hike
prices to reflect higher costs, which would not be perceived by consumers as unfair
(Somervuori, 2014), as when a tax rise implies a price increase in WS and WW
services. Since consumers use fairness rules firms are allowed to fully recover cost
increases (Kahneman et al., 1986a), reflecting these increases in final prices. The
model contemplates cases where the initial outcome evaluation was negative, but if
the fairness judgement is positive and leads to the conclusion that the outcome is
fair. Therefore, the individuals may experience feelings of disappointment, but not
unfairness (Rutte and Messick, 1995).
Finally, part three describes the reaction or emotional response, which are the
consequences of PPF. This process leads to an action, such as the observed consumer
behaviour. When the fairness judgements are negative the consumer may have
potential cognitive or behavioural reactions48. One example of a behavioural reaction
is the adoption of non pro-environmental behaviours. Consumers that believe the
tariffs are unfair are less likely to water the garden during the coolest parts of the day,
as described in 4. Thus, the fairness evaluation can lead to two conclusions: i) the
outcome was fair and, consequently, the outcome revaluated is positively influenced
47. See (Rutte and Messick, 1995) for a detailed discussion of fairness rules.
48. For example, cognitive reactions are cognitive distortions of price or changing the reference,
and behavioural reactions are changes in behaviour or, in a extreme case, leave the situation. See
(Rutte and Messick, 1995) for a details.
82 5. Perceived Price Fairness - Determinants in the residential water sector in Portugal
ii) the outcome was unfair and consumer reacts. In the latter, negative attitudes or
hostile behaviours are common.
The proposed model is an extension of this conceptual model of price fairness
including as novelties price awareness, since consumer are not always aware of their
price, as discussed in chapter 3, and bill comparison that can be influenced by price
fairness evaluation, according to chapter 4.
The figure shows the inclusion of the price awareness process which influences
the consumer choice of price or bill comparison. In this process, consumer are
price-conscious or naïve, as in Frondel and Messner (2008). After the awareness
process takes place the consumer makes the price comparison, or uses heuristics to
simplify the decision process and chooses alternatives to price, in our model this
will be the bill comparison process. Bill comparison will be similar to the outcome
evaluation process (Rutte and Messick, 1995) described above.
Consumers will not have fairness concerns all the time. An outcome evaluated
in a negative manner will become salient and trigger the fairness judgement process
(Somervuori, 2014). Any information related with water price can trigger this process.
Bill comparison as an outcome evaluation process will be based on social, historical
and context information (Rutte and Messick, 1995), such as information received
by mail or in the website of the water utility, news in the media about water prices,
and the consumer’s water bill history. When there is a negatively evaluated price
the consumer will feel distress and the next phase of the fairness evaluation process
occurs. If fairness is negatively valued there will be an emotional response process,
which leads to an action.
This conceptual model presents two novelties: i) it incorporates the fact
that consumers unaware of prices can still make consumption decisions and ii) it
hypothesizes that consumers can use heuristics or simplification mechanisms to make
decisions in reality, due to bounded rationality with limited knowledge and ability
(Simon, 1955).
Unfortunately, the available data on the survey (table E.4 in section E) seems
limited to analyse the potential determinants of PPF (Diller, 2008)49. Therefore, we
propose a set of determinants and respective variables that can explain PPF in the
next section.
49. We performed additional tests on a potential PPF index, based on fairness questions in the
survey, but found low level for the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (0.62), a
measure of partial correlation of variables in the factor analysis. Moreover the Cronbach’s alpha
was at the "poor" level (0.49), revealing weak internal consistency between the variables used in the
components of the factor analysis, according to the reliability of summative rating scale presented
by George and Mallery (2003).
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5.4 Determinants of PPF for water
Researchers in economics and marketing have been mainly confined to the study of
the intrinsic price, although in the last three decades the research in behavioural
pricing or price effects arise (Krishna, 2009). Krisna’s conceptual model to explain
the observed consumer behaviour is influenced by two type of price effects: i) the
price presentation effects that impacts on consumer perceived savings (a measure-
ment of subjective price) (Krishna et al., 2002) and ii) antecedents that influence
PPF (Krishna, 2009). Therefore, two multi-dimensional constructs or intermediate
variables explain the observed consumer behaviour, the "price framing"50 and the
"fair price". The antecendents on PPF that allow to explain how consumers perceive
fairness standards are extensively reported in the literature (Campbell, 1999, 2007;
Bechwati et al., 2009; Diller, 2008; Krishna, 2009), although this seems to be an issue
addressed in marketing literature but rather neglected by mainstream economics.
The PPF arises as an extension of the seminal work on the reference transaction
developed by Kahneman et al. (1986b), based on the principle of dual entitlement,
which rules fairness standards and entitles reference price to consumers and reference
profit to firms, as well as establishing sellers’ profit orientation. Within this framework
the water utilities should, in theory, be entitled to a (positive) profit of reference
while consumers have a right to a term of reference, i.e. the reference price. However,
in Portugal, as in other countries, increasing block rates are common and water
utilities have tariff structures with different number and size of blocks (OECD, 2010).
These non linear prices introduce greater complexity and may contribute to the lack
of clarity of the water price. Recent studies note the existence of a gap between
consumer expectations on total monthly water bills and the informational contents
of water bills (Martins and Moura e Sá, 2015). These authors stress that there are
low awareness levels regarding key elements of their bills, a fact that jeopardises the
effectiveness of these bills in communicating prices. Additionally, water consumers
appear to have a "benchmark" reference (Moura e Sá and Martins, 2014) about the
water bill (or internal reference point). Moura e Sá and Martins (2014) developed a
set of fifty-seven consumers’ requirements based in interviews to three focus groups
and found that the high majority of their sample only look at bills when there is an
odd situation (e.g. an unexpected increase in total amount paid) or for comparison
(e.g. monthly comparisons between the amount to be paid in the current month and
the previous one). So water consumers seem to look mainly for odd or abnormal
patterns and to get information about total water expenses, using a kind of heuristic,
or shortcut, to evaluate their bill. Thus, they take a practical and quick decision, in
a behavioural economic perspective: if nothing "abnormal" happens they check the
50. See Krishna et al. (2002) for a detailed meta-analysis of price presentation effects.
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total amount and pay.
PPF may be a significant factor in household decisions on water consumption.
The analysis of PPF shows a range of approaches to evaluate the standards of justice
on price, income and earnings in the seminal work of Kahneman et al. (1986b). A
recent approach found that consumer attitudes towards allocation rules, such as
highspeed train seats and parking spaces, are framed by the context (Raux et al.,
2009). Krishna (2009) provides an analysis of the PPF antecedents as is performed
in the marketing literature. In this study, we attempt to define what could be the
main PPF determinants (i.e. antecedents) in the Portuguese residential water sector.
We point towards a line of future research to assess consumer perceptions about
water policies and discuss economic criteria to make PPF measurable in a way that
will contribute to the water demand literature.
The consumer assessment of PPF is based on several antecedents or determi-
nants. Some of the antecedents of PPF highlighted in the literature are (Campbell,
1999, 2007; Bechwati et al., 2009; Krishna, 2009):
• Firm reputation.
• Firm with excessive profits.
• Inferred motive of firm, such as immoral or unethical behaviour.
• Consumer inability to understand pricing structures.
• Direction of price change.
• Human or inhuman communication of price change (e.g. price tags).
• Price for self versus price for others.
In order to identify determinants of PPF in WS and WW services we propose
the following components based on Diller (2008):
The major changes from the original approach were the inclusion of price clarity
as a determinant and the exclusion of the right of influence and co-determination,(Diller,
2008). The clarity and simplicity of the water bill, as well as the poor consumer
knowledge about their water price are important issues as previously discussed in
chapter 3. On the other hand, the water supply (WS) and wastewater (WW) services
involve business relationships between water utilities and water consumers involving
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Fig. 5.3: Components of PPF in WS and WW services
Source: Author’s analysis adapted from Diller (2008, p.354).
asymmetric information and market power. PPF is particularly important in trans-
actions in which there is a power imbalance, being essential to promote consumer
acceptability regarding the conditions imposed by the utility. Consumer acceptability
could foster an improvement in the implementation of public policies. Currently,
we do not see the right to co-determination of the price, as applicable in the water
sector at least explicitly. However, it is important to emphasize that the adoption of
such a strategy could foster the acceptance of price increases as fair (Diller, 2008).
The potential indicators that can allow to explain these components are
discussed below.
5.4.1 Price clarity
Price clarity reflect concerns about if the information provided is clear and under-
standable. In this sense, this determinant addresses the question of clarity as a
crucial issue for providing better and comprehensive information, specially about
price, in the water bill.
The clarity of the price charged for WS and WW services has emerged as a
relevant topic in the literature on residential water demand. Some recent studies
using samples of consumers found that less than 15% of their sample were aware of
the price paid for their water consumption (Frondel and Messner, 2008; Carter and
Milon, 2005), as well as the findings about consumer awareness about marginal and
average prices in chapter 3. These evidences reveals that more attention is needed to
this neglect issue. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of a systematic approach by
water entities that provide information about water sector. Recently, an analysis of
the existence of explicit information related with price in the monthly water bill was
performed by Machado (2015). This study reveals that the compliance level of the
water bills is unsatisfactory, thus recommending the implementation of an invoice
template issued by ERSAR. Along with documentation with additional information
to explain procedures to water utilities (ERSAR, 2015). This could be an important
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process to improve clarity.
Additionally, the clarity of the water bill is a privileged instrument through
which the consumer gains (or should gain) knowledge of the prices for each tariff
block. Potential indicators of the clarity of the information available in the bill are
provided by one latent variable presented in Consumer Satisfaction Index, namely
the analysis of the clarity and simplicity of the water tariffs (ECSI Portugal, 2015),
as well as in ERSAR (2014c) and APDA (2014) reports. These factors that could
summarize the complexity of pricing structures are describe in table 5.1, as well as
the available data sources and the type of data available.
Tab. 5.1: Price clarity - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources
Factors Sources (type of data)
Analysis of the clarity and simplicity of the water
tariffs
ECSI Portugal (2015, p.8)
(by municipality)
Existence of explicit information on the invoice
price in the monthly water bill (Gaudin, 2006)
n.a.
Type of tariff APDA (2014, pp.51-54)
(by management model)
Number of tariff blocks n.a.
Dimension / consumption intervals of the tariff
blocks
n.a.
Number of charged components by service (e.g.
water supply, wastewater, solid waste)
n.a.
Type of charged components by service (fixed ac-
cess charge and variable charge)
ERSAR (2014c, pp.173-182)
(by municipality)
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: n.a. not available.
5.4.2 Distributive fairness
The fairness of prices implies that prices should be based on costs, a rule that is
considered honest in general. A surprising finding from Kahneman et al. (1986b) is
that fairness judgements allows for firms not to share a loss imposed to transactors,
and in the domain of gains firms are permitted not to share their gains with transactors.
Another unexpected finding is that fairness rules imply that a firm may incorporate
opportunity costs related to excess demand, because it is unfair to use its monopolistic
influence. The authors also found that is offensive/unfair to exploit the special
dependence of an individual and the location of scarce goods (such as water) in an
explicit auction. Kahneman et al. (1986a) identify two rules of fairness: (i) a firm
is "unfair" when it exploits an increase in market power which affects the reference
transaction through losses to the other part, and (ii) a firm is "fair" even when it
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cuts salaries or increases prices or rents, if these actions are done to maintain its
reference profit. WS and WW services are a different case from other sectors, and
do not follow this pattern, given the low cost recovery levels in mainland Portugal.
Some potential explanations could be that water is an essential good and the sector
is a natural monopoly, which can imply that different rules of fairness apply.
As natural monopoly, water utilities are constrained by regulations and generally
not expected to be entitled to a positive reference profit. Currently, Portuguese
utilities still have insufficient recovery cost levels, on average, especially in the case
of WW, as previously mentioned in section 5.2. Distributive fairness implies that
the water utility (WU) should not have profit, so that consumers do not have a loss.
Another important issue is that consumers consider that lower water prices for
specific groups are fair if adequate reasons exists, such as low-income or numerous
households, as long as these different conditions are clearly specified. This sector
appears to have idiosyncratic features that lead us to question: will consumers
consider it fair for a WU to incorporate losses in order to keep the final price steady
for consumers, even when exogenous events, such as reduced availability or quality
issues indicate that a price increase is in order? If yes, in which kind of events? And
additionally will reference price (Kahneman et al., 1986b) influence the PPF?
Summarizing up, distributive fairness can be assessed taking into account the
dimensions or type of indicators in table 5.2.
5.4.3 Consistent behaviour
Water utilities are not expected to make changes without prior notice to the consumers.
It is essential that the WU follows a consistent behaviour, based on a proper legal
and institutional framework, respecting regulatory measures and procedures in the
water sector. The existence of a public regulator for the water sector, ERSAR, and
the extension of its regulation powers to all utilities (ERSAR, 2010a) was a major
breakthrough. ERSAR promotes the standardization of policies and tariffs, collect
and publish information, and pushes towards a better implementation of legislation
on WS and WW services, as well as monitoring water quality for human consumption.
It is important to note that only a few years ago was ERSAR’s scope of
action extended to the regulation of service quality and economic regulation for
WU with direct management and delegations. ERSAR was established in 2006 and
became operational in 2009, with the entry into force of the Decree-Law 277/2009
(as cited in ERSAR (2014a)). The latter piece of legislation approved ERSAR’s
organic statute, mission, and redefined and enlarged its regulatory power, in addition
to the concessions to water utilities already in their "umbrella supervisor". The
strengthening of this regulation power of ERSAR has consequences that may impact
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Tab. 5.2: Distributive fairness - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources
Factors Sources (type of data)
Indicators of consumer perceptions about distribu-
tive fairness (e.g. collected through surveys or
experiments)
n.a.
Affordability of water utility services ERSAR (2014c, p.183-189)
(by municipality)
Tariff charges (i.e. monthly water bill) for 10 cubic
meters by service
ERSAR (2014c, pp.165-172)
(by municipality)
Indicators of economic and financial performance
reflecting whether the WU had a profit or loss (e.g.
operating results, net income) as well as indicators
of efficiency and water loss
ERSAR (2014c, pp.193-202)
(by municipality)
Comparative analysis of asymmetric price charged
between urban and rural regions and water use
purposes
APDA (2014, pp.55-69)
(partial information by region, man-
agement model and municipality size)
Existence of tariff for numerous households, avail-
able in the WU, in order to foster social equity
APDA (2014, pp.51-54)
(by management model)
Existence of a social tariff for households with low
incomes provided by the WU in order to foster
social equity
APDA (2014, pp.51-54)
(by management model)
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: n.a. not available.
on consumer perceptions about the consistent behaviour of water utilities. In this
respect, it is interesting to assess whether the regulations in this context, and the
recommendations suggested by ERSAR, influence consumer perceptions about the
behaviour of WU as service providers, and therefore the PPF. This could be achieved
through the development of a PPF index, performed on an annual basis, in line with
ECSI.
The WFD already states that water prices should encourage efficient use of
water resources, whatever their use, through the cost allocation to users. As noted
earlier, WFD defends adequate cost recovery level, including financial costs and
environmental and resource costs. It also requires this cost allocation to different
uses to be clear. However, for this allocation to be valid, WU have to provide reliable
accounting data.
Ultimately, by securing a better balance between the satisfaction of consumer
needs and the environmental sustainability of water resources, as well as encouraging
consistent reporting by WU, the WFD fosters a positive perception about PPF.
Some potential indicators for assessing the consistent behaviour of WU in terms of
tariff structures are described in table 5.3.
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Tab. 5.3: Consistent behaviour -Relevant factors of measurement and available sources
Factors Sources (type of data)
Evaluation from ERSAR to determine if WU im-
plements the mandatory legislation
ERSAR (2014d, pp.91-105, 149-171)
(by municipality)
Determine if WU implements the cost-recovery
principle according to WFD
ERSAR (2014c, pp.122-159)
(by municipality)
Comparative analysis of annual variation of fees
and charges
APDA (2014, pp.130-138)
(partial information by municipality)
Financing capacity and financial self-sustainability
of the WU
ERSAR (2014c, pp.193-202)
(by municipality)
Investments and subsidies received by the WU
(Government budget, Program Contracts and EU
Funds) and monitoring that these subsidies are
being reflected in the final tariffs paid by water
consumers
ERSAR (2014c, p.60-64)
(partial information by water utility
companies)
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: n.a. not available.
5.4.4 Price reliability
In the analysis of price reliability, we highlight that the effective price paid by the
household is only available retrospectively because the water bill is only available
after consumption has been made (i.e. in the following month). Furthermore, not
only is there a variable component of the price dependent on the consumption level,
but the actual water consumption is not always measured on a monthly basis, but
rather estimated. Besides, there are several other components (e.g. water resources
charge, VAT, solid waste and wastewater fees) in the water bill, many of which
depend on the water consumption level.
Price reliability implies that water utilities will not undertake unexpected
changes on prices. In order to increase PPF, this determinant can be fostered by
transparency in reporting the individual costs charged on the final consumer price.
Despite the limitations, some of the potential indicators that may be used to parse
this determinant are shown in table 5.4.
5.4.5 Price honesty
This determinant reflects whether the price can be considered true and transparent
(Diller, 2008). However, water prices do not appear to be transparent to consumers
(Martins and Moura e Sá, 2011). While determining price clarity is key to improve
consumer understanding of what they are paying, price honesty addresses the trust
in the pricing information and the various components of the amount paid on the
water bill. This component reflects the accuracy and completeness of information
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Tab. 5.4: Price reliability - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources
Factors Sources (type of data)
Consumer assessment of reliability of WS and WW
services
ECSI Portugal (2015, p.8)
(by municipality)
Reliability of the data provided by the water utili-
ties to ERSAR
ERSAR (2014c, pp.122-159)
(by municipality)
Identification of explicit information in the water
bill about cost recovery ratios, since is expected
that this information will increase the perceived
price reliability
n.a.
Infrastructure sustainability of the services in the
water sector
ERSAR (2014d, pp.75-86,133-144)
(by municipality)
Comparative analysis of improvements in the level
of information and awareness of consumers about
the tariff blocks applicable for its WU and operat-
ing costs by services
n.a.
Analysis of minimum and maximum price charged
and price variations
APDA (2014, pp.139-146)
(by region)
Analysis of price-quality relationship based on per-
ceived quality and value of the WS and WW ser-
vices
ECSI Portugal (2015, p.8)
(by municipality)
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: n.a. not available.
about prices, conditions and services. Consumers are entitled to information about
price and payment of the service through the water bill.
Given the importance of price elasticity of demand as a central variable for
water management and public policy analysis, pricing honesty emerges as a prominent
issue. Price honesty in the context of a relationship between two agents, buyer and
seller, is based on the fair and proper way the price is perceived by the economic
agents involved in the transaction. The information provided to consumers must be
complete, since this could influence their judgements about price honesty. For an
honest relationship water utilities could disclose to consumers the costs by type of
services. This could be an issue, since clearly established cost accounting system is
need in WS and WW services51. As an essential good, water typically has an inelastic
demand, causing consumers to have small reactions to price variations. Additionally,
this sector is a natural monopoly where price is not competitive, which makes price
honesty a particularly relevant determinant.
Showing the levels of cost recovery by component, i.e. charged by type of
service (e.g. water supply, wastewater, solid waste) may allow consumers to have
51. In fact, there are Portuguese municipalities that are not possible to determine the cost recovery
level, see ERSAR (2014c, pp.122-159) for details.
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a better price fairness judgement which will consequently influence their reliability
perception and increased acceptability.
Table 5.5 presents indicators to explain price honesty of residential water
demand.
Tab. 5.5: Price honesty - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources
Factors Sources (type of data)
Analysis of complete information in the water bills n.a.
Analysis of contract conditions provided by the
water utilities
n.a.
Compliance of the WU to the right to inform con-
sumers through their websites, preferentially using
complete information
ERSAR (2014b, pp.97-98)
(by municipality)
Level of consumer awareness about the purpose of
each component charged in the water bill
n.a.
Level of awareness among consumers about the
ability of the water utility to achieve cost recovery
in water supply and sanitation of their county or
municipality
n.a.
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: n.a. not available.
5.4.6 Respect and regard for the partner
This determinant is quite relevant to long-term relationships, a situation that occurs
in water sector, since residential water consumers in a given location can only get
water from one WU. A relationship of respect with consumers should be created
given the lack of alternative choices. The principle of solidarity must be taken into
consideration, and the monopolist should not exert undue pressure on consumers,
understanding that it is not supposed to take advantage of its monopolistic position.
There is evidence that sellers (i.e. water utilities), although they are in a
position of greater power, seem to reject using their position to benefit themselves.
Kahneman et al. (1986b) argue that when exist budget and legal constraints only,
firms are profit maximizers, but in reality the existence of fairness restrictions affects
their operational decisions. This may actually be one of the potential explanatory
factors for difficulties in cost recovery in the water sector, discussed in section 5.2.
Although the WU has a monopolistic position in the market, with many of these
water utilities being managed directly or indirectly by municipalities the expected
impact of fairness restrictions, and, consequently, impact on political reputation may
potentially affect the operational decisions. Plus, the absence of correct pricing and
the procrastination of price (increasing) decisions by the WU could have significant
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impacts on cost recovery ratios.
Some of the potential indicators that show relevance to measure the respect
and regard for the partner are described in table 5.6.
Tab. 5.6: Respect and regard for the partner - Relevant factors of measurement and
available sources
Factors Sources (type of data)
Opinion survey on the respect and regard of water
utility by their customers
ECSI Portugal (2015, p.8)
(by municipality)
Clarity of information provided sent to the con-
sumer either in the water bill (Martins and Moura
e Sá, 2011) or in other information provided by
mail or other communication channels
ECSI Portugal (2015, p.8)
(by municipality)
Percentage of consumers who understand the cal-
culation of water price by their water utilities
n.a.
Number of customer complaints ERSAR (2014d, pp.59-62,121-124)
(by municipality)
Evaluation of grounds for complaints ERSAR (2014b, pp.93-97)
(by municipality)
Indicators of service quality provided to water users ERSAR (2014d, p.33-287)
(by municipality)
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: n.a. not available.
5.4.7 Fair dealing
Fair dealing involves a consistent, non-discriminatory and ethical treatment defending
the interests of all parties, based on the use of careful and accurate information.
This dimension of PPF refers to the concept of procedural fairness (Diller, 2008),
including generosity in case of doubt and flexibility against unforeseen situations. In
the water sector, this would involve, for example, WU ensuring free repairs when
there have been deficiencies in supply or service, even if no such legal obligation
exists. This flexibility in understanding a business relationship may lead, for example,
to an increase in perceived fairness, positively contributing to a good WU-consumer
relationship.
On this determinant, ERSAR has an important role. This authority aims to
protect the interests of consumers by promoting the service quality provided by the
WU and ensuring socially acceptable tariffs, without neglecting the economic, financial
and environmental sustainability. The ERSAR still has regulatory responsibilities
monitoring the WS and WW services and regulates the water quality for human
consumption. Thus, ERSAR is in a position to ensure fair treatment. This can be
achieved either by controlling that WUs are in compliance with legislation and public
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policies, and by protecting consumers’ interests and fostering good communication
among water customers and utilities.
Next, in table 5.7 we present some dimensions which are considered relevant
to approach this determinant:
Tab. 5.7: Fair dealing - Relevant factors of measurement and available sources
Factors Sources (type of data)
Consumer perception survey about the fair treat-
ment carried out by the WU
n.a.
Operating performance indicators of faults and
system malfunctions
ERSAR (2014d, p.79-86)
(by municipality)
Degree of compliance of the water sector legislation
by the WU in terms of water quality tests
ERSAR (2014d, p.55-58,161-168)
(by municipality)
Guarantees of free replacements and repairs in
situations of shortages and deficiencies
n.a.
Source: Author’s analysis. Note: n.a. not available.
5.5 Conclusion and Future Research
This study developed a conceptual model of price fairness, and defines the potential
items that can explain the components of PPF, identifying measures of the PPF in
the Portuguese residential water sector.
Recently, Chung and Petrick (2015) developed a multidimensional scale to
measure price fairness in tourism and their results highlight two dimensions: cognitive
and affective fairness, and stressing a lack of studies about PPF from a consumer per-
spective, since the literature is mainly focused on pricing strategy from a managerial
perspective. When consumers do not know price, our conceptual model highlights
that price fairness judgements can be influenced by heuristics that lead to consumer
decisions based on alternatives to prices, such as the monthly water bill. Although
the creation of a scale to measure PPF adapted to a specific context or field of
research is fairly common, is still a thoughtful process in which the researcher needs
to select several factors to explain each component. In most cases data is collected
through surveys, experiments or scenario-based fairness judgements (Xia et al., 2004).
This chapter tried to go beyond this typical creation of a construct, and also the
traditional approach in economic research, using an interdisciplinary approach from
various fields.
The analysis of PPF components suggests measurement variables to perform a
fairness evaluation, which as highlighted in the conceptual model, can come about
via either price or bill comparison. The organism’s simplifications of the real world
94 5. Perceived Price Fairness - Determinants in the residential water sector in Portugal
creates discrepancies that explain behaviour, as noted by Simon (1955); one of these
discrepancies is level of price awareness. The novelty in our conceptual model is
proposing that residential water consumers have limited knowledge of water price.
Thus, the level of price awareness determines whether price or bill comparison will
occur. Thereafter, these comparison processes will follow the conventional path where
a negative evaluation of an outcome triggers a fairness judgement, as presented in
the literature (Somervuori, 2014; Maxwell, 2008; Rutte and Messick, 1995).
In this sense, potential lines of future research are to test the validity and
reliability of the proposed items for each component of PPF and the use of the
monthly water bill as an alternative to price in fairness assessments. The issue of
perceived bill fairness, is exclusive to WS and WW services, since other services like
communication and subscription services e.g. Internet access, online music download,
online newspapers also present complex pricing schemes (Lambrecht et al., 2007).
According to the analysis of PPF components performed in section 5.4, there
are important available sources for data collection, but there is lack of information in
some components, in particular in the case of factors to measure consumer perception.
As noted in chapter 2 the quality and availability of the data in the water sector
is still limited, although ERSAR has made an effort to present more complete and
reliable information every year, and on a more regular basis (ERSAR, 2014a, 2013,
2012b, 2010b, 2009, 2008). Improvement of data quality is crucial to improve water
consumer fairness judgements and actions. More attention should be paid to con-
sumer perceptions, for the improvement of consumer awareness indicators discussed
in chapter 3. Once more, ERSAR could play a central role in the development of the
relationship between water utilities and water users, promoting a deeper understand-
ing of water consumer insights, and establish a contribution to the sustainability in
the water sector, since PPF could be a relevant tool to improve the assessment and
monitoring of the effects of public policies. The proposed approach can be applied
to other sectors and countries, taking into account positive geographic and cultural
idiosyncrasies. These issues are fruitful avenues of research that could be explored in
future studies.
6. NONLINEAR PRICING WITH REFERENCE DEPENDENCE
6.1 Introduction
For most goods, consumers pay a single unit price which is easy to know and
understand. Utility bills and other service bills, on the other hand, are commonly
based on nonlinear price schedules with many confounding elements, such as access
charges (or fixed fees) and unit prices that vary along several blocks. In these
circumstances price becomes endogenous, because it depends on the block the
consumer is on, and studying consumer reactions to price changes is more difficult.
In particular, average prices are different from marginal prices and demand analysis
requires appropriate techniques to isolate price elasticities and ensure that these
are properly interpreted. As noted in Olmstead et al. (2007, p.194), with varying
block rates "how price affects demand is, itself, somewhat elusive". The same authors
find that the price elasticity of water demand is higher when the tariff structure
is increasing block rates (IBR) and suggest that this could be due to an as yet
unidentified behavioural response to price structure, as opposed to price. This
matches a common perception among water managers that having IBR sends the
consumer a stronger message about resource scarcity, which explains at least partly
the growing popularity of IBR schemes (OECD, 2010). Monteiro and Roseta-Palma
(2011) discuss the possibility that IBR are an efficient way for utilities to achieve
cost-recovery when weather affects water demand and costs, but the behavioural
implications of the price structure are not considered. In this paper, we analyse
how the multiple unit prices associated with a nonlinear schedule, as well as the
total amount the consumer pays (i.e. expense), can induce a behavioural response if
consumer choices are altered because they are anchoring the price or expense on a
given reference point and then treating deviations from this reference as losses or
gains.
Reference-price models are based on the general theory of reference-dependent
preferences, first proposed in the seminal paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
which emphasizes that people attribute value to changes in relevant variables, such
as wealth, and not their absolute magnitudes. Moreover, loss aversion, defined as
a larger sensitivity to changes that are seen as losses than to gains of similar size,
appears to be a widespread trait of consumer preferences. Ho et al. (2006) provide
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an overview of the evidence on loss aversion and reference dependence in a significant
range of economic domains. Once the concept of reference dependence is introduced,
it is crucial to understand how the reference point is defined. Kamenica (2008) notes
that "context can influence decisions" and discusses how the range of products a
firm offers can lead to contextual inference by consumers. Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)
introduce a utility function with two separable components, consumption utility
and gain-loss utility, where the former is akin to the classical utility formulation
and the latter includes the reference point. The most common assumption is that
people compare outcomes to their status quo, but Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) propose,
more generally, that the reference point comes from expectations, which may not
coincide with the status quo. This idea was also previously developed in a paper on
asymmetric price elasticities (Putler, 1992), which suggests an expectations model to
define the reference point, differing from previous literature that typically modeled
reference prices exclusively using past prices.
While our discussion of reference expense seems to be a novelty, there are quite
a few references in the marketing literature discussing reference-price models. Putler
(1992) develops a theoretical setting of consumer choice and estimates asymmetric
price elasticities for the (homogeneous) wholesale egg market. This type of price-
elasticity asymmetry is also considered in Greenleaf (1995), which considers the
implications for the profitability of promotions, and in Fibich et al. (2005) which
discuss the difference between short-term and long-term effects. Krishna (2009)
reviews the evidence on behavioural aspects of pricing, distinguishing between price
presentation effects (which are typically analysed in lab experiments and include
external factors, e.g. external reference prices) and internal reference prices (mostly
based on scanner data on consumer purchases). In the economics literature, Heidhues
and Kőszegi (2008) use a differentiated-product setting to study the impact on
equilibrium prices of consumer loss aversion when there is strategic competition
among firms. Finally, Simonson and Drolet (2004) ascribe possible differences between
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept to the different alternatives available
to buyers and sellers, while concluding that the same principles guide anchoring
behaviour in both cases. Our main contribution is to explore the potential role of
price schedules in consumer expectations about price, in the first model, but we also
explore the higher awareness of consumer to expense rather than price.
Nonlinear pricing has been the object of growing interest, "becoming increasingly
popular for communication services (wireless phone service, Internet access) and
subscription services (online music download, online newspapers)" (Lambrecht et al.,
2007, p.698). Recent experimental economics applications with energy and water
utilities (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011) are focused on social comparison through
reference points, typically "reference consumption", and the potential roles of price
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and expense information are not considered. Moreover, for many natural resources
there is currently a focus on demand management, especially in developed countries
where supply management was paramount in the past and where current resource
use is frequently unsustainable (Griffin, 2006). One of the essential elements of
demand management is an understanding of consumer reactions to price, but little (if
anything) has been written on such reactions when consumers have gain-loss utility
and price schedules are complex, or in situations where there is higher awareness to
expense than to unit prices.
Furthermore, there are not many examples of behavioural economics insights
in the environmental economics literature, with the exception of environmental
valuation studies, in spite of the potential importance of behavioural failures in the
environmental policy arena (Shogren and Taylor, 2008). In the case of water demand,
Correia and Roseta-Palma (2014) discuss the handful of articles which attempt to
incorporate behavioural effects. Behavioural economics is also (slowly) emerging in
energy economics (Pollitt and Shaorshadze, 2011), climate change literature (Brekke
and Johansson-Stenman, 2008) and sustainable forest management (Knetsch, 2005).
The latter points out that "it is becoming increasingly clear that most economic
analyses of resource issues (...) could be markedly improved by including the insights
from the findings of behaviour economics" (Knetsch, 2005, p.101).
To contribute to such improvement, this paper is organized as follows: Section
6.2 presents our two models: i) a reference-price model with block rates and ii) a
reference-expense model, describing theoretical results under different reference-price
possibilities and a reference-expense framework. Section 6.3 concludes the paper by
briefly examining implications for utilities or other firms, as well as pointing avenues
for further research.
6.2 Modelling different types of reference effects with block rates
6.2.1 Modelling reference-price effects
Most price analyses in economics as well as in marketing focus on intrinsic price,
although over the last three decades the "behavioural aspects of pricing" (henceforth
behavioural pricing) emerge as an ineluctable topic (Krishna, 2009). In this section,
we assume that consumers make rational choices and know their rate structure, yet
have subjective reference prices which are affected by available block rates. Demand
analysis under block-rate prices requires the use of a model that distinguishes the
choice of block, which is discrete in nature, from the choice of consumption within
the block, which is continuous (see Moffitt (1986) for the two-good model and an
explanation of the econometric approach to demand estimation, and Hewitt and
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Hanemann (1995) for an extension to the N-good case and an application to water
demand). To find consumer demand, essentially requires three steps: i) definition of
the budget subsets for the discrete choice; ii) maximization of utility in each budget
subset to find demand conditional on location in that subset; iii) given conditional
demands from the previous step, build the unconditional demand. The novelty in
this paper is the incorporation of a gain-loss component based on the existence of a
reference price in the utility function within step ii).
Definition of budget subsets
Suppose there are N goods, x1 to xN , one of which, x1, is characterized by a nonlinear
price schedule with a fixed fee or fixed access charge, FC, and K rate blocks, which
imply K − 1 switching points (or kink points). Let x11 to x1K−1 and p11 to p1K
denote the block-switching points and the block prices, respectively. Also, the first
block starts at x10 = 0. We assume that once the consumer changes to a higher block,
only the additional units are charged at the new price, so that several marginal prices
can co-exist in the consumer bill. Figure 6.1 illustrates the two-block budget set
when there are only two goods and rates are increasing, p11 < p12.
Fig. 6.1: Budget set with two blocks for x1, with increasing block rates
The budget set B will be kinked but continuous and it will have 2K−1 subsets,
denoted by Bb, where B =
2K−1⋃
b=1
Bb. All budget subsets are convex even if the full
budget set is not, as will be the case for decreasing block rates. There are two type
of subsets: i) kink points, which occur when x1 = x1k and ii) line segments defined
as
[
(x1, ..., xN ) | x1k ≤ x1 ≤ x1k+1, p(x1) +
N∑
j=2
pjxj ≤M
]
(Hewitt and Hanemann,
1995). The complete budget set can be written using the K budget segments defined
by:
p(x1) +
N∑
j=2
pjxj ≤M (6.1)
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where M is consumer income and p(x1) is the payment function for a customer’s
quantity purchased for a good or service with a K-rate block structure, namely:
p(x1) =

p11x1 + FC if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x11
p12 (x1 − x11) + p11x11 + FC if x11 < x1 ≤ x12
...
p1K (x1 − x1K−1) +
K−1∑
k=1
p1k (x1k − x1k−1) + FC if x1k−1 < x1
(6.2)
Alternatively, the budget set can also be written using a difference term, dk,
which is the difference between the payment incurred for quantity x1 (in the kth
block) and what it would have cost to purchase the same quantity at that block’s
price p1k, and which is very common in the literature:
p1kx1 +
N∑
j=2
pjxj ≤M + dk ∀k = 1, ...,K
where dk = −FC −
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i
(6.3)
The sum of M and dk is also known as virtual income. Thus defined, the
difference term will be negative for decreasing block rates and it may be positive or
negative for IBR, depending on the size of the fixed access charge 52. Naturally, the
case without such charges is a special case of this general formulation.
Reference points - reference prices
As noted in the Introduction, the conventional reference point is the status quo,
based on the implicit assumption that the consumer’s expectation about this status
quo remains unchanged (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006; Putler, 1992). Krishna (2009)
presents a conceptual framework suggesting that the subjective price perceived by
consumers has two types of determinants: internal reference prices (i.e. reference
points created by consumers themselves) and external factors affecting reference
prices (i.e. price presentation effects). Consumer behaviour, normally expressed
by the quantity purchased (consumption level), is assumed to be determined by
subjective price. According to conventional theory, the consumer is a price taker and
in this sense, the reference point is exogenous, because "references prices are formed
before the consumer chooses what to purchase, and are viewed as being exogenous
at the time of choice" (Putler, 1992, p.289). The neoclassical perspective states that
the consumption level will depend on two determinants: price and income. In this
sense the existence of a reference consumption level (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) may
52. See appendix C.1 for details.
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be influenced by reference prices and a reference consumer income53. In order to
check the impact on consumer choices, we suggest three different reference-price
possibilities, in a two-block setting: i) price of the first block, ii) price of the second
block, and iii) the average of the two block prices. Case i) would apply if in the
recent past the consumer paid the price of the first block. Case ii) is similar, for a
consumer that has a higher consumption level so that he expects the second-block
price. Case iii) would be applicable to situations where the typical consumption level
is close to the block limit, sometimes falling on the first block and others on the
second.
Utility maximization with gain-loss component based on reference prices
For the consumption choice within each budget subset, there are two alternatives:
either the consumer is on a kink point (x∗1 = x1k for some k) or he is on a line segment
k where the (constant) marginal price is p1k. Either way, the decision will be the
outcome of a utility-maximization problem with piecewise-linear budget constraints,
where the utility conditional on being located on a specific budget subset is:
max
x1,...,xN
U(x1, ..., xN , Lk, Gk, θ)
s.t. x ∈ Bb
(6.4)
Gk and Lk are gain and loss terms, respectively, and θ represents other param-
eters of the utility function. This general formulation is compatible with Kőszegi
and Rabin (2006)’s assumption of separability between consumption utility and
gain-loss utility. Moreover, the model is reduced to the conventional economic model
if there are no reference-dependence effects54. We now describe the role of Gk and
Lk, following Putler (1992) but considering, for simplicity, that good 1 (x1) is the
only good where these terms exist, while taking into account multiple block prices.
The idea is that having a price schedule (i.e. external reference prices) for this good
provides the consumer with exogenous information that affects (internal) reference
prices, and this may influence his perception of the price he is paying. Define the
unit loss as lk = I(p1k − p1r), where p1r is the reference price, and the unit gain
as gk = (1− I) (p1r − p1k). Naturally, the consumer cannot simultaneously feel an
53. The existence of a reference income or wealth is, however, outside the scope of this work.
54. Note, however, that Köszegi and Rabin’s model is based on the expectations-formation literature,
in contrast with our model which is based on adaptation-level formation. Adaptation-level theory
suggests that reference-price formation by consumers can be grounded on the path of past prices
and other factors, such as suggested prices (Putler, 1992). Pricing strategies could, in principle, be
designed to highlight the price which firm managers intend to be the reference price.
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(overall) gain and an (overall) loss, so:
I =
{
1 p1k > p1r
0 otherwise
To allow for the possibility that the gains or losses experienced by the consumer
may not be linear, we define effective per unit gain or loss as:
E(lk, gk) =

El(lk) p1k > p1r
0 p1k = p1r
Eg(gk) p1k < p1r
where El(lk) > 0, Eg(gk) > 0, and each one approaches zero when lk and
gk, respectively, approach zero. Now we can define the total loss or gain affecting
the consumer, Lk = El(lk)x1 or Gk = Eg(gk)x1.55 We assume that consumption
marginal utilities are positive and decreasing, while ∂U∂Lk < 0,
∂2U
∂L2
k
> 0, ∂U∂Gk > 0 and
∂2U
∂G2
k
< 0. Thus the utility function has the expected properties, i.e. strict concavity
in consumption and gains and convexity in losses. The existence of loss aversion
would be reflected in a presumably stronger reaction of El(lk) to price "losses" than
that embodied in Eg(gk) for price "gains".
The third step, as described in detail in Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), is to take
the conditional demands for all budget subsets, verify which achieve indirect utility
maximization taking all blocks into account and build the unconditional demand
functions (if the whole budget set B is convex and there is a unique optimum) or
correspondences (if the budget set is not convex, in which case there may be more
than one solution). Note however, that demand functions will now depend not only
on prices and income but also on the gain and loss effects.
Theoretical results using alternative reference prices
In this section, we analyse the impact of the gain-loss formulation on consumer
choices for different reference-price possibilities. Starting with an interior solution on
segment k, the first-order conditions associated with utility-maximization problem
55. For the loss term, it would be possible to consider only the units paid at the higher price, e.g.
x1 − x1k−1 but this adjustment would not change the first-order condition.
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(6.4) are:
∂U
∂x1
+ El
∂U
∂Lk
+ Eg
∂U
∂Gk
− λp1k = 0 ∀k = 1, ...,K (6.5)
∂U
∂xj
− λpj = 0 ∀j = 2, ..., N
p1kx1 +
N∑
j=2
pjxj = M + dk
Assuming that an interior solution exists, the solution of first-order conditions
(6.5) is represented by the conditional demand functions (i.e. conditional on the
quantity consumed being in the kth block), in particular for good 1:
x1 = x1(p1k, lk, gk,M + dk, θ)
This general conditional demand function includes the standard components
(i.e. price and (virtual) income) plus the marginal gain and marginal loss terms and
consumer parameters.
As noted in the literature (Olmstead et al., 2007; Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995;
Moffitt, 1986), the consumption choice could be either within each budget subset
(i.e. line segment k) or at the kink point between two segments (for example, at
x1k−1 = x11 for k = 2). Therefore, the unconditional demand (x1) in the more
general case for k blocks and taking into account the unit gain and unit loss of each
conditional demand function, we have:
x1=

x∗11(p11, l1, g1,M + d1, θ) if x∗11(p11, l1, g1,M + d1, θ) < x11
x11
if x∗11(p11, l1, g1,M + d1, θ) ≥ x11
and x∗12(p12, l2, g2,M + d2, θ) ≤ x11
x∗12(p12, l2, g2,M + d2, θ) if x∗12(.) > x11
...
x1k−1
if x∗1k−1(p1k−1, lk−1, gk−1,M + dk−1, θ) ≥ x1k−1
and x∗1k(p1k, lk, gk,M + dk, θ) ≤ x1k−1
x∗1k(p1k, lk, gk,M + dk, θ) if x∗1k(p1k, lk, gk,M + dk, θ) > x1k−1
(6.6)
Notice that the utility maximization only occurs at the kink point if utility
maxima along each segment are found in the unfeasible range (Moffitt, 1986). Under
IBR, the budget set will be strictly convex, therefore any interior solution will be
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unique as long as indifference curves are continuous, even if they are no longer
expected to be differentiable at the (block-switching) kink point: although the
following figures only show the relevant section of each indifference curve, it is clear
that the marginal rate of substitution will be higher where the slope of the budget
constraint is lower, invalidating the existence of an alternative solution on the other
block.
Whenever the price for good 1 is the same as the reference price, the gain
and loss terms disappear and the problem reverts to the traditional consumer
maximization problem. Otherwise, the impact of the new components can be
intuitively gathered from an analysis of the marginal rate of substitution between
good 1 and any other good j at a given consumption point x∗(x∗1, x∗j ):
∂U
∂x1
+ El ∂U∂Lk
∂U
∂xj
<
∂U
∂x1
∂U
∂xj
<
∂U
∂x1
+ Eg ∂U∂Gk
∂U
∂xj
(6.7)
Recall that xj ,∀j = 2, ...N, does not have gain and loss terms 56. Inequality
(6.7) indicates that indifference curves will be steeper for losses (p1k > p1r) than
when there is no gain-loss effect (p1k = p1r), while less steep indifference curves will
occur in the domain of gains (p1k < p1r). A graphical analysis in two-good space
can be used to show how the resulting change in the slope of indifference curves
yields a different consumption choice. We will consider only two blocks and no fixed
charge, to simplify. To apply the gain-loss framework, however, requires us to make
assumptions about the reference price. We check the impact on consumer choices in
three different cases: i) p1r = p11, ii) p1r = p12, and iii) p1r = p11+p122 .
If the reference price is the price of the first block (p11), then consumers on the
second block will be affected by a sense of loss, since their price is higher than the
reference price, as shown on Figure 6.2. On the other hand, consumers on the first
block or the kink will react no differently than in traditional models. Using equation
(6.7), it is clear that if the consumer’s choice without gain-loss components was on
the second block, at that point, x∗1trad, the new indifference curve will have a lower
slope. Thus, the new choice will be a point to the left of x∗1trad, such as x∗1new.
In this case, the consumer will therefore choose less of the good x1. Furthermore,
if there is an increase of the second-block price (p12), the loss term increases so the
consumption response will be stronger than we would expect in a traditional utility-
maximization setting. 57 This is a potential theoretical justification for the finding
that consumers with IBR show higher consumption elasticities, as noted in section 6.1.
It could also explain why water managers defend increasing blocks as a way to signal
56. See Putler (1992) for the case where all goods have gain and loss terms but prices are uniform.
57. See appendix C.2 for the Generalized Slutsky Equation.
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Fig. 6.2: Decrease in consumption due to the loss effect (with p1r = p11)
scarcity and decrease consumption, over and beyond what could be expected from
a higher uniform price. Despite the coexistence of a wide range of rate structures
in OECD countries (OECD, 2010), IBR are the most common choice for water (for
example, in Portugal, Spain and Italy)58.
There is no a priori reason, however, for consumers to set p11 as their reference
price. It would also be possible for p12 to be the reference. In that case, consumers
on the second block will have no gain/loss term, and those on the first block or at
the kink will feel a gain because they see their price as a discount. Using similar
reasoning to that developed in the previous paragraph, this will lead to an increase
in consumption, as depicted in Figure 6.3.
Fig. 6.3: Increase in consumption due to the gain effect (with p1r = p12)
Finally, if the reference price is the average of the two block prices, p1r = p11+p122 ,
indifference curves will shift on both segments, yielding a rise in consumption for
those on the first block and a decrease for those on the second. This case is shown in
Figure 6.4, which highlights that we would expect to see more "bunching" around
58. Although of course alternative tariff structures also have advantages, for instance decreasing
block rates benefit large customers while providing stable cash flows to the seller (OECD, 2010).
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the kink point.
Fig. 6.4: Increase (decrease) in consumption in the first (second) block (with average price
as the reference)
6.2.2 Modelling reference-expense effects
The previous model assumes that consumers have a reference price for the good which,
along with the actual price paid, influences their consumption decisions. However, it
would also be possible for a reference point to be related with the total amount paid
for the service. In other words, consumers could have a reference expense, which
seems more realistic in the residential water sector. As noted in Chapter 3, in a
survey of Portuguese residential water users only 8% stated that they knew their
marginal price, while 87% claimed familiarity with their total monthly water bill.
Consumers thus show higher awareness with respect to their water bill expenses than
to prices. A model which includes reference-expense effects seems to be in order.
Definition of budget subset
Suppose there are N goods, x1 to xN , with x1, as in section 6.2.1. However, assume
in this case that the consumer does not have salient information about block rates
and will react only to the total amount paid for each good.
To simplify, we will assume in this section that unit prices are constant (or
seen by consumers to be constant 59) for all goods, so that the budget set B is no
longer kinked:
N∑
i=1
ei ≤M, ∀i = 1, ..., N (6.8)
59. In our survey we found knowledge about the full pricing structure to be limited. Only 54% of
households tried to guess their tariff structure.
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where M is consumer income and ei = pixi is the expense made for purchasing
i. The expense is composed of xi, an n−vector of purchased amounts, and pi, an n−
vector of prices.
Reference points - reference expense
In section 6.2.1, we suggested different prices that could be used as reference points.
When dealing with expense, we acknowledge that people will typically have only
one bill to pay in each period. There could still be different ways of modeling
reference expense, e.g. using a lagged reference expense (such as the bill paid in the
immediately preceding month or in the same month a year before if seasonality is an
issue) or an average value. A further alternative would be for utilities to highlight a
representative value for expense, as is commonly done for consumption in studies of
social comparison. The relevant point in this section is to start from the premise
that a reference expense exists, so a higher expense will be felt as a loss while a lower
expense would be seen as a discount.
Utility maximization with gain-loss component based on reference expense
The consumer choice decision will be the outcome of the utility-maximization problem:
max
x1,...,xN
U(x1, ..., xN , Li, Gi, θ)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
ei =M
(6.9)
where Gi, Li and θ represent gain term, loss term and parameters of the utility
function, respectively. The loss is defined as li = Ii(ei−eir), where eir is the reference
expense of good or service i, and the gain as gi = (1− Ii) (eir−ei). As in the previous
model, the consumer cannot simultaneously feel gain and loss, thus we use a binary
variable:
I =
{
1 ei > eir
0 otherwise
Likewise, we define effective gain or loss as:
Ei(li, gi) =

Eli(li) ei > eir
0 ei = eir
Egi(gi) ei < eir
where Eli(li) > 0, Egi(gi) > 0, and each one approaches zero when li and gi,
respectively, approach zero. Now, we can define the total loss or gain affecting the
consumer, Li = Eli(li)ei or Gi = Egi(gi)ei, respectively. We assume that consumption
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marginal utilities are positive and decreasing, while ∂U∂Li < 0,
∂2U
∂L2i
> 0, ∂U∂Gi > 0 and
∂2U
∂G2i
< 0. Thus, the utility function has the expected properties, i.e. strict concavity
in consumption and gains and convexity in losses.
Theoretical results using reference expense
The impact of the gain-loss component on consumer choices for reference-expense
effects is given by the first-order conditions associated with utility-maximization
problem (6.9):
∂U
∂xi
+
[
Eli
∂U
∂Li
+ Egi
∂U
∂Gi
− λ
]
pi = 0 (6.10)
N∑
i=1
ei = M, ∀i = 1, ..., N
The results will be similar to Putler (1992), with the difference that pi will
now influence the gain and loss terms. The solution of first-order conditions (6.10) is
represented by the conditional demand function:
xi = xi(pi, li, gi,M, θ) (6.11)
.
The impact of the new components can be intuitively gathered from an analysis
of the marginal rate of substitution between good 1 and any other good j at a given
consumption point x∗(x∗1, x∗j ):
∂U
∂x1
+ El1p1
∂U
∂L1
νj <
∂U
∂x1
νj <
∂U
∂x1
+ Eg1p1
∂U
∂G1
νj ,
where νj = ∂U∂xj +
[
Elj
∂U
∂Lj
+ Egj ∂U∂Gj
]
pj
(6.12)
This inequality allows us to perform an indifference curve analysis in two-good
space (good 1 and good j) in which the utility maximization bundle xg will occur
where the indifference curve Ug is tangent to the budget constraint, when expense is
lower than the reference expense (ei < eir). When the expense is higher than the
reference expense (ei > eir), the utility maximization bundle xl will occur in the
tangent between the indifference curve Ul and the budget constraint, as shown in
Figure 6.5.
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Fig. 6.5: Increase (decrease) in consumption with expense lower (higher) than reference
expense
6.3 Conclusion and Future Research
First of all, it is important to note that nonlinear pricing analysis "(...) is a more
realistic and thus more complex view of reality" (May, 1999, p.3). In this chapter,
we have seen that the inclusion of a behavioural reaction to a reference price arising
from a schedule with more than one unit price can generate different effects on
consumption, depending on which price is seen by the consumer as the reference
point. Because results are ambiguous, and considering that there is no reason to
suppose a certain unit price will catch the consumer’s attention more than any other,
firms could advertise the price that best suits strategic objectives. For example,
utilities who are dealing with capacity constraints or natural resource scarcity can
focus specifically on advertising the first block price, or even the second, if there
are more than two and the first is a heavily subsidized block meant only to ensure
affordability for poorer households. Higher-block prices would then be framed as
losses, to induce conservation behaviour even without raising prices. Furthermore,
if those prices were to be raised, for example to reflect marginal cost as so often
recommended on efficiency grounds, such framing would also encourage a stronger
consumption response. We briefly summarize the main theoretical results for the three
different reference prices in table 6.1. We also propose a model based on reference
expense where the relevant question is "what if consumers are not ’price-conscious’
and are only aware of their total expense?". Given the simplifying assumptions of
linear prices and a pre-existing value for the reference expense, our results are a
straightforward extension of Putler (1992).
6.3.
C
onclusion
and
Future
R
esearch
109
Tab. 6.1: Main theoretical results with three different reference-price possibilities
Reference price Gain and loss effect on
current block
Impact on water
consumption
Scenarios First
block
Second
block
Average First
block
Second
block
Increase Decrease Expected theoretical results
Increasing block rates
Case 1 (p1r = p11) No gain /
loss term
Loss effect Consumers on second block will be af-
fected by a sense of loss. Consumers on
the first block or the kink, on the other
hand, will react no differently than in
traditional models.
Case 2 (p1r = p12) Gain effect No gain /
Loss term
Consumers on first block or the kink
will be affected by a sense of gain. Con-
sumers on the second block will react
according to traditional models.
Case 3 (p1r = p11+p122 ) Gain effect Loss effect (1st block) (2nd block) Consumers on both first block or second
block will move towards the kink point,
"bunching" around the kink point.
Source: author’s analysis.
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We only explore IBR, due to both their tractability and their increasing
application in developed and developing countries, as noted earlier, but the extension
of the model to decreasing block rates is also a path for further research. These
display some advantages, namely stabler flows from high-consumption costumers
and decreasing revenue fluctuations, especially when there are also fixed charges
(OECD, 2010; Griffin, 2006). Decreasing block rates may also be efficient, as shown in
Elnaboulsi (2001). On the other hand, uniform rates are much simpler for utilities to
apply and for consumers to understand, are efficient when consumers are homogeneous
as long as they reflect marginal costs, and could even turn out to provide higher
welfare levels than IBR for low-consumption and low-income households (Griffin and
Mjelde, 2011).
We assume that all consumers know either their block structures or their
expense, and that there are no price fairness concerns. Both assumptions could be
challenged. The latter topic was discussed in Chapter 5. As for the former, it is often
possible to distinguish between two types of consumers (or households): those who
have price knowledge and those who are “naïve" (i.e. “price-ignorant"). For instance,
considering the literature on residential water demand, Carter and Milon (2005)
found that price-conscious households exhibit more responsiveness to both average
and marginal prices, as expected. Additionally, the authors obtain a somewhat
counter-intuitive conclusion that price awareness increases water consumption, which
may be explained by price overestimation, in line with electricity demand literature
(as pointed out in their article). Gaudin (2006) notes that the information provided to
water consumers through the water bill alters the effectiveness of water pricing policy.
Frondel and Messner (2008) use data from a household survey to corroborate that
water pricing policies will only have significant effects in sophisticated households
(i.e. " price-conscious"), while naïve households, the large majority of their sample,
do not significantly reduce consumption when price increases. Finally, Martins
and Moura e Sá (2011) argue that water bills fail to provide clear information
to consumers, obscuring price signals and jeopardizing the effectiveness of pricing
strategies. Despite this empirical evidence, most discussions of water demand seem to
be broadly circumscribed to model specification, estimation techniques and economic
outcomes (i.e. price and income elasticities) (Worthington and Hoffman, 2008; Arbués
et al., 2003).
Finally, although the models in this chapter were developed having in mind
residential water demand, the first model is applicable to any industries with nonlinear
price schedules, while the second model can be used whenever there is a total expense
to pay (and unit prices are not so salient to consumers), such as in communication
and subscription services. Nonetheless, this exploratory work needs to be further
developed and complemented with empirical tests using the methods developed
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for discrete/continuous choice models, so price reactions under block rates can be
clearly compared with those arising from uniform rates. There is also the possibility
that consumers do not really react to prices when schedules are too complicated.
Neoclassical theory suggests that consumers are price-conscious. Yet as noted
in Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004), excessive complexity may lead the consumer
to "schmedule", i.e. use an inaccurately discerned schedule instead of the true
one. Developing models with heterogeneous consumers, as well as including the
possibility of rational inattention (recently elaborated by Sitzia et al. (2015) and
Grubb (2014)), would be valid extensions. Moreover, empirical strategies to assess
consumer behaviour in such cases, and thereby deriving pricing policy lessons, seems
a promising avenue for future research.
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7. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
"I am convinced that, in human if not in financial terms, the most valuable areas of
research in the twenty-first century will include humankind’s understanding and
management of water resources." (Merrett, 2005, p.8).
Water is an essential good for ecosystems and businesses, and although it is
not a public good, it is a scarce resource that must be widely available to every
person and therefore a merit good. In this thesis, we contribute to the advancement
of water management through the incorporation of behavioural economic insights.
Behavioural economics as a scientific subfield started as early as the 1940s
(Lambert, 2006) and can be divided between "old" and "new" behavioural economics.
"Old" behavioural economics started with the "bounded rationality" of Herbert Simon
(1955), the "new" behavioural economics started in 1979, with the prospect theory
of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, proposed in one of the most widely cited
papers in Econometrica (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Herbert Simon and Daniel
Kahneman were two non-economists that won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Sciences (also known as Nobel Prize in Economics), which may reveal that economic
research could evolve also through more interactions with other social sciences.
In terms of theoretical framework we relied on prospect theory as a start-
ing point, especially on reference dependence. Prospect theory has been mainly
constrained within economics to applications in finance and insurance (Barberis,
2013). These research areas have been fruitful fields, due to the large availability of
information on investors and transactions, and the emergence of "big data". The
literature evolved to highlight "anomalies" or "market anomalies", a common term
used by behavioural economists. These "anomalies" are characterized as empirical
evidence that do not corroborate conventional economic theory and started in the
1980s with Richard Thaler (e.g. Thaler (1987)).
However insights from prospect theory, such as reference points and their
potential applications can (and should) be applied to other fields. Water resource
economics could be one of these fields, due to the relevance of water as a scarce
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resource and human right since 2010 (Albuquerque and Roaf, 2012), as well as the
potential risks associated with water resource sustainability.
Simon (2008) argues that the development of behavioural research (both
empirical findings and theory) should be made through tests using empirical methods
to validate economic theories. The methods proposed are surveys and experiments.
These methods were not common in the economic sciences, although they have
recently gained popularity among economists. This thesis provides the first clues
about reference points and their determinants in residential water sector (chapter
4), which may have different applications. For example, field experiments in the
residential water sector may use reference price or bill, as alternatives to the reference
consumption used for social comparison (Ferraro and Price, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011).
Overall, experimental economists have shown that social comparison messages reduce
water and electricity consumption (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013), and these behavioural
nudges may have a persistent effect six years after its implementation (Bernedo et al.,
2014). Further research can tackle this issue and enhance non-pecuniary conservation
programs (Miranda, 2012), since nowadays one of the challenges to the researchers is
to design and use these techniques.
In this thesis we tried to conciliate contributions from neoclassical and be-
havioural theories (chapter 6) based on the empirical evidence of the survey used
(chapters 3). We draw potential policy recommendations based on the formation of
reference points, namely that price (un)fairness should also be taken into account
by policy-makers, since it would be relevant for water-conservation programs. Fur-
thermore, policies regarding modern reporting and billing standards and reference
points, such as the improvement of information quality in the water bills could be
enhanced (chapter 4). Moreover, PPF could be a important tool for monitoring the
effects of water policies on the consumers (chapter 5) and reference block price and
bill could be used as a management tool by the water utilities (chapter 6).
According to Somervuori (2014) behavioural pricing research has been mainly
focused on the price/perceived quality relationship and reference price, with the
identification of anomalies of consumer responses to price information that chal-
lenge the mainstream economics. The author identifies five subareas of behavioural
pricing from which we developed three, as described in table 7.1. The analysis of
price awareness, the formation of reference points and perceived price fairness were
developed in chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively. The price elasticity estimation, using
the reference-dependence model proposed in chapter 6 would be a interesting line of
research to understand the impact of references in the estimation of water demand.
The understanding of consumer perception and price evaluation processes are
still limited (Somervuori, 2014). Another avenue of further research can be the use
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Tab. 7.1: Subareas of behavioural pricing explored in this thesis
Subareas of behavioural pricing
Price awareness
Reference price
Price fairness
Price elasticity estimation -
Price–quality relationship -
Source: author’s analysis based on Somervuori (2014).
of external reference points (e.g. a reference price in the water bill) which can be a
nudge. Since consumers tend to behave irrationally but in predictable ways (Ariely,
2009), they can be encouraged to make better choices through nudging (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008). Nudging is recommended in different contexts, from avoiding
littering (Cialdini et al., 1990) to energy conservation (Costa and Kahn, 2013; Allcott
and Mullainathan, 2010). In the latter, some reasons pointed for nudging are the
small weight of the bill in household expenditure and politically difficult to impose
price increases (Delmas and Lessem, 2014), as well as in water sector, according to
chapter 3. This work also promoted a new avenue of research within JOPA, a Young
Water Professionals group in Portugal, where we developed the first review of nudges
in the water sector (Correia et al., 2015).
Overall, the main aim of this thesis was to use behavioural economics as a bridge
to reach new ground on pricing and non-pricing strategies enhancing sustainable
water consumption in households, as well as the promotion of water conservation in
order to contribute to the development of economic instruments in water resource
economics. The specific contributions and implications of the findings provided
in each chapter of this thesis, as well as limitations, are summarised in table 7.2.
The findings in this thesis contradict conventional economic theory, in some cases,
but also raise concerns about the theory of reference points, whether using price
as reference (Putler, 1992) or consumption as reference (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006).
Overall, our findings suggest that consumers are aware of neither average price nor
monthly consumption, at least for the Portuguese residential water sector.
The two main questions that remain are why and how. Firstly, why does
this happen? Why don’t the majority of consumers have references for average
price and monthly consumption? And how can this be reconciled with neoclassical
theory, which assumes price and consumption as key elements in consumer choice?
Independently of these findings, consumers still use water in their everyday life,
therefore ways to enhance consumer awareness, as well as clarity and transparency
of water bills, is one of the future avenues for policy.
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Tab. 7.2: Synopsis of the main results of the studies
Chapters Study name Limitations Main contributions Policy implications (recommendations)
Chapter 2 Behavioural Economics in
Water Management - An
Overview of Behavioural Eco-
nomics Applications to Resi-
dential Water Demand
- Relative high importance given
to reference points literature, al-
though behavioural economics field
has much more to offer
We suggest four behavioural applications:
reference block pricing; asymmetric elastici-
ties; reference transaction; and social com-
parison through reference consumption.
Introduction of behavioural science insights
into public policies as recommend by Euro-
pean Commission
Chapter 3 Do you know how much you
pay for water?
- Development of more indicators on
perceptions, clarity and simplicity of
the water bill
- High consumer unawareness level of
marginal (92% of our sample) and average
price (93%) as well as monthly water con-
sumption perceived (76%). Conversely, they
are highly aware of their water bill (87%)
- The fact that the monthly water bill is bet-
ter than the global tariff structure should
be acknowledge in water policies
- Public authorities, the government and
water utilities should adopt a holistic ap-
proach to enhance consumer awareness to
tackle misperceptions, as well as the lack of
information that actually exists in the daily
decision process of water consumers
Chapter 4 Water consumer behaviours
and perceptions
- Use of probit models instead of us-
ing a perception scale for reference
points
- Use of "all-of-nothing" approach in-
stead of special regressor method in
outdoor and indoor water conserva-
tion choices studies
- Use of individual variables instead
of a global index to measure price
fairness
- Price fairness perceptions explain water-
saving and the adoption of modern billing
procedures in residential water sector
- Price fairness effect and submitting the me-
ter readings have significant positive effects
in the respondent’s probability of having
a reference price and consumption, respec-
tively
- People with higher income, who frequently
look into details and know their tariff struc-
ture have higher probability of having refer-
ence points
- Pricing and non-pricing policies should
account for price (un)fairness effect through
improvement of information quality in the
water bill or sensibilization campaigns
- Promote water literacy and transparency
among water consumers
- Evaluate and monitor fairness concerns
and promote clarification of water tariffs
and water bill accounting for framing effects
Chapter 5 Perceived Price Fairness
(PPF) - Determinants in
residential water sector in
Portugal
- Poor consumer knowledge about
water price and transparency issues
on the water bill
- Conceptual model of price fairness with
price awareness
- We suggest a list of determinants of PPF
and variables to measure these determinants
- Development of indicators about fairness
in residential water sector
- Development of public policies accounting
for reference transaction
Chapter 6 Nonlinear pricing with refer-
ence dependence
- Consumers are assumed to be price-
conscious although they could be
"naïve" (i.e. " price-ignorant")
- Use of an increasing block rates
(IBR) scenario only
- Hybrid model using neoclassical and be-
havioural theories
- First analysis of reference-dependent pref-
erences in a (increasing) block-rate setting
- Utilities dealing with capacity constraints
or natural resource scarcity should advertise
the first block price to frame other blocks
as losses in order to induce conservation
behaviour even without raising prices
Source: author’s analysis.
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Secondly, how can reference-dependent models cope with lack of awareness?
Is it possible to use reference-dependent methodologies for other relevant variables,
such as total monthly expenditure? What are the main references driving consumer
perceptions and decision-making and how can they be incorporated into economic
models? These are the questions that yet remain.
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A.1 Tables
Tab. A.1: Dwelling ownership and main residence by type of dwelling
Type of dwelling
House* Apartment Total
No. % Cum
%
No. % Cum
%
No. % Cum
%
Owner of the residence
Yes 939 82.9 82.9 826 76.2 76.2 1,765 79.6 79.6
No 194 17.1 100.0 258 23.8 100.0 452 20.4 100.0
Total 1,133 100.0 1,084 100.0 2,217 100.0
Main residence
Yes 962 84.8 84.8 970 89.2 89.2 1,932 86.9 86.9
No 173 15.2 100.0 118 10.8 100.0 291 13.1 100.0
Total 1,135 100.0 1,088 100.0 2,223 100.0
Source: Survey data. Note: *Detached or semi-detached house.
Tab. A.2: Monthly net household income and household size by type of dwelling
Type of dwelling
House* Apartment Total
No. % No. % No. %
Monthly net household income
Less than 500 Euros 179 18.3 129 13.1 308 15.7
501-1,000 Euros 296 30.3 284 28.8 580 29.5
1,001-1,500 Euros 220 22.5 280 28.4 500 25.5
1,501-2,000 Euros 130 13.3 135 13.7 265 13.5
More than 2,001 Euros 152 15.6 158 16.0 310 15.8
Total 977 100.0 986 100.0 1,963 100.0
Household size
one 130 11.5 176 16.2 306 13.8
two 394 34.8 399 36.6 793 35.7
three 282 24.9 301 27.6 583 26.2
four or more 326 28.8 213 19.6 539 24.3
Total 1,132 100.0 1,089 100.0 2,221 100.0
Source: Survey data. Note: *Detached or semi-detached house.
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Tab. A.3: Respondents’ characteristics by type of dwelling
Type of dwelling
House* Apartment Total
No. % No. % No. %
Gender
Male 569 50.1 489 44.9 1,058 47.5
Female 567 49.9 601 55.1 1,168 52.5
Total 1,136 100.0 1,090 100.0 2,226 100.0
Level of Schooling
Does not read nor write 20 1.8 3 0.3 23 1.0
Primary education 579 51.2 400 36.8 979 44.2
Secondary education 483 42.7 606 55.8 1,089 49.1
Higher education 49 4.3 77 7.1 126 5.7
Total 1,131 100.0 1,086 100.0 2,217 100.0
Water bill payer
Yes 1,009 89.1 1,036 95.3 2,045 92.1
No 124 10.9 51 4.7 175 7.9
Total 1,133 100.0 1,087 100.0 2,220 100.0
Water bill awareness
Never 102 9.0 62 5.7 164 7.4
Rarely 84 7.4 81 7.5 165 7.4
Sometimes 116 10.2 102 9.4 218 9.8
Often 62 5.5 87 8.0 149 6.7
Always 769 67.9 755 69.5 1,524 68.6
Total 1,133 100.0 1,087 100.0 2,220 100.0
Reason why looked
Increase in the total paid 136 55.1 127 50.4 263 52.7
Decrease in the total paid 3 1.2 7 2.8 10 2.0
No 108 43.7 118 46.8 226 45.3
Total 247 100.0 252 100.0 499 100.0
Information awareness
Total amount 458 44.9 486 47.8 944 46.3
Detailed information 562 55.1 531 52.2 1,093 53.7
Total 1,020 100.0 1,017 100.0 2,037 100.0
Source: Survey data. Note: *Detached or semi-detached house.
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Tab. A.4: Consumer habits and decisions by type of dwelling
Type of dwelling
House* Apartment Total
No. % No. % No. %
Concerns to avoid evaporation
No 67 9 10 20 77 10
Yes 654 91 39 80 693 90
Total 721 100 49 100 770 100
Do you wash full loads?
No 95 9 84 8 179 9
Yes 915 91 939 92 1,854 91
Total 1,010 100 1,023 100 2,033 100
Do you wash your car with a hose?
No 75 34 33 58 108 39
Yes 148 66 24 42 172 61
Total 223 100 57 100 280 100
Is there an alternative to publicly supplied water?
No 823 73 1,069 99 1,892 86
Yes 307 27 9 1 316 14
Total 1,130 100 1,078 100 2,208 100
Do you pay the water bill by direct debit?
No 606 54 530 49 1,136 52
Yes 509 46 546 51 1,055 48
Total 1,115 100 1,076 100 2,191 100
Do you receive an electronic water bill?
No 1,062 95 1,029 95 2,091 95
Yes 58 5 52 5 110 5
Total 1,120 100 1,081 100 2,201 100
Source: Survey data. Note: *Detached or semi-detached house.
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B. APPENDIX - WATER CONSUMER BEHAVIOURS AND
PERCEPTIONS
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B.1 Modelling Framework
B.1.1 Probit model with sample selection
The sample selection bias addresses the sometimes neglected issue in this literature,
that a dependent dummy variable of water conservation choice is observed only for a
limited and non-random sample. Consider a probit model with sample selection in
which a latent equation can be denoted as a linear model of the latent variable yj∗,
for j observations. This method models the probability of the consumer making a
choice, where yj∗ is an unobservable magnitude that represents the net benefit of
consumer j taking an action (e.g. watering the garden in the morning or at night to
avoiding evaporation). The explanatory variables are represented as vector x, where
β is a set of unknown parameters for x, and with additive error εj (Baum, 2006):
yj∗ = xjβ + ε1j , (B.1)
where the error term is assumed to be normally distributed (i.e. N (0, 1)). In
the presence of sample selection if we only run this regression the information on
missing values (both for yj∗ and xj∗ factors) will not be used in the model B.1.
Moreover, consider a probit equation in which we observe the water-saving
decision, in other words the binary response outcome (instead of the latent variable
y∗j itself):
yprobitj = (y∗ > 0), i.e. y
probit
j =
1 if y
∗ > 0
0, otherwise
(B.2)
Equation B.2 models the probability with which each household (i.e. j obser-
vation) adopts a water-saving behaviour (i.e. 1) (Nauges, 2014), for that choice.
Since, in same case, the dependent variable is not observable (e.g. the behaviour
of avoiding evaporation when watering the garden depends if the consumer has a
garden), the probability of yselectj being observed accounts for this potential selectivity
issue that can be stated in the following selection equation:
yselectj = (z′γ + ε2j > 0) (B.3)
where again the error term is assumed to have a standard normal distribution,
and ρ = corr(ε1j , ε2j) . To identify the model, the factors z must have variables
other than the ones included in vector x (Nauges, 2014). These variables are also
know as excluded instruments, because they are not included in the main equation,
only in equation B.3. When the potential correlation (ρ) between the error terms
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of equations B.2 and B.3 is nonzero (i.e. significantly different from zero), the
standard binary probit yields biased and inconsistent estimates of yprobitj . In the
cases where selection is non-random the probit model with sample selection (Stata
command heckprob) is recommended since it provides consistent estimations, as well
as asymptotically efficient.
For additional technical details see Baum (2006) and Stata software documen-
tation. For empirical evidence addressing sample selection in the context of water
saving behaviours see Nauges (2014).
B.1.2 Special regressor model
In econometrics literature the endogeneity bias from regressors of binary choice
models have receive significant attention (Dong and Lewbel, 2015; Lewbel, 2014,
2000), specially with dealing with non-continuous explanatory variables. In seminal
work by Lewbel (2000) the development of the special regressor method consists in
a general approach that does not require a continuous distribution of endogenous
regressors, i.e. these covariates can be continuous, limited, censored or discrete. The
advantages gained from the special regressor method, over linear probability models,
control functions, maximum likelihood (Dong and Lewbel, 2015) is made at the
exchange of three assumptions, choose a special exogenous regressor V conditionally
independence of ε that will be additive in the model with respect to this latent error,
as well as having a large support and being conditionally continuous distributed.
Following Dong and Lewbel (2015) consider a conventional binary choice model
of the decision or choice D, a dummy variable:
D = I(X ′β + ε ≥ 0), (B.4)
where explanatory factors are represented as the vector X with a vector of
unknown parameters to be estimated as β coefficients and ε an unobserved error
term. Plus, consider that the indicator function (I(·)) for conventional probit model
varies between two value, if its argument · is true will be equal to one and will be zero
otherwise. Where we will have two special cases, the standard probit technique will
have ε with a standard normal distribution (N(0, 1)) and for logit model the ε will
have a logistic distribution. The aim of the special regressor model is after estimating
β get the decision probabilities as well as the marginal effects of explanatory regressors
X. The special regressor will be represented as a model of the same type of equation
B.4, however including the (special) exogenous regressor V , which is normalized:
D = I(X ′β + V + ε ≥ 0) (B.5)
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and where the ε have unknown variance (σ2ε). Instead in standard probit the
variance of the error term ε is normalized to one, but this is equivalent to normalised
to one the β of the regressor, and often could be more correct in terms of economic
sense (Dong and Lewbel, 2015). These authors suggest that a simple method is to
corroborate the slope graphically of the non-parametric regression of D on special
regressor V and explanatory factors X, given prove of the monotonic (increasing)
relationship, and this can be done through the use of the Kernel-weighted local
polynomial regression Bontemps and Nauges (2015).
In the case we have a endogenous regressors we will a have latent nonpara-
metric instrumental variables model (Lewbel, 2014), where Z represent a vector of
instruments satisfying the properties E(Z ′ε) = 0 and E(Z ′X) with full rank that
allow the construction of a variable T such that a linear 2SLS regression of T on X
given Z yields the desired β (Dong and Lewbel, 2015). The variable T is defined as:
T = D − I(V ≥ 0)
fV |Z(V | Z)
, (B.6)
where the fV |Z is the conditional probability density function of special regressor
V given the instruments Z. Under the assumed model for special regressor V and
the two previous properties mentioned (E(Z ′ε) = 0 and E(Z ′X) full rank) (Dong
and Lewbel, 2015; Lewbel, 2014) needed for the 2SLS model we get the special
regressor estimator. This simple estimator can be obtained using five step procedure,
assuming that we have j observations on Dj , Xj , Vj and Zj , and that Sj is a vector
of explanatory variables (Xj) and instruments (Zj).
Step 1: Special regressor V should have mean zero, if not we must demean it.
Step 2: Assume cˆ is the estimated coefficients of Sj in an ordinary least
squares linear regression and compute the residuals for each j (Uj) as the differences
between the observed special regressor estimates (Vj) and its predictions (Ûj).
Step 3: For each observation j let the fˆj be the non-parametric kernel density
estimator of U . This is
fˆj =
1
nh
n∑
i=1
K
(
Ûj − Ûi
h
)
, for j = 1, ..., n (B.7)
where K stands for the kernel (symmetric) density function similar to the
standard normal density, and h is a bandwidth.
Step 4: For each observation j create the data T̂j as follows:
T̂j =
Dj − I(Vj ≥ 0)
fˆj
, (B.8)
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Step 5: Based on a linear 2SLS regression compute the βˆ with respect to
X vector, of the T̂j on X, given the chosen instruments (Z). Afterwards, choice
probabilities and the marginal effects of interest can be computed following Lewbel
et al. (2012). The procedure described above can be implemented in statistical
software in an easy and intuitively manner (an example is sspecialreg command
provided for Stata software and developed by Baum (2013)).
For additional information see Dong and Lewbel (2015), Lewbel et al. (2012),
and Lewbel (2014, 2000) and Stata software documentation. For an empirical
application in the residential water sector see Bontemps and Nauges (2015).
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B.2 Brief literature review of the determinants of water-saving behaviours in outdoor and indoor uses
Tab. B.1: Brief literature review of the type of variables used in studies about the water-saving behaviours in outdoor and indoor uses
Studies Dependent variable(s) Household and respondents
factors
Attitudinal and behavioural
factors
Political factors Climate factors
(Grafton, 2014)* 6 water-saving be-
haviours (indoor and
outdoor uses)
income (-), male (+ and -), age
(+ and -), household size (+
and -), education (-), owner
(+), years in residence (+ and
-), urban or suburban area (-)
ranking of environmental
concerns (+ and -), resource
depletion and environmental
concerns (+), "environmen-
tal concern" index (+)
Voter (+), environ-
mental organization
supporter (+)
-
(Nauges, 2014) 5 water-saving be-
haviours (indoor and
outdoor uses)
logincome (-), volumetric
charge (+), male (-), age (+
and -), education (s.i.), owner
(+ and -), years in residence
(+ and -), urban or suburban
area (-)
environmental concerns (+
and -), "environmental con-
cern" index (+)
Voter (+ and -), en-
vironmental organiza-
tion supporter (+)
-
(Dupont and Renzetti,
2013)
Lawn watering and
garden watering
income (+), marginal price of
water (+ and -), price varia-
tion (+), increasing volumet-
ric charge (+), education (+),
children (-), household size (+)
- non-price water poli-
cies (-)
Rainfall (-) and tem-
perature (+)
(Grafton et al., 2011) 5 water-saving be-
haviours (indoor and
outdoor uses)
income (-), volumetric charge
(+), age (+ and -), education
(+ and -), adults (+ and -),
children (+ and -), rooms (+),
detached house (+ and -), size
of residence (-), urban or sub-
urban area (+ and -)
environmental concerns (+
and -)
Voter (+), environ-
mental organization
member (+), and sup-
porter (+)
-
Source: Author’s analysis
Note: (+) and (-) represent a positive or negative statistically significant impact and "s.i." stands for a "statistically insignificant" impact of the independent variables. *This study used
spearman correlation to determine statistically significant effects of the regressors.
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B.3 Brief literature review of the determinants of the preference for drinking tap water
Tab. B.2: Brief review of the type of variables used in studies about the decision between drinking tap water or alternative sources
Studies Dependent variable(s) Household and respondents
variables
Water quality variables Trust variables
(Bontemps and Nauges,
2015)
drinking tap water log(income) (-), water price
(-), age (-), children (-); town
or suburban and owns a car
(s.i.)
tap water satisfaction index
(+), Water quality environ-
mental index (s.i.)
-
(Francisco, 2014) purchase bottled or puri-
fied water
education (+), household size
(-), children (0-5 years) (+),
bottled/purified water price
(-); age, children (6-18 years)
and income (s.i.)
Safe to drink without treat-
ment (dummy) (-)
perceived trust based
on government informa-
tion about safe water
(s.i.)
(Nauges, 2014) satisfaction with taste
and healthy impacts
age (-), urban area (+), envi-
ronmental concern index (s.i.
and +); education and chil-
dren (s.i.)
(instrumented) satisfaction
level with taste (+) and
healthy impacts (+)
trust about the envi-
ronmental impacts of
products (-)
(Johnstone and Serret, 2012) purchase bottled water income (+), owns a car (+),
volumetric charge (-), waste
concerns (-); household size,
age, children, urban area and
male (all s.i.)
satisfaction level with taste
(+) and healthy impacts (+)
trustworthy govern-
ment information
about environmental
concerns (s.i.)
(Um et al., 2002) purchase bottled water income, household size, home
ownership, type of house, ad-
ministrated area, age, educa-
tion (all s.i.)
tap water quality perceived
(+), expectations about fu-
ture quality (s.i.)
-
Source: Author’s analysis
Note: (+) and (-) represent a positive or negative statistically significant impact and "s.i." stands for a "statistically insignificant" impact of the independent variables.
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B.4 List of variables with definitions, units and sources
Tab. B.3: List of variables of interest with definitions, units and sources
Variable Definition Unit Source
aavcons Average water consumption by
household
cubic meters Survey
aavprice Average water price paid by
household
€ Survey
afford The percentage of actual aver-
age monthly bill in the income
fitted
Percentage Survey
avcons6m Average water consumption by
household in the last 6 months
cubic meters Survey
avpmun Average water price paid by
household for each municipal-
ity
€ Water utilities
avvioqual Average percentage of tests not
complying with the limits im-
posed in the quantity of chemi-
cals in the water, between 1993
and 2012
Percentage ERSAR
children Dwelling with at least one chil-
dren
(1, 0) Survey
ddebit Pay the water bill by direct
debit
(1, 0) Survey
dettot Are you aware of the detailed
information in the water bill or
just the total amount paid
(1, 0) Survey
dishwach How many dishwashers are
there in your house?
- Survey
drinktap Do you usually prefer to drink
tap water?
(1, 0) Survey
dwetype Type of dwelling is 1 if it is de-
tached or semi-detached house
or 0 if it is an apartment
(1, 0) Survey
ebill2012 Respondent receive an elec-
tronic water bill (only for mu-
nicipality with this service in
2012)
(1, 0) Survey
elder Number of household members
with 65 or more years of age
- Survey
employed Number of household members
who are employed
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Tab. B.4: List of variables of interest with definitions, units and sources (continued)
Variable Definition Unit Source
expenscarce Water should be more expen-
sive where it is scarce
1: totally disagree; 2:
disagree; 3: neither
agree nor disagree; 4:
agree; 5: totally agree
Survey
fair The price you pay for water is
fair
1: totally disagree; to
5: totally agree
Survey
fairprice Respondent totally agree with
the statement "The price you
pay for water is fair" and to-
tally disagree with "The tariffs
charged for an essential good
such as water are unfair"
(1, 0) Survey
freqdet The consumer is often or al-
ways aware of the detail in the
water bill
(1, 0) Survey
heducation Respondent with higher educa-
tion, undergrated or higher
(1, 0) Survey
hpayers Payers represent at least half
of the household size
(1, 0) Survey
hsize Household size Numeric Survey
inactive Number of household members
who are inactive but not retired
or students
Numeric Survey
inastudent The proportion of household
members who are either inac-
tive or student
Percentage Survey
incfitted income fitted obtained through
the regression in table B.7
Numeric Survey
income Monthly net household income
by categories in the survey, cat-
egories 1: €500 or less; 2: €501-
€1000; 3: €1001-€1500; 4:
€1501-€2000; 5: €2001-€2500;
6: €2501-€3000; 7: €3001-
€3500; 8: More than €3500
Numeric Survey
knowIBR Respondent know its tariff
structure is an increasing block
rate (IBR)
(1, 0) Survey
loss The water price should be in-
creased if the water utility in-
curs a loss
1: totally disagree; to
5: totally agree
Survey
mainresidence Dwelling is the main residence (1, 0) Survey
male Respondent is male (1, 0) Survey
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Tab. B.5: List of variables of interest with definitions, units and sources (continued)
Variable Definition Unit Source
maxtempdev Deviation between the temper-
ature in beginning of the sum-
mer of 2012 (April-June) com-
pared with maximum temper-
ature over the last 15 years by
municipality
Celsius degrees IPMA
meter Do you usually submit the me-
ter reading to the water utility?
(1, 0) Survey
owner Owner of the residence (1, 0) Survey
p16education Respondent does not read nor
right or has primary education
(1-6 years of schooling)
(1, 0) Survey
p19education Respondent does not read nor
right or has primary education
(1-9 years of schooling)
(1, 0) Survey
p56education Respondent with at least pri-
mary education with 5-6 years
of education
(1, 0) Survey
payers Number of payers of the
monthly water bill in the house-
hold
Numeric Survey
pearn Percentage of employed and re-
tired members divided by the
household size
Percentage Survey
percbillt Total monthly water bill per-
ceived in Euro
€ Survey
pool Dummy if the dwelling has a
swimming pool
(1, 0) Survey
precdev Deviation between the precipi-
tation in beginning of the sum-
mer of 2012 (April-June) com-
pared with precipitation over
the last 15 years by municipal-
ity
millimetres IPMA
referencebill Respondent gives a value for
the monthly total bill
(1, 0) Survey
refblockprice Do you know the per cubic me-
ter price associated with each
block?
(1, 0) Survey
referencecons Respondent gives a value for
the average monthly consump-
tion perceived
(1, 0) Survey
referenceprice Respondent gives a value for
the average price
(1, 0) Survey
runwat Do you make use of the water
that flows while you wait for it
to get warm?
(1, 0) Survey
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Tab. B.6: List of variables of interest with definitions, units and sources (continued)
Variable Definition Unit Source
school Numbers of years of schooling
of the respondent (categories)
1: does not read nor
right (0 years); 2: Pri-
mary education (1-4);
3: Primary education
(5-6); 4: Primary ed-
ucation (7-9); 5: Sec-
ondary education (10-
12); 6: Higher educa-
tion - undergraduate
(13-15); 7: Higher ed-
ucation - master (16-
17); 8: Higher educa-
tion - PhD (more than
17 years)
Survey
tap How many taps are there in
your house?
(1, 0) Survey
unemployed Number of household members
who are unemployed
Numeric Survey
unfairprice Totally agree with a statement
"The tariffs charged for an es-
sential good such as water are
unfair"
(1, 0) Survey
uniform Water tariffs should be equal
in all the country
1: totally disagree; to
5: totally agree
Survey
urban Respondent are located in an
urban area
(1, 0) INE
washmach How many washing machines
are there in your house?
Numeric Survey
watsummer Number of times a week peo-
ple water the garden during the
Spring/Summer
Numeric Survey
well Is there an alternative to pub-
licly supplied water?
(1, 0) Survey
wsfullload Do you wash full loads, when
possible?
(1, 0) Survey
wshortage Water shortage experience (1, 0) Survey
wssoap Do you close the tap while soap-
ing in the shower?
(1, 0) Survey
wstank Does your dwelling have a laun-
dry tub or water deposit/tank
for rainwater harvesting?
(1, 0) Survey
wswatgarden Do you water your gar-
den/backyard/vegetable
garden in the morning or at
night to avoid evaporation?
(1, 0) Survey
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B.5 Estimation of income fitted variable incfitted for the special regressor
method
Tab. B.7: OLS estimated coefficients of income (with sampling weights) to obtain the linear prediction
of fitted income
Variables income
school 0.367***
(0.019)
male 0.389***
(0.056)
hsize 0.334***
(0.027)
pearn 1.428***
(0.104)
owner 0.307***
(0.070)
pool 0.356***
(0.134)
tap 0.053***
(0.010)
dishwach 0.347***
(0.066)
Municipality 1 (reference) -
2.municipality -0.105
(0.102)
3.municipality -0.374***
(0.098)
4.municipality -0.149
(0.102)
5.municipality -0.419***
(0.143)
6.municipality -0.359***
(0.117)
7.municipality -0.273***
(0.098)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.8: OLS estimated coefficients of income with sampling weights to obtain the linear
prediction of income fitted (continued)
Variables income
8.municipality -0.220**
(0.096)
9.municipality -0.262*
(0.143)
10.municipality -0.304***
(0.092)
11.municipality -0.191**
(0.083)
12.municipality -0.429***
(0.097)
13.municipality -0.291***
(0.100)
Constant -1.411***
(0.152)
Observations 1,836
R2 0.533
p-value 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
Tab. B.9: Summary statistics of the variable income fitted (incfitted) used as special
regressor
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
incfitted 2.878 0.949 0.046 8.097
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B.6 Special regressor method estimated average index and coeffi-
cients
Tab. B.10: Average index, marginal effects at means on the probability to have consumer
perception awareness based on reference points
Variables referenceprice referencebill referencecons
incfittedd 0.0453*** 0.070***
(0.012) (0.027)
knowIBR -0.241*** 0.159*** -0.390**
(0.087) (0.058) (0.179)
fairprice -0.100 0.049 -1.570**
(0.389) (0.443) (0.772)
freqdet 0.039** -0.019*** 0.072**
(0.015) (0.007) (0.034)
urban 0.004 -0.003 -0.021
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017)
meter 0.003 -0.003 0.021
(0.008) (0.006) (0.015)
mincfittedd 0.028**
(0.012)
Constant 0.050* -0.036* 0.133**
(0.026) (0.021) (0.058)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses based on three special regressor
models (1,556 observations) were calculated using 250 bootstrapping
samples, sspecialreg command in Stata was used. The predicted prob-
abilities were based on the average index function, as suggested by
Lewbel et al. (2012), and provided by the previous Stata command
Baum (2013).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.11: Special regressor estimated coefficients on the probability to have consumer
perception awareness based on reference points
Variables referenceprice referencebill referencecons
knowIBR -7.329*** 6.602*** -6.978***
(1.455) (1.342) (1.416)
fairprice -4.500 7.811 -7.717
(8.522) (9.215) (10.203)
freqdet 1.252*** -0.793*** 1.371***
(0.316) (0.290) (0.313)
urban -0.113 0.173 -0.277
(0.272) (0.253) (0.282)
meter 0.144 -0.101 0.431*
(0.247) (0.227) (0.253)
Municipality 1 (reference) - - -
2.municipality 1.754*** -1.527*** 1.808***
(0.548) (0.520) (0.574)
3.municipality 0.094 -0.064 0.035
(0.534) (0.491) (0.542)
4.municipality 2.076*** -1.773*** 1.952***
(0.603) (0.558) (0.610)
5.municipality 0.068 -0.211 0.229
(0.699) (0.652) (0.722)
6.municipality 0.459 -0.536 0.771
(0.697) (0.693) (0.771)
7.municipality 0.706 -0.599 0.825*
(0.455) (0.427) (0.470)
8.municipality 0.646 -0.614 0.741*
(0.402) (0.381) (0.422)
9.municipality 1.659** -1.434** 1.422*
(0.774) (0.709) (0.781)
10.municipality 0.122 -0.259 0.172
(0.448) (0.433) (0.477)
11.municipality 0.536 -0.486 0.752*
(0.378) (0.350) (0.390)
12.municipality 1.629*** -1.486*** 1.663***
(0.544) (0.515) (0.562)
13.municipality 1.197** -0.949** 1.823***
(0.497) (0.466) (0.523)
Constant 1.090** -1.138** 1.201**
(0.535) (0.496) (0.530)
Observations 1,556 1,556 1,556
chi2 29.47 35.23 38.98
p-value 0.030 0.006 0.002
Note: Standard errors in parentheses for special regressor models using Stata command
sspecialreg. The options used were standard kernel density approach, the Silverman’s
rule of thumb for automated bandwidths and trimming option at 5% level (Ghosh
and Vogt, 2012).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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B.7 Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of reference points
on special regressor
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Fig. B.1: Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of referenceprice on special regressor
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Fig. B.3: Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of referencecons on special regressor
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B.8 Tables
Tab. B.12: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
aavcons 2188 8.409 6.389 .083 57
aavprice 2188 3.744 7.478 .296 149.97
afford 2009 7.016 6.957 .512 182.348
avcons6m 2183 7.62 6.081 -4.833 47.833
avpmun 2188 3.699 1.236 1.674 6.034
avvioqual 2188 3.006 1.617 .802 6.494
children 2099 .387 .487 0 1
ddebit 2158 .482 .5 0 1
dettot 2012 .536 .499 0 1
dishwach 2086 .572 .499 0 2
drinktap 2175 .419 .493 0 1
dwetype 2182 .507 .5 0 1
ebill2012 2179 .037 .188 0 1
elder 2041 .439 .733 0 4
employed 2179 1.226 .959 0 10
expenscarce 2051 2.258 1.153 1 5
fair 2067 3.132 1.166 1 5
fairprice 2001 .013 .115 0 1
freqdet 2012 .465 .499 0 1
heducation 2188 .28 .449 0 1
hpayers 2186 .807 .395 0 1
hsize 2186 2.71 1.215 1 14
inactive 2173 .242 .486 0 3
inastudent 2170 .215 .244 0 1
incfitted 2009 2.882 .938 .046 8.097
income 1937 2.997 1.617 1 8
knowIBR 2188 .388 .487 0 1
loss 2042 1.977 1.044 1 5
mainresidence 2185 .871 .335 0 1
male 2188 .477 .5 0 1
maxtempdev 2188 .591 1.198 -1.185 2.234
meter 2160 .191 .393 0 1
owner 2179 .797 .402 0 1
p16education 2188 .286 .452 0 1
p19education 2188 .447 .497 0 1
p56education 2188 .787 .41 0 1
Notes: Number of observations (Obs.), means, standard deviations(Std.
Dev.), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) values of each variable.
Since in the analysis performed in chapter 4 we excluded 45 outliers
(negative values of monthly water consumption, and other extreme or
odd values, such as the number of household members who contribute
to pay the water bill being zero) the final number of observations may
not add up with summary statistics of chapter 3, appendix A.
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Tab. B.13: Summary statistics (continued)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
payers 2188 1.623 .547 1 4
pearn 2170 .705 .301 0 2
percbillt 1912 20.021 13.282 1.6 100
pool 2187 .035 .183 0 1
precdev 2188 27.492 9.413 13.281 37.565
referencebill 2188 .874 .332 0 1
refblockprice 2178 .084 .277 0 1
referencecons 2188 .235 .424 0 1
referenceprice 2188 .066 .248 0 1
runwat 2174 .323 .468 0 1
school 2181 4.389 1.598 1 8
tap 2135 6.342 3.008 2 30
unemployed 2174 .221 .509 0 5
unfairprice 2036 .142 .35 0 1
uniform 2058 2.014 1.183 1 5
urban 2188 .682 .466 0 1
washmach 2180 .962 .219 0 2
watsummer 747 3.711 2.885 0 14
well 2171 .14 .347 0 1
wsfullload 2003 .914 .28 0 1
wshortage 2152 .235 .424 0 1
wssoap 2103 .768 .422 0 1
wstank 2184 .065 .247 0 1
wswatgarden 749 .903 .297 0 1
Notes: Number of observations (Obs.), means, standard deviations(Std.
Dev.), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) values of each variable.
Since in the analysis performed in chapter 4 we excluded 45 outliers
(negative values of monthly water consumption, and other extreme or
odd values, such as the number of household members who contribute
to pay the water bill being zero) the final number of observations may
not add up with summary statistics of chapter 3, appendix A.
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Tab. B.14: Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to have consumer
perception awareness based on reference points, with sampling weights
Variables referenceprice referencebill referencecons
incfitted 0.225*** -0.139** 0.088*
(0.069) (0.064) (0.052)
freqdet 0.485*** 0.424*** 0.445***
(0.144) (0.112) (0.095)
knowIBR 0.535*** 0.253** 0.690***
(0.135) (0.119) (0.100)
fairprice -0.753** 0.591 0.263
(0.336) (0.439) (0.388)
urban -0.458*** 0.082 -0.201*
(0.149) (0.143) (0.111)
meter 0.151 0.202 0.627***
(0.150) (0.137) (0.113)
Municipality 1 (reference) - - -
2.municipality 0.186 -0.522** 0.111
(0.211) (0.203) (0.160)
3.municipality -0.583* -0.218 -0.011
(0.317) (0.266) (0.211)
4.municipality 0.121 -0.526** -0.108
(0.243) (0.213) (0.182)
5o.municipality - -0.654** 0.585**
(0.298) (0.262)
6.municipality 0.154 0.189 0.368*
(0.241) (0.288) (0.192)
7.municipality 0.649*** -0.774*** 0.530***
(0.211) (0.197) (0.164)
8.municipality 0.161 -0.483** 0.287*
(0.217) (0.194) (0.158)
9.municipality -0.838* -0.472 -0.304
(0.445) (0.296) (0.250)
10.municipality -0.330 -0.024 -0.279
(0.277) (0.225) (0.180)
11.municipality 0.093 -0.032 0.292**
(0.216) (0.202) (0.146)
12.municipality -0.347 -0.412** 0.262
(0.268) (0.208) (0.167)
13.municipality 0.297 -0.443** 0.887***
(0.213) (0.214) (0.159)
Constant -2.525*** 1.711*** -1.698***
(0.295) (0.266) (0.216)
Observations 1,660 1,700 1,700
χ2 124.3 81.81 187.3
p-value 0 4.12e-10 0
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.0726 0.159
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
166 B. Appendix - Water consumer behaviours and perceptions
Tab. B.15: Final probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt outdoor
water-saving behaviours with sampling weights
Variables wstank wswatgarden
dwetype 1.172***
(0.226)
tap 0.051** 0.041
(0.023) (0.026)
well 0.649*** 0.112
(0.183) (0.225)
children 0.002 -0.562**
(0.196) (0.227)
elder 0.045 -0.384**
(0.122) (0.154)
inactive 0.277* 0.328*
(0.168) (0.182)
percbillt -0.001 0.023***
(0.007) (0.008)
unfairprice -0.115 -0.870***
(0.243) (0.264)
avcons6m -0.051***
(0.016)
watsummer 0.199***
(0.052)
Municipality 1 (reference) - -
2.municipality -0.112 -0.388
(0.352) (0.387)
3.municipality 0.041 0.271
(0.309) (0.479)
4.municipality 0.143 0.462
(0.336) (0.500)
5.municipality 0.785** 0.205
(0.317) (0.496)
6.municipality -0.072 1.341***
(0.263) (0.456)
7.municipality 0.593** 0.065
(0.291) (0.360)
8.municipality 0.204 0.242
(0.262) (0.358)
9.municipality 0.769** 1.000**
(0.350) (0.441)
10.municipality -0.222 1.201**
(0.291) (0.575)
11.municipality -0.218 0.987**
(0.293) (0.466)
12.municipality 0.062 0.000
(0.301) (0.000)
13.municipality -0.301 0.427
(0.274) (0.290)
Constant -2.737*** -0.091
(0.368) (0.411)
Observations 1,609 502
χ2 127.7 96.33
p-value 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.312 0.273
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.16: Heckman probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to watering
the garden in the coolest parts of the day with sampling weights
Variables wswatgarden
tap 0.054*
(0.029)
well 0.121
(0.225)
children -0.569**
(0.251)
elder -0.378**
(0.158)
inactive 0.344*
(0.188)
percbillt 0.024***
(0.007)
unfairprice -0.849***
(0.272)
watsummer 0.196***
(0.056)
Municipality 1 (reference) -
2.municipality -0.499
(0.399)
3.municipality 0.350
(0.445)
4.municipality 0.303
(0.545)
5.municipality 0.424
(0.617)
6.municipality 1.476***
(0.473)
7.municipality -0.064
(0.379)
8.municipality 0.231
(0.352)
9.municipality 1.081**
(0.469)
10.municipality 1.171**
(0.560)
11.municipality 0.844*
(0.505)
12.municipality 5.742***
(0.823)
13.municipality 0.606*
(0.363)
Constant -0.589
(0.787)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.17: Heckman probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to watering
the garden in the coolest parts of the day with sampling weights (continued)
Probit models with sampling weights and robust standard errors
Variables wswatgarden
Selection equation
washmach 0.515***
(0.186)
pool 0.887***
(0.214)
incfitted 0.174***
(0.057)
Municipality 1 (reference) -
2.municipality -0.326**
(0.152)
3.municipality 0.459***
(0.166)
4.municipality -0.314**
(0.157)
5.municipality 1.495***
(0.246)
6.municipality 1.123***
(0.162)
7.municipality -0.225
(0.156)
8.municipality 0.142
(0.138)
9.municipality 0.587***
(0.208)
10.municipality 0.139
(0.138)
11.municipality -0.354***
(0.133)
12.municipality 0.073
(0.150)
13.municipality 1.117***
(0.147)
Constant -1.765***
(0.260)
Observations 1,805
χ2 281.5
p-value 0.000
Wald test of ρ = 0, χ2(1) 0.370
p-value 0.543
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.18: Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt outdoor water-saving
behaviours, including other variables in the literature
Variables wstank wsgarden
dwetype 0.073***
(0.017)
tap 0.004** 0.004
(0.002) (0.004)
well 0.044*** -0.001
(0.013) (0.029)
children -0.006 -0.069**
(0.014) (0.030)
elder 0.004 -0.056***
(0.010) (0.021)
inactive 0.022* 0.042*
(0.012) (0.025)
percbillt -0.000 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
unfairprice -0.005 -0.097***
(0.018) (0.033)
avcons6m -0.003***
(0.001)
income 0.000 0.013
(0.004) (0.009)
school 0.000 -0.014
(0.004) (0.009)
owner 0.023 0.046
(0.016) (0.033)
urban -0.008 -0.035
(0.014) (0.031)
precdev 0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.004)
maxtempdev 0.005 0.045
(0.009) (0.036)
watsummer 0.028***
(0.007)
Observations 1,461 449
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.19: Probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt outdoor
water-saving behaviours, including other variables in the literature
Variables wstank wsgarden
dwetype 1.040***
(0.223)
tap 0.060** 0.035
(0.026) (0.030)
well 0.632*** -0.011
(0.195) (0.241)
children -0.080 -0.576**
(0.205) (0.245)
elder 0.053 -0.468***
(0.136) (0.163)
inactive 0.308* 0.356*
(0.167) (0.196)
percbillt -0.002 0.025***
(0.008) (0.008)
unfairprice -0.069 -0.811***
(0.255) (0.274)
avcons6m -0.049***
(0.017)
watsummer 0.231***
(0.063)
income 0.006 0.111
(0.061) (0.076)
school 0.004 -0.118*
(0.060) (0.071)
owner 0.332 0.387
(0.230) (0.269)
urban -0.117 -0.297
(0.201) (0.259)
precdev 0.013 -0.027
(0.019) (0.030)
maxtempdev 0.078 0.379
(0.131) (0.300)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.20: Probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt outdoor
water-saving behaviours, including other variables in the literature (continued)
Variables wstank wsgarden
Municipality 1 (reference) - -
2.municipality -0.173 -1.391
(0.487) (1.150)
3.municipality 0.127 -1.091**
(0.450) (0.511)
4.municipality 0.297 0.607
(0.374) (0.556)
5.municipality 0.795* -0.513
(0.442) (1.084)
6.municipality 0.204 0.023
(0.456) (0.570)
7.municipality 0.356 -1.078
(0.454) (1.138)
8.municipality 0.298 -1.241*
(0.369) (0.662)
9.municipality 1.003** -0.083
(0.504) (0.537)
10.municipality -0.085 0.096
(0.431) (0.603)
11.municipality 0.042 0.000
(0.419) (0.000)
12o.municipality 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
13o.municipality 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -3.414*** 1.263
(0.755) (0.776)
Observations 1,461 449
χ2 131.9 102.3
p-value 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.320 0.314
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.21: Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt outdoor water-saving
behaviours without sampling weights
Variables wstank wsgarden
dwetype 0.107***
(0.020)
tap 0.005*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.004)
well 0.063*** 0.016
(0.014) (0.030)
children -0.000 -0.053*
(0.013) (0.031)
elder 0.006 -0.028
(0.008) (0.019)
inactive 0.019* 0.032
(0.011) (0.025)
percbillt 0.000 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
unfairprice -0.022 -0.096***
(0.017) (0.034)
avcons6m -0.003***
(0.001)
watsummer 0.017***
(0.006)
Observations 1,609 502
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.22: Probit models estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt outdoor
water-saving behaviours without sampling weights
Variables wstank wsgarden
dwetype 1.125***
(0.198)
tap 0.048*** 0.071***
(0.018) (0.026)
well 0.666*** 0.102
(0.144) (0.198)
children -0.001 -0.344*
(0.138) (0.195)
elder 0.060 -0.182
(0.080) (0.122)
inactive 0.201* 0.205
(0.113) (0.160)
percbillt 0.002 0.016*
(0.006) (0.008)
unfairprice -0.233 -0.625***
(0.178) (0.220)
avcons6m -0.036***
(0.012)
watsummer 0.109***
(0.040)
Municipality 1 (reference) - -
2.municipality -0.116 -0.363
(0.339) (0.353)
3.municipality 0.068 0.361
(0.295) (0.433)
4.municipality 0.145 0.432
(0.316) (0.443)
5.municipality 0.800*** 0.223
(0.303) (0.417)
6.municipality 0.020 1.157***
(0.248) (0.420)
7.municipality 0.583** -0.024
(0.277) (0.333)
8.municipality 0.197 0.243
(0.249) (0.312)
9.municipality 0.788** 0.795
(0.348) (0.496)
10.municipality -0.194 1.113**
(0.279) (0.503)
11.municipality -0.205 0.924*
(0.290) (0.475)
12.municipality 0.104 0.000
(0.294) (0.000)
13.municipality -0.260 0.263
(0.261) (0.268)
Constant -2.812*** -0.056
(0.286) (0.395)
Observations 1,609 502
χ2 159.5 53.21
p-value 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.255 0.183
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.23: Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours with sampling weights
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
inastudent 0.861***
(0.247)
aavprice -0.017**
(0.007)
wshortage 0.405**
(0.190)
unfairprice -0.473***
(0.160)
expenscarce -0.158***
(0.056)
loss -0.148***
(0.055)
referenceprice 0.685**
(0.318)
referencebill 0.419**
(0.167)
knowIBR 0.302** 0.257***
(0.123) (0.094)
employed -0.152***
(0.048)
p56education -0.739***
(0.157)
heducation -0.359***
(0.096)
dettot 0.260***
(0.091)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.24: Final Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours with sampling weights (continued)
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
dishwach -0.258***
(0.084)
hpayers -0.274***
(0.101)
male -0.287***
(0.080)
p16education 0.342***
(0.090)
meter 0.383***
(0.099)
refblockprice 0.485***
(0.130)
aavcons -0.016**
(0.007)
Municipality 1 (reference) - - -
2.municipality 0.092 -0.093 0.143
(0.202) (0.154) (0.131)
3.municipality 0.056 -0.208 -0.445**
(0.267) (0.178) (0.177)
4.municipality 0.337 -0.501*** -0.166
(0.251) (0.140) (0.147)
5.municipality 0.271 0.136 -0.189
(0.403) (0.290) (0.206)
6.municipality 0.037 0.320* -0.201
(0.239) (0.181) (0.156)
7.municipality -0.235 0.118 -0.006
(0.194) (0.154) (0.134)
8.municipality -0.096 0.006 -0.017
(0.184) (0.154) (0.130)
9.municipality 0.081 -0.035 0.124
(0.301) (0.237) (0.205)
10.municipality 0.164 -0.357** -0.024
(0.206) (0.143) (0.133)
11.municipality 0.378* -0.400*** 0.107
(0.202) (0.128) (0.118)
12.municipality 0.438* -0.049 0.326**
(0.238) (0.148) (0.135)
13.municipality 0.120 0.151 -0.093
(0.212) (0.161) (0.143)
Constant 1.437*** 1.565*** -0.056
(0.249) (0.168) (0.155)
Observations 1,761 1,927 2,037
χ2 92.03 114.2 110.6
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.092 0.064
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.25: Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt indoor water-saving
behaviours, encompassing all variables with sampling weights
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
inastudent 0.087*** 0.088 -0.051
(0.033) (0.061) (0.068)
aavprice -0.002** -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
wshortage 0.045* 0.034 0.045
(0.023) (0.033) (0.037)
unfairprice -0.061*** -0.005 -0.044
(0.019) (0.041) (0.042)
expenscarce -0.022*** 0.029** -0.015
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
loss -0.017** -0.019 -0.003
(0.007) (0.014) (0.014)
referenceprice 0.083* 0.101 -0.008
(0.047) (0.062) (0.065)
referencebill 0.052** -0.064 0.012
(0.022) (0.049) (0.052)
knowIBR 0.042** 0.084*** 0.003
(0.017) (0.029) (0.031)
employed -0.006 -0.036** 0.007
(0.009) (0.016) (0.017)
p56education -0.026 -0.214** -0.031
(0.026) (0.087) (0.062)
heducation -0.012 -0.087*** 0.006
(0.019) (0.030) (0.035)
dettot 0.006 0.084*** 0.004
(0.016) (0.028) (0.031)
dishwach 0.008 -0.031 -0.090***
(0.018) (0.031) (0.032)
hpayers -0.013 -0.069* -0.115***
(0.021) (0.039) (0.039)
male -0.004 0.035 -0.084***
(0.015) (0.028) (0.030)
p16education -0.051** 0.100 0.100*
(0.024) (0.068) (0.054)
meter 0.009 0.006 0.134***
(0.019) (0.036) (0.036)
refblockprice -0.027 -0.048 0.156***
(0.040) (0.049) (0.057)
aavcons 0.000 -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 1,550 1,615 1,660
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.26: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours, encompassing all variables with sampling weights
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
inastudent 0.756*** 0.302 -0.151
(0.276) (0.210) (0.203)
aavprice -0.017** -0.001 -0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
wshortage 0.394* 0.119 0.134
(0.208) (0.115) (0.109)
unfairprice -0.532*** -0.016 -0.130
(0.168) (0.141) (0.126)
expenscarce -0.188*** 0.099** -0.043
(0.061) (0.043) (0.037)
loss -0.149** -0.064 -0.008
(0.061) (0.048) (0.043)
referenceprice 0.719* 0.349 -0.024
(0.399) (0.216) (0.194)
referencebill 0.453** -0.221 0.037
(0.196) (0.171) (0.155)
knowIBR 0.365*** 0.289*** 0.009
(0.138) (0.102) (0.093)
employed -0.055 -0.123** 0.021
(0.078) (0.054) (0.051)
p56education -0.230 -0.737** -0.093
(0.226) (0.300) (0.185)
heducation -0.100 -0.301*** 0.016
(0.160) (0.106) (0.104)
dettot 0.050 0.290*** 0.013
(0.139) (0.098) (0.093)
dishwach 0.066 -0.107 -0.268***
(0.159) (0.107) (0.097)
hpayers -0.116 -0.237* -0.343***
(0.180) (0.134) (0.118)
male -0.031 0.122 -0.249***
(0.132) (0.096) (0.091)
p16education -0.444** 0.343 0.296*
(0.209) (0.236) (0.162)
meter 0.075 0.020 0.399***
(0.160) (0.124) (0.109)
refblockprice -0.238 -0.167 0.464***
(0.346) (0.169) (0.171)
aavcons 0.000 -0.026*** -0.022***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.27: Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours, encompassing all variables with sampling weights (continued)
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
Municipality 1 (reference) - - -
2.municipality 0.032 -0.147 0.138
(0.229) (0.167) (0.151)
3.municipality -0.107 -0.201 -0.440**
(0.277) (0.191) (0.193)
4.municipality 0.358 -0.465*** -0.330*
(0.312) (0.168) (0.181)
5.municipality 0.462 -0.026 -0.258
(0.531) (0.335) (0.248)
6.municipality 0.038 0.079 -0.283
(0.266) (0.206) (0.175)
7.municipality -0.249 -0.059 0.044
(0.208) (0.175) (0.154)
8.municipality -0.090 -0.032 0.032
(0.197) (0.168) (0.145)
9.municipality 0.124 -0.075 -0.040
(0.354) (0.251) (0.237)
10.municipality 0.157 -0.228 0.017
(0.220) (0.158) (0.149)
11.municipality 0.298 -0.421*** 0.104
(0.209) (0.139) (0.130)
12.municipality 0.344 -0.034 0.176
(0.293) (0.173) (0.158)
13.municipality 0.074 -0.009 -0.058
(0.255) (0.190) (0.166)
Constant 1.994*** 1.882*** 0.199
(0.413) (0.405) (0.310)
Observations 1,550 1,615 1,660
χ2 109.7 129.7 105.2
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.161 0.121 0.071
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.28: Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt indoor water-saving
behaviours, encompassing all variables without sampling weights
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
inastudent 0.085*** -0.012 -0.030
(0.029) (0.047) (0.050)
aavprice -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
wshortage 0.044** 0.028 0.023
(0.017) (0.024) (0.027)
unfairprice -0.058*** 0.009 -0.039
(0.016) (0.029) (0.032)
expenscarce -0.018*** 0.023** 0.001
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
loss -0.014** 0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
referenceprice 0.084* 0.071 0.005
(0.044) (0.047) (0.050)
referencebill 0.043** -0.062 -0.015
(0.019) (0.038) (0.039)
knowIBR 0.023* 0.056** 0.009
(0.014) (0.022) (0.024)
employed 0.001 -0.031*** -0.016
(0.007) (0.012) (0.014)
p56education 0.005 -0.149*** -0.041
(0.024) (0.056) (0.047)
heducation 0.003 -0.061*** -0.018
(0.015) (0.022) (0.027)
dettot 0.012 0.065*** 0.033
(0.013) (0.021) (0.023)
dishwach 0.019 0.003 -0.037
(0.014) (0.023) (0.025)
hpayers 0.000 -0.071** -0.086***
(0.018) (0.029) (0.030)
male -0.018 0.020 -0.112***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.022)
p16education -0.023 0.093** 0.082*
(0.022) (0.044) (0.042)
meter -0.001 0.012 0.071**
(0.016) (0.027) (0.028)
refblockprice 0.007 0.007 0.082*
(0.031) (0.040) (0.045)
aavcons -0.001 -0.006*** -0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1,550 1,615 1,660
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.29: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours, encompassing all variables without sampling weights
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
inastudent 0.688*** -0.043 -0.092
(0.228) (0.166) (0.151)
aavprice -0.018*** -0.000 -0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
wshortage 0.356** 0.100 0.070
(0.139) (0.086) (0.082)
unfairprice -0.469*** 0.031 -0.118
(0.132) (0.102) (0.096)
expenscarce -0.148*** 0.082** 0.003
(0.042) (0.032) (0.029)
loss -0.117** 0.002 -0.007
(0.049) (0.036) (0.033)
referenceprice 0.680* 0.252 0.016
(0.355) (0.169) (0.150)
referencebill 0.349** -0.222 -0.045
(0.157) (0.137) (0.118)
knowIBR 0.184* 0.197** 0.026
(0.111) (0.077) (0.072)
employed 0.008 -0.109*** -0.048
(0.061) (0.042) (0.041)
p56education 0.037 -0.529*** -0.124
(0.198) (0.198) (0.142)
heducation 0.027 -0.218*** -0.054
(0.126) (0.080) (0.080)
dettot 0.096 0.229*** 0.098
(0.103) (0.075) (0.070)
dishwach 0.151 0.011 -0.111
(0.117) (0.082) (0.075)
hpayers 0.001 -0.252** -0.259***
(0.148) (0.103) (0.091)
male -0.146 0.072 -0.339***
(0.105) (0.073) (0.068)
p16education -0.189 0.331** 0.248*
(0.180) (0.157) (0.128)
meter -0.008 0.042 0.215**
(0.132) (0.096) (0.085)
refblockprice 0.059 0.023 0.246*
(0.250) (0.142) (0.135)
aavcons -0.005 -0.020*** -0.011*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.30: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt indoor
water-saving behaviours, encompassing all variables without sampling weights (continued)
Variables wsfullload wssoap runwat
Municipality 1 (reference) - - -
2.municipality 0.063 -0.116 0.127
(0.215) (0.158) (0.146)
3.municipality -0.096 -0.183 -0.430**
(0.266) (0.183) (0.190)
4.municipality 0.374 -0.486*** -0.385**
(0.296) (0.161) (0.172)
5.municipality 0.561 0.083 -0.263
(0.506) (0.305) (0.243)
6.municipality 0.071 0.179 -0.225
(0.238) (0.193) (0.168)
7.municipality -0.273 -0.033 0.040
(0.198) (0.165) (0.148)
8.municipality -0.023 -0.005 0.047
(0.182) (0.159) (0.140)
9.municipality 0.127 -0.043 -0.084
(0.339) (0.245) (0.232)
10.municipality 0.197 -0.223 -0.010
(0.212) (0.151) (0.144)
11.municipality 0.304 -0.385*** 0.173
(0.204) (0.133) (0.128)
12.municipality 0.353 -0.017 0.160
(0.280) (0.165) (0.152)
13.municipality 0.125 0.027 0.023
(0.246) (0.180) (0.158)
Constant 1.486*** 1.557*** 0.104
(0.355) (0.299) (0.249)
Observations 1,550 1,615 1,660
χ2 109.9 141.1 108.6
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.099 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.31: Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern
billing standards with sampling weights
Variables ddebit ebill2012
p19education -0.498*** -0.641***
(0.081) (0.143)
owner 0.937*** 0.424**
(0.102) (0.180)
hsize -0.086***
(0.031)
urban 0.312***
(0.099)
aavprice 0.012***
(0.004)
unfairprice -0.207*
(0.110)
meter -0.238** 0.268*
(0.096) (0.150)
Municipality 1 (reference) - -
2.municipality 0.350*** -
(0.133)
3.municipality 0.454*** -
(0.175)
4.municipality 0.206 -
(0.138)
5.municipality 0.439** -
(0.221)
6.municipality -0.008 -
(0.166)
7.municipality 0.105 -0.068
(0.139) (0.213)
8.municipality 0.069 0.017
(0.129) (0.199)
9.municipality 0.320 -0.583
(0.212) (0.435)
10.municipality 0.074 -
(0.133)
11.municipality -0.284** -0.008
(0.125) (0.181)
12.municipality 0.249* 0.033
(0.133) (0.190)
13.municipality 0.214 0.135
(0.139) (0.195)
Constant -0.645*** -1.767***
(0.172) (0.219)
Observations 1,989 1,306
chi2 192.3 37.43
p-value 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.073
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.32: Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt modern billing standards,
encompassing all variables without sampling weights
Variables ddebit ebill2012
p19education -0.183*** -0.066***
(0.020) (0.016)
owner 0.273*** 0.023
(0.026) (0.018)
hsize -0.025*** 0.002
(0.009) (0.005)
urban 0.093*** -0.013
(0.030) (0.017)
aavprice 0.004*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
unfairprice -0.048 -0.008
(0.031) (0.019)
meter -0.054** 0.048***
(0.027) (0.015)
Observations 1,989 1,229
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.33: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern billing
standards, encompassing all variables without sampling weights
Variables ddebit ebill2012
p19education -0.508*** -0.562***
(0.060) (0.130)
owner 0.759*** 0.200
(0.078) (0.156)
hsize -0.069*** 0.016
(0.024) (0.040)
urban 0.258*** -0.108
(0.083) (0.147)
aavprice 0.012*** -0.002
(0.004) (0.006)
unfairprice -0.135 -0.066
(0.085) (0.165)
meter -0.151** 0.407***
(0.076) (0.126)
Municipality 1 (reference) - -
2.municipality 0.367*** -
(0.130)
3.municipality 0.429** -
(0.169)
4.municipality 0.222 -
(0.135)
5.municipality 0.425** -
(0.212)
6.municipality -0.029 -
(0.159)
7.municipality 0.107 -0.038
(0.134) (0.216)
8.municipality 0.067 -0.012
(0.126) (0.197)
9.municipality 0.309 -0.606
(0.209) (0.433)
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.34: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern billing
standards, encompassing all variables without sampling weights (continued)
Variables ddebit ebill2012
10.municipality 0.071 -
(0.130)
11.municipality -0.291** 0.007
(0.121) (0.183)
12.municipality 0.234* 0.033
(0.129) (0.191)
13.municipality 0.201 0.021
(0.135) (0.205)
Constant -0.525*** -1.553***
(0.145) (0.258)
Observations 1,989 1,229
chi2 229.9 34.77
p-value 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.061
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
Tab. B.35: Average marginal effects on the probability to adopt modern billing standards,
encompassing all variables
Variables ddebit ebill2012
p19education -0.171*** -0.075***
(0.026) (0.019)
owner 0.322*** 0.047**
(0.031) (0.022)
hsize -0.029*** -0.000
(0.010) (0.006)
urban 0.107*** -0.014
(0.034) (0.017)
aavprice 0.004*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
unfairprice -0.071* 0.007
(0.038) (0.023)
meter -0.082** 0.030*
(0.033) (0.017)
Observations 1,989 1,229
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.36: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern billing
standards, encompassing all variables
Variables ddebit ebill2012
p19education -0.498*** -0.657***
(0.081) (0.148)
owner 0.937*** 0.409**
(0.102) (0.183)
hsize -0.086*** -0.003
(0.031) (0.051)
urban 0.312*** -0.124
(0.099) (0.151)
aavprice 0.012*** -0.002
(0.004) (0.006)
unfairprice -0.207* 0.061
(0.110) (0.199)
meter -0.238** 0.268*
(0.096) (0.150)
Municipality 1 (reference) - -
2.municipality 0.350*** -
(0.133)
3.municipality 0.454*** -
(0.175)
4.municipality 0.206 -
(0.138)
5.municipality 0.439** -
(0.221)
6.municipality -0.008 -
(0.166)
7.municipality 0.105 -0.020
(0.139) (0.219)
8.municipality 0.069 0.034
(0.129) (0.202)
9.municipality 0.320 -0.645
(0.212) (0.423)
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.37: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to adopt modern billing
standards, encompassing all variables (continued)
Variables ddebit ebill2012
10.municipality 0.074 -
(0.133)
11.municipality -0.284** 0.033
(0.125) (0.187)
12.municipality 0.249* 0.057
(0.133) (0.196)
13.municipality 0.214 0.102
(0.139) (0.211)
Constant -0.645*** -1.650***
(0.172) (0.287)
Observations 1,989 1,229
chi2 192.3 38.48
p-value 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.074
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
188 B. Appendix - Water consumer behaviours and perceptions
Tab. B.38: Final probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to drink tap water,
comparison without and with sampling weights
drinktap drinktap
Variables (without sampling weights) (with sampling weights)
avpmun -0.153*** -0.152***
(0.058) (0.059)
avvioqual -0.273*** -0.272***
(0.052) (0.052)
unemployed 0.250*** 0.237***
(0.058) (0.077)
mainresidence -0.275*** -0.222*
(0.091) (0.121)
fair 0.048* 0.061*
(0.026) (0.034)
urban 0.160* 0.150
(0.083) (0.096)
Municipality 1 (reference) - -
2.municipality -1.129*** -1.107***
(0.163) (0.165)
3.municipality -1.456*** -1.458***
(0.213) (0.217)
4.municipality -1.820*** -1.817***
(0.184) (0.185)
5.municipality 0.486* 0.477*
(0.250) (0.254)
6.municipality 1.547*** 1.540***
(0.215) (0.217)
7.municipality -0.938*** -0.929***
(0.208) (0.208)
8.municipality -0.786*** -0.787***
(0.116) (0.116)
9.municipality -0.578*** -0.572***
(0.197) (0.197)
10.municipality -0.772*** -0.774***
(0.128) (0.129)
11.municipality -0.025 -0.017
(0.193) (0.193)
12o.municipality 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
13o.municipality 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.514*** 1.427***
(0.287) (0.306)
Observations 2,044 2,044
chi2 249.0 235.0
p-value 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.078
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.39: Average marginal effects on the probability to drink tap water, including other
relevant variables in the literature
drinktap drinktap
Variables (without sampling weights) (with sampling weights)
avpmun -0.047** -0.048**
(0.022) (0.023)
avvioqual -0.102*** -0.106***
(0.021) (0.023)
unemployed 0.084*** 0.063*
(0.026) (0.035)
mainresidence -0.114*** -0.091*
(0.034) (0.047)
fair 0.023** 0.027**
(0.009) (0.013)
urban 0.057* 0.056
(0.031) (0.037)
incfitted -0.006 -0.031
(0.025) (0.034)
hsize 0.014 0.020
(0.015) (0.019)
children -0.006 -0.026
(0.031) (0.042)
school 0.012 0.012
(0.013) (0.017)
owner 0.045 0.100**
(0.031) (0.041)
carown -0.098*** -0.078
(0.035) (0.049)
Observations 1,854 1,854
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
190 B. Appendix - Water consumer behaviours and perceptions
Tab. B.40: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to drink tap water,
including other relevant variables in the literature
drinktap drinktap
Variables (without sampling weights) (with sampling weights)
avpmun -0.134** -0.134**
(0.063) (0.064)
avvioqual -0.293*** -0.293***
(0.062) (0.063)
unemployed 0.241*** 0.175*
(0.074) (0.099)
mainresidence -0.327*** -0.252*
(0.098) (0.132)
fair 0.065** 0.073**
(0.027) (0.035)
urban 0.162* 0.154
(0.088) (0.102)
incfitted -0.018 -0.085
(0.073) (0.095)
hsize 0.041 0.056
(0.042) (0.053)
children -0.018 -0.071
(0.089) (0.117)
school 0.033 0.033
(0.037) (0.048)
owner 0.128 0.276**
(0.088) (0.114)
carown -0.280*** -0.215
(0.102) (0.135)
Municipality 1 (reference) - -
2.municipality -1.210*** -1.203***
(0.179) (0.181)
3.municipality -1.431*** -1.458***
(0.226) (0.234)
4.municipality -1.763*** -1.768***
(0.203) (0.205)
5.municipality 0.648** 0.579**
(0.282) (0.289)
6.municipality 1.527*** 1.488***
(0.237) (0.241)
7.municipality -1.005*** -0.999***
(0.235) (0.238)
8.municipality -0.775*** -0.800***
(0.121) (0.123)
9.municipality -0.611*** -0.610***
(0.203) (0.206)
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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Tab. B.41: Probit model estimated coefficients on the probability to drink tap water,
including other relevant variables in the literature (continued)
drinktap drinktap
Variables (without sampling weights) (with sampling weights)
10.municipality -0.748*** -0.765***
(0.133) (0.136)
11.municipality -0.075 -0.058
(0.215) (0.218)
12o.municipality 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
13o.municipality 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.443*** 1.379***
(0.345) (0.394)
Observations 1,854 1,854
chi2 242.1 223.0
p-value 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.088
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s computations using Stata 12.1
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C.1 Sign of the difference term with decreasing and increasing
block rates
Considering that FC, p1i, p1i+1 and x1i are non-negative by definition, with decreasing
block rates we have dk < 0 because −FC ≤ 0 and −
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i < 0 since
p1i > p1i+1 ≡ p1i − p1i+1 > 0 reflecting that higher blocks have smaller prices
due to the decreasing rate structure. With IBR dk S 0 since −FC ≤ 0 but
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i < 0, dk will depend on the relation −FC S
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i.
Therefore, dk =

> 0 −FC >
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i
= 0 −FC =
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i
< 0 −FC <
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i
.
Finally, with an uniform block rate dk ≤ 0 since the only relevant term is
−FC ≤ 0. Assuming that the block’s price are always different within a decreasing
block rate and IBR structures. With decreasing block rates we have dk < 0 because
−
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i < 0 and with IBR dk > 0 −
k−1∑
i=1
(p1i − p1i+1)x1i > 0. Trivially,
with an uniform block rate we have dk = 0 since the FC = 0. Assuming that the
block’s price are always different within a decreasing block rates and IBR structures.
C.2 Generalized Slutsky Equation
Suppose that we are analyzing the decrease in the price of the second block ( p12),
according to the literature (Olmstead et al., 2007; Moffitt, 1986) the change in p12
has no effect on the first block’s consumption. We state that due to gain and loss
terms this is will be true only if the reference price is not connect directly or indirectly
to p12. For illustration purposes, consider the three reference prices60 we analyse, in
the case of consumption on the first block x∗11.
The first case, if the reference price is the price of first block ( p1r = p11) the
unit loss will be zero (l1 = 0), as well as the unit gain (g1 = 0)61. Trivially, there is
no price reference effects. In the second case, if the reference price is the price of
second block (p1r = p12), thus the unit loss will be zero (l1 = 0), but the unit gain
will be difference between p12 and p12 representing the gain effect (g1 = p12 − p11)62.
60. Recall the three different reference prices suggested: i) p1r = p11, ii) p1r = p12, and iii)
p1r = p11+p122 .
61. Recall that unit loss is lk = I(p1k − p1r), and the unit gain as gk = (1− I) (p1r − p1k), where
p1r is the reference price. In this first case, l1 = 0(p11 − p11) = 0 and g1 = (1− 0) (p11 − p11) = 0.
62. In this case the reference point is the price of the second block, thus l1 = 0(p11 − p12) = 0 and
g1 = (1− 0) (p12 − p11) = (p12 − p11).
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Tab. C.1: Summary of the unit gain and unit loss for two-block IBR
Reference prices \ gain and loss effects l1 g1 l2 g2
Case 1 (p1r = p11) 0 0 p12 − p11 0
Case 2 (p1r = p12) 0 p12 − p11 0 0
Case 3 (p1r = p11+p122 ) 0
1
2(p12 − p11) 0
Therefore, this suggest that change in p12 affects the consumption on the first block.
The third case assumes the average price between the two blocks (p1r = p11+p122 ), in
this sense it is expected that the gain effect will also affect the consumption on the
first block. Since the unit loss will be zero again (l1 = 0), but the unit gain will be
difference between the average price and price on the first block which will be given
by the gain term g1 = 12(p12 − p11)63.
Again by way of illustration, consider the three reference prices now in the
case of consumption on the second block x∗12. When the reference price is the price
of first block ( p1r = p11) the unit loss will be the difference between prices of the
second block and first block (l2 = p12 − p11), which will affect the consumption on
second block, with no unit gain effects (g2 = 0). In the second case, if the reference
price is the price of first block (p1r = p12), thus both the unit loss and unit gain will
be zero (l2 = 0, g2 = 0). Trivially, there is no price reference effects if the reference
price is the price of the second block and consumption occurs on this same block.
The third case assumes the average price between the first and the second block
(p1r = p11+p122 ), thus is expected that the loss effect will also affect the consumption
on the second block. The unit loss will be l2 = 12(p12 − p11), but the unit gain will
be zero (g2 = 0). The results are summarized on Table C.1.
The effect of own-price changes can be expressed by a generalized Slutsky
Equation with the typical substitution and income effects (SE and IE, respectively)
plus a gain/loss effect (GLE), with respect to the reference price (Putler, 1992).
∂x1
∂p1k
= ∂h1
∂p1k︸ ︷︷ ︸−x1
∂x1
∂M︸ ︷︷ ︸+
[
(1− I)∂M
∂gk
− I ∂M
∂lk
]
∂x1
∂M︸ ︷︷ ︸
SE IE GLE
(C.1)
Assume for simplicity that x1 = x1(p1k, lk, gk,M + dk) is Marshallian demand
function and h1 = h1(p1k, lk, gk, e(p1k, U) is Hicksian demand function, given price
p1k, lk and gk that denotes the typical loss and gain terms, virtual income (income
plus difference term) M + dk , and expenditure function given price and utility level,
e(p1k, U). Additionally, I is the binary variable takes the value one if the price of
the block is higher than the reference price and zero otherwise, as already stated.
63. In the case of the average price as a reference price, l1 = 0(p11 − p11+p122 ) = 0 and g1 =
(1− 0) ( p11+p122 − p11) = 12 (p12 − p11).
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The partial derivative of the Marshallian demand function or own-price elasticity
may be affected by both the price of the block and the reference price:
∂x1
∂p1k
= ∂x1
∂p1k
+ x1
∂x1
∂M
− (1− I)∂x1
∂gk
+ I ∂x1
∂lk
(C.2)
Notice that this expression allows that own-price demand elasticity will be
equal to conventional demand theory, if there no reference price loss/gain effects.
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D. APPENDIX - PORTUGUESE HOUSEHOLD WATER CONSUMPTION
SURVEY (PORTUGUESE VERSION)

Default Question Block
  
Nome do Inquiridor 
  
Entidade Gestora 
  
Nº Identificação Cliente 
COMECE AQUI O INQUÉRITO 
Este questionário tem como objectivo a recolha de dados sobre a gestão e conservação de água para serem utilizados 
num projecto de investigação liderado pelo ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa em parceria com a Entidade 
Reguladora dos Serviços de Água e Resíduos e a ....(refira o nome da Entidade Gestora). O ISCTE-IUL garante o total 
anonimato deste inquérito e a confidencialidade dos dados recolhidos. 
A duração do questionário é de 10 minutos. 
Tem 16 anos ou mais? 
Sim
Não. (Termine o inquérito aqui. Agradeça a colaboração e desligue o telefone)
Reside há mais de 1 ano na sua habitação? 
Sim
Não. (Termine o inquérito aqui. Agradeça a colaboração e desligue o telefone)
Género: 
  
(Não leia esta pergunta) 
Masculino
Feminino
Não Sei/ Não Responde
 Freguesia: 
Freguesia
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
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É o(a) proprietário(a) deste alojamento? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
Este alojamento é a sua residência principal?      
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
Tem responsabilidade no pagamento da factura da água deste alojamento? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
A.1. Com que frequência costuma tomar conhecimento da informação presente nas facturas da água? 
  
(Leia as opções de resposta ao consumidor) 
Nunca
Raramente
Às vezes
Quase Sempre
Sempre
Não Sei/ Não Responde
(Se o consumidor respondeu “Nunca” passar para pergunta 1.1., se respondeu “Sempre” passar à pergunta A.3.) 
A.2. Quando obteve a informação da factura, isso deveu-se a um aumento ou diminuição do montante a pagar? 
Sim. Aumento
Sim. Diminuição
Não.
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
A.3. Costuma ter conhecimento do valor a pagar ou do detalhe da factura? 
Valor a pagar
Detalhe
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Não Sei/ Não Responde
1. Caracterização do agregado familiar 
1.1. Quantas pessoas compõem o agregado familiar? 
nº de pessoas
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
1.2. Quantas pessoas do agregado familiar têm 65 anos ou mais? 
nº pessoas
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
1.3. Quantas pessoas do agregado familiar são menores de 18 anos? 
nº pessoas
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
1.4. Quantas pessoas do agregado familiar contribuem para o pagamento da despesa da água e saneamento? 
nº pessoas
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
1.5. Quantos anos de escolaridade completos tem? 
  
(NÃO leia as opções de resposta!) 
Não sabe ler/escrever (0 anos)
1º ciclo (1 a 4 anos)
2º ciclo (5 a 6 anos)
3º ciclo (7 a 9 anos)
Ensino Secundário (10 a 12 anos)
Licenciatura/ Bacharelato (13 a 15 anos)
Mestrado (16 a 17 anos)
Doutoramento (mais de 17 anos)
Não Sei/ Não Responde
1.6. Dos elementos que constituem o agregado familiar, quantos são: 
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(Leia cada uma das opções de resposta) 
Profissionais Activos
 
Estudantes
 
Desempregado(a)s
 
Reformado(a)s/ Aposentado(a)s
 
Outros Inactivos (Ex.:Domestica(o)s, menores de 6 anos, ...)
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
1.7. Indique em qual das opções se encontra o rendimento líquido mensal do seu agregado familiar. 
  
(Leia as opções de resposta ao consumidor) 
Menos de 
500 €
 
Entre 501€ e 
1000€
 
Entre 1001€ 
e 1500€
 
Entre 1501€ 
e 2000€
 
Entre 2001€ 
e 2500€
 
Entre 2501€ 
e 3000€
 
Entre 3001€ 
e 3500€
 
Mais de 
3500€
 
Não Sei/ Não 
Responde
 
         
2. Caracterização do alojamento 
2.1. O alojamento em que reside é: 
Moradia
 
Apartamento
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
 
   
2.2. Quais os elementos que fazem parte do seu alojamento: 
a) Tem piscina? 
  
(Exclua qualquer tipo de piscinas insufláveis.) 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
b) Possui Tanques ou Depósitos para captação da água da chuva? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
b1) Utiliza outro método de captação da água da chuva? 
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Sim. Qual?
 
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
2.2.1. Tem Jardim/ Quintal/ Horta ? 
Sim, Jardim.
Sim, Quintal.
Sim, Horta.
Não. (Passe à pergunta 2.2.4)
Não Sei/ Não Responde. (Passe à pergunta 2.2.4)
2.2.1.1. Em média, quantas vezes por semana os rega? 
Nº de vezes Primavera/ Verão (ler esta opção de resposta)
 
Frequência de rega inferior a uma vez por semana Pri/Ver (ex: 1 vez por mês)
Nº de vezes Outono/Inverno (ler esta opção de resposta)
 
Frequência de rega inferior a uma vez por semana Out/Inv (ex: 1 vez por mês)
Não Sei/ Não Responde
2.2.2. Rega o jardim/quintal/horta de manhã/noite para evitar a evaporação? 
Sim
 
Não
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
 
   
2.2.3. Utiliza água da rede para as regas? 
Sim
 
Não
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
 
   
2.2.4. Utiliza algum método de poupança de água, na descarga do autoclismo, por ex. uma garrafa de água? 
Sim
Não
Outro método
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
2.2.5. Tem carro? 
Sim.
Não (Passe à pergunta 2.3)
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Não Sei/ Não Responde (Passe à pergunta 2.3)
2.2.5.1 Se possui automóvel, costuma lavá-lo com água da rede? 
Com: 
Sim,
Balde e Esponja
Mangueira
Outros
 
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
2.3. Tendo em conta o seu alojamento, indique o nº de:
nº Não Sei/ Não Responde  
Answer 1 Não Sei/ Não Responde
Polibãs  
Banheiras  
Nº Total de 
Torneiras  
Torneiras 
com redutor 
de caudal
 
Máquinas 
de Lavar 
Roupa
 
Maquinas 
de Lavar 
Louça
 
Autoclismos 
de 
descarga 
simples
 
Autoclismos 
de 
descarga 
dupla
 
3. Hábitos de consumo 
3.1. Costuma tomar duche ou banho de imersão? 
Duche
Banho Imersão. (Passe à pergunta 3.3)
Não Sei/ Não Responde
3.2. Fecha a torneira do duche enquanto se ensaboa? 
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Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
3.3. Aproveita a água do duche/ banho que corre enquanto aquece? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
3.4. A sua residência possui alternativas ao abastecimento de água pela rede? 
Sim. Qual?
 
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
3.5. Fecha a torneira enquanto escova os dentes? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
3.6. Sempre que possível, utiliza as máquinas de lavar com carga completa? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
3.7. Bebe preferencialmente água da torneira? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
 4. Dados relativos à facturação 
4.1. Tem por hábito comunicar a leitura do consumo? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
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 4.2. Faz o pagamento por débito em conta? 
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
4.3. Recebe a factura da água em formato electrónico (em vez de ser pelo correio)?       
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
4.4. Quantos são os escalões do seu tarifário de abastecimento de água? 
Nº de Escalões
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
 4.5. Conhece o preço por metro cúbico de água associado a cada escalão?     
Sim
Não
Não Sei/ Não Responde
4.6. Qual o preço médio aproximado que paga por cada metro cúbico de água? 
Euros
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
4.7. Indique se no tarifário praticado o preço é: 
Uniforme (sempre igual)
 
Crescente (aumenta à 
medida que aumenta o 
consumo)
 
Decrescente (diminui à 
medida que aumenta o 
consumo)
 
Mistos
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
 
     
  4.8. Em média, quantos metros cúbicos de água consome mensalmente o seu agregado? 
(Escreva a resposta)
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
  4.9. De quanto é que foi a sua última factura da água mensal? 
Euros
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Não Sei/ Não Responde
4.10. No último ano registou alguma interrupção no fornecimento de água por indisponibilidade do serviço? 
Não
Sim. Em que mês/meses?
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
4.11. No último ano identificou perdas ou fugas de água no interior da sua habitação? 
Não
Sim. Em que mês/meses?
 
Não Sei/ Não Responde
4.12. Mencione qual (quais) as componentes que considera serem cobradas na sua factura de água: 
  
(Leia as opções de resposta ao consumidor) 
    
 
Sim Não Não Sei/ Não Responde 
Água    
Taxa de Recursos Hídricos    
Águas Residuais 
(Saneamento)     
Resíduos Sólidos     
IVA (Imposto sobre o Valor 
Acrescentado)     
Outra. Indique qual? 
 
    
5. Opiniões sobre sustentabilidade ambiental e financeira. 
Numa escala de 1 a 5 em que o nº 1 significa “Discordo Totalmente” e o 5 “Concordo totalmente” indique em que medida 
concorda com as afirmações. 
    
 
Discordo 
totalmente Discordo 
Nem 
Concordo 
nem 
Discordo Concordo 
Concordo 
Totalmente 
Não Sei/ 
Não 
Responde 
a) A água existente é suficiente para 
os usos que se fazem dela.     
b) A água deveria ser mais cara para 
evitar desperdícios.     
c) A sua família consome água acima 
das suas necessidades.     
d) A água é um bem escasso.    
e) A sua família tem um consumo de 
água moderado.    
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 f) A água deve ser mais cara onde for 
mais escassa.     
g) As empresas fornecedoras de água 
devem ter receitas que permitam pagar 
os custos do serviço. 
    
h) Mesmo em situações de escassez, 
o preço da água não deveria 
aumentar. 
    
i) O preço que pago pela água é justo.     
j) O preço da água deveria ser 
aumentado caso a empresa 
fornecedora de água apresente 
prejuízo. 
    
k) As tarifas da água deveriam ser 
iguais em todo o território nacional.     
l) As tarifas cobradas por um bem 
essencial como a água são injustas.     
A sua colaboração foi muito importante neste estudo. Muito obrigado(a) pelo tempo 
dispensado!  
  
(Desligue o telefone) 
  
Sugestão / Reclamação do Cliente (CASO NÃO SE APLIQUE DEIXE EM BRANCO) 
Indique se o inquérito ficou "Completo" ou "Incompleto", caso o tenha conseguido levar o até ao fim ou não.  
Completo
Incompleto
ATENÇÃO O BOTÃO QUE SE SEGUE SUBMETE O INQUÉRITO!!! 
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E. APPENDIX - PORTUGUESE HOUSEHOLD WATER CONSUMPTION
SURVEY (ENGLISH VERSION)

213
Tab. E.1: Description of the questions in the survey and coding
Description Coding
Water utility identification number -
Costumer identification number -
Are you 16 years or more? 1:yes; 2:no
Did you live for more than 1 year in your housing? 1:yes; 2:no
Gender 1:male; 2:female
Parish 1: Parish; 2:do not know/do not answered
Are you the owner of the dwelling? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Is this dwelling your main residence 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Are you responsible for paying the water bill 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
How often are you aware of the information in the
water bill?
1: never; 2: rarely; 3: sometimes; 4: often;
5: always
When you obtained the information from the water
bill, was it due to an increase or a decrease in the
total to pay
1: yes, increase; 2: yes, decrease; 3: no; 4:
do not know/do not answered
Are you aware of the detailed information in the
water bill or just the total amount to pay?
1: total; 2: detail; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Household size 1: number of persons 2: do not know/do
not answered
Number of household members with 65 or more
years of age
1: number of persons 2: do not know/do
not answered
Number of household members under 18 years of
age
1: number of persons 2: Do not know/Do
not answered
Number of household members who contribute to
pay the water bill
1: number of persons 2: Do not know/Do
not answered
Numbers of years of schooling of the respondent 1: does not read nor right (0 years); 2: pri-
mary education (1-4 years); 3: primary ed-
ucation (5-6 years); 4: primary education
(7-9 years); 5: secondary education (10-12
years); 6: higher education - undergrad-
uate (13-15 years); 7: higher education -
master (16-17 years); 8: higher education
- PhD (more than 17 years); 9: do not
know/do not answered
Number of household members who are 1: employed; 2: students; 3: unemployed;
4: retired; 5: inactive; 6: do not know/do
not answered
Monthly net household income 1: less than €500; 2: €501-€1000; 3:
€1001-€1500; 4: €1501-€2000; 5: €2001-
€2500; 6: €2501-€3000; 7: €3001-€3500;
8: More than €3500
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Tab. E.2: Description of the questions in the survey and coding (continued)
Description Coding
Type of dwelling 1: detached or semi-detached house; 2:
apartment; 3: do not know/do not an-
swered
Does your dwelling have a pool? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Does your dwelling have a laundry tub or water
deposit/tank for rainwater harvesting?
1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you use other rainwater capture method? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you have a garden, backyard, vegetable garden? 1: yes, garden; 2: yes, backyard; 3:
yes, vegetable garden; 4: no; 5: do not
know/do not answered
How many times a week do you water your gar-
den/backyard/vegetable garden?
1: number of times on Spring/ Summer
2: water frequency less than once a week
on Spring/ Summer 3: number of times
on Fall/Winter 4: : water frequency less
than once a week on Fall/Winter 5: do not
know/do not answered
Do you water your garden, backyard, vegetable
garden in the morning or at night to avoid evapo-
ration?
1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you water your garden/backyard/vegetable gar-
den with water from the public supply network?
1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you use any water saving method to flush your
toilet?
1: yes, bottle; 2: no; 3: yes, other method
; 4: do not know/do not answered
Do you have a car? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you wash your car with water from the public
supply network?
1: yes, with: bucket and a sponge ; hose;
others; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Considering your dwelling type indicate the number
of
1: shower-baths: number do not know/do
not answered 2: bathtubs number do not
know/do not answered 3: taps number do
not know/do not answered 4: taps with
flow regulator number do not know/do not
answered 5: washing machines number do
not know/do not answered 6: dishwash-
ers? number do not know/do not answered
7: simple toilet cisterns number do not
know/do not answered 8: dual flush toi-
let cisterns number do not know/do not
answered
Do you shower or take a bath? 1: shower; 2: bath; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you close the tap while soaping in the shower? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
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Tab. E.3: Description of the questions in the survey and coding (continued)
Description Coding
Do you make use of the water that flows while you
wait for it to get warm?
1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Is there an alternative to publicly supplied water
in your house?
1: yes; which?; 2: no; 3: do not know/do
not answered
Do you close the tap while you brush your teeth? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you wash full loads, when possible? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you usually prefer to drink tap water? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
Do you usually submit the meter reading to the
water utility?
1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered Do you pay the water bill by
direct debit? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not
know/do not answered
Do you receive an electronic water bill? 1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
How many blocks are there in your water supply
tariff?
1: number of blocks 2: do not know/do
not answered
Do you know the per cubic meter price associated
with each block?
1: yes; 2: no; 3: do not know/do not
answered
What is the approximate average price you pay for
each cubic meter of water consumed?
1:euros 2: do not know/do not answered
What is your tariff structure? 1: uniform; 2: increasing; 3: decreasing; 4:
mixed; 5: do not know/do not answered
How many cubic meters of water does your house-
hold consume monthly on average?
1. cubic meters 2: do not know/do not
answered
How much was the last total amount of your water
bill?
1: euros 2: do not know/do not answered
Have you experienced any interruption in the water
supply service in the last year?
1: no; 2: yes. Which months?; 3: do not
know/do not answered
Have you experienced any water losses or leakages
in the last year?
1: no; 2: yes. Which months?; 3: do not
know/do not answered
Please identify the components that you think is
being charged on your water bill
1: water – yes, no, do not know/do not
answered; 2: water resources tax– yes, no,
do not know/do not answered; 3: sewerage
service– yes, no, do not know/do not an-
swered; 4: municipal solid waste service–
yes, no, do not know/do not answered; 5:
value-added tax– yes, no, do not know/do
not answered; 6: others. Which?
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Tab. E.4: Description of the questions in the survey and coding (continued)
Description Coding
On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means " Strongly Disagree " and 5 " strongly
agree " to indicate how much you agree with the statements
The existing water is enough for its uses 1: totally disagree; 2: disagree; 3: neither
agree nor disagree; 4: agree; 5: totally
agree; 6: do not know/do not answered
Water should be more expensive to avoid waste 1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
Your family consumes more water than it needs 1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
Water is a scarce good 1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
Your family has moderate water consumption 1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
Water should be more expensive where it is scarce 1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
Water utilities should have enough revenues to
cover the costs of providing the service
1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
Even in scarce situations water price should not
increase
1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
The price you pay for water is fair 1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
The water price should be increased if the water
utility incurs a loss
1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
Water tariffs should be equal in all the country 1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
The tariffs charged for an essential good such as
water are unfair
1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree; 6:
do not know/do not answered
